Kasus :
Satgas: Dampak Kasus Gayus Sangat Merusak
Kategori beratnya kasus ini karena bukan hanya menyangkut aparat pajak.
Minggu, 28 Maret 2010, 13:36 WIB
Heri Susanto
VIVAnews - Satuan Tugas Pemberantas Mafia Hukum mengungkapkan bahwa kasus Gayus Tambunan merupakan kasus mafia yang tergolong berat. Dampak kerusakannya juga sangat besar.
"Bayangkan, jika kasus ini dibiarkan, dampaknya akan sangat merusak," ujar
Sekretaris Satgas Mafia Hukum, Denny Indrayana saat dihubungi VIVAnews di Jakarta, Minggu, 28 Maret 2010.
Dia menekankan kategori beratnya kasus ini karena bukan hanya menyangkut aparat pajak, melainkan juga terkait dengan aparat penegak hukum lainnya, seperti kepolisian dan kejaksaan.
Di sisi lain, dampak besar dari kasus ini adalah dari sisi penerimaan negara. Padahal, penerimaan negara selama ini sebagian besar disumbang dari pajak. "Bayangkan, jika kasus ini dibiarkan terjadi," katanya.
Karena itu, kata Denny, Satgas membantu kepolisian untuk mengungkap kasus tersebut. Satgas telah menghimpun informasi sangat penting dan strategis dari Gayus Tambunan guna menginvestigasi kasus ini lebih lanjut.
Informasi itu terkait dengan mafia yang bukan sekedar melibatkan orang pajak, tetapi juga terkait dengan mafia peradilan, yakni mencakup institusi penegak hukum lainnya. "Kami sudah serahkan kepada Mabes Polri untuk ditindaklanjuti."
Anggota Satuan Tugas (Satgas), Mas Achmad Santosa mengungkapkan pengadilan pajak merupakan tempat penyelewengan yang dilakukan pegawai pajak.
Gayus Tambunan kini tengah diburu oleh Ditjen Pajak dan Kepolisian Indonesia. Gayus menjadi tersangka dugaan makelar kasus pajak karena di rekeningnya terdapat duit senilai Rp 25 miliar yang diduga berasal dari wajib pajak.
Sumber : http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/139740-satgas__dampak_kasus_gayus_sangat_merusak
Analisis :
Hasil analisis :
A. Analisa kasus :
Kasus gayus dinyatakan bukan kasus pidana perpajakan oleh dirjen pajak karena kasus ini tidak berkaitan dengan SPT wajib pajak, tetapi dalam pendapat kami, kasus ini adalah kasus perpajakan, dimana tindak kejahatan terjadi di dalam lingkup perpajakan. Selain itu, kasus ini juga menyeret secara langsusng beberapa pasal dalam undang-undang yang berbeda.
Kasus Gayus, menurut kami, merupakan suatu concursus atau perbarengan tindak pidana. Pada dasarnya yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan tindak pidana ialah terjadinya dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh satu orang dimana tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama kali belum dijatuhi pidana, atau antara tindak pidana yang awal dengan tindak pidana berikutnya belum dibatasi oleh suatu putusan hakim. Dapat juga di dalam bentuk concursus itu terjadi dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh dua atau lebih orang. Jadi intinya, yang terpenting adalah ada lebih dari satu tindak pidana dan diantara tindak pidana tersebut belum diputus hakim.
Pada pengulangan juga terdapat lebih dari satu tindak pidana yang dilakukan oleh satu orang. Perbedaan pokoknya adalah bahwa pada pengulangan tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama atau lebih awal telah diputus oleh hakim dengan mempidana pada si pembuat/pelaku, bahkan telah dijalaninya baik sebagian atau seluruhnya. Sedangkan pada perbarengan (concursus) syarat seperti pada pengulangan tidaklah diperlukan. Pengulangan tindak pidana lebih familiar dengan sebutan recidive.
Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dituduh melakukan tiga tindak pidana sekaligus, yaitu korupsi, pencucian uang, dan penggelapan. Ini tidak masuk ke dalam suatu penyertaan pidana karena Gayus melakukan delik secara sendiri dan tidak bersama-sama. Penyertaan dalam poin kesatu bentuk-bentuk penyertaan, yaitu “mereka yang melakukan (pembuat pelaksana: Pleger)” adalah berbeda dengan enkelvoudige dader (pembuat tunggal).
Perbedaan pleger dengan dader (pembuat tunggal) adalah, bagi seorang pleger masih diperlukan keterlibatan minimal seorang lainnya, baik secara psikis, misalnya terlibat dengan seorang pembuat penganjur; atau terlibat secara fisik, misalnya dengan pembuat peserta atau pembuat pembantu. Jadi, seorang pleger diperlukan sumbangan dari peserta lain dalam mewujudkan tindak pidana. Tetapi, keterlibatan dalam hal sumbangan peserta lain ini, perbuatannya haruslah sedemikian rupa sehingga perbuatannya itu tidak semata-mata menentukan untuk terwujudnya tindak pidana yang dituju.
Fakta-fakta di dalam kasus mafia pajak dengan tersangka Gayus Halomoan Tambunan, menunjukkan dan mengindikasikan bahwa itu merupakan suatu perbarengan tindak pidana.
Hal tersebut karena Gayus disangkakan dan dijerat dengan pasal mengenai korupsi, pencucian uang (money laundering) serta penggelapan. Ketiganya merupakan bentuk tindak pidana. Masing-masing berbeda antara satu dengan yang lain. Korupsi diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Kemudian, money laundering diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang. Lalu, penggelapan itu diatur di dalam Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372-377.
Oleh karena itu, concursus dari kasus Gayus masuk ke dalam concursus realis (perbarengan perbuatan) atau meerdaadse samenloop. Perihal apa yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan perbuatan, kiranya dapat disimpulkan dari rumusan pasal 65 ayat (1) dan pasal 66 ayat (1) KUHP, yakni : “beberapa perbuatan yang masing-masing harus dipandang sebagai perbuatan yang berdiri sendiri sehingga merupakan beberapa kejahatan …”. Pengertian perbuatan dalam rumusan di ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 adalah perbuatan yang telah memenuhi seluruh syarat dari suatu tindak pidana tertentu yang dirumuskan dalam undang-undang, atau secara singkat adalah tindak pidana, yang pengertian ini telah sesuai dengan kalimat di belakangnya, “sehingga merupakan beberapa kejahatan” (berdasarkan penafsiran sistematis).
Jadi berdasarkan rumusan ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 KUHP, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa masing-masing tindak pidana yang mana tindak pidana dalam perbarengan perbuatan itu satu sama lain adalah terpisah dan berdiri sendiri. Inilah ciri pokok dari perbarengan perbuatan. Kesimpulannya, kasus Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dalam penyelesaiannya dapat diadili dan dipidana sekaligus karena ini merupakan concursus. Nantinya akan diputus dalam satu putusan pidana dan tidak dijatuhkan sendiri-sendiri.
B. Pasal yang menjerat tersangka :
UU KUP Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perubahan Ketiga Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 Tentang Ketentuan Umum Dan Tata Cara Perpajakan :
• Pasal 36A (4) Pegawai pajak yang dengan maksud menguntungkan diri sendiri secara melawan hukum dengan menyalahgunakan kekuasaannya memaksa seseorang untuk memberikan sesuatu, untuk membayar atau menerima pembayaran, atau untuk mengerjakan sesuatu bagi dirinya sendiri, diancam dengan pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 12 Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi dan perubahannya.
Pasal 12 UU Tipikor, di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi.:
Setiap orang yang melakukan tindak pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 419, Pasal 420, Pasal 423, Pasal 425, atau Pasal 435 Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, dipidana dengan pidana penjara seumur hidup atau pidana penjara paling singkat 4 (empat) tahun dan paling lama 20 (dua puluh) tahun dan denda paling sedikit Rp 200.000.000,00 (dua ratus juta rupiah) dan paling banyak 1.000.000.000,00 (satu milyar rupiah).
Kasus ini merupakan kasus pidana penyuapan, dengan adanya kesaksian tersangka atas adanya suap PT. Bakrie yang diterima oleh tersangka. Pasal yang terkait dengan kasus ini adalah Pasal 11 Undang-Undang Pemberantasan Korupsi mengatur tentang penerimaan uang oleh pegawai negeri yang patut diduga berhubungan dengan jabatannya dan gratifikasi.
Setiap orang yang melakukan tindak pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 418 Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling singkat 1 (satu) tahun dan paling lama 5 (lima) tahun dan denda paling sedikit Rp 50.000.000,00 (lima puluh juta rupiah) dan paling banyak 250.000.000,00 (dua ratus lima puluh juta rupiah).
Isi pasal 418 dan 419 KUHP, yang mana berkaitan dengan kasus dalam pembahasan kami adalah sebagai berikut.
Seorang pejabat yang menerima hadiah atau janji padahal diketahui atau sepatutnya harus diduganya., hahwa hadiah atau janji itu diberikan karena kekuasaan atau kewenangan yang berhubungan dengan jabatannya, atau yang menurut pikiran orang yang memberi hadiah atau janji itu ada hubungan dengan jabatannya diancam dengan pidana penjara paling lama enam tahun atau pidana denda paling banyak empat ribu lima ratus rupiah.
Diancam dengan pidana penjara paling lama lima tahun seorang pejabat:
(1) yang menerima hadiah atau janji padahal diketahuinya bahwa hadiah atau janji itu diberikan untuk menggerakkannya supaya melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu dalam jabatannya yang bertentangan dengan kewajibannya;
(2) yang menerinia hadiah mengetahui bahwa hadiah itu diberikan sebagai akibat. atau oleh karena si penerima telah melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu dalam jabatannya yang bertentangan dengan kewajibannya.
Kasus ini juga masuk dalam kasus pidana, karena berkaitan dengan adanya upaya penggelapan dana negara. Penggelapan itu diatur di dalam Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372 , yang isinya :
Barang siapa dengan sengaja dan melawan hukum memiliki barang sesuatu yang seluruhnya atau sebagian adalah kepunyaan orang lain, tetapi yang ada dalam kekuasaannya bukan karena kejahatan, diancam karena penggelapan, dengan pidana penjara paling lama empat tahun atau pidana denda paling banyak sembilan ratus rupiah
Selain kasus penggelapan, juga terdapat adanya upaya untuk menguntungkan diri sendiri, sebagaimana disebutkan dalam pasal 378
Barang siapa dengan maksud untuk menguntungkan diri sendiri atau orang lain secara melawan hukum, dengan memakai nama palsu atau martabat palsu, dengan tipu muslihat, ataupun rangkaian kebohongan, menggerakkan orang lain untuk menyerahkan barang sesuatu kepadanya, atau supaya memberi hutang maupun menghapuskan piutang, diancam karena penipuan dengan pidana penjara paling lama empat tahun
Selain jeratan sanksi diatas, kasus ini juga masuk dalam ranah money loundry, diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang, dengan adanya pengalihan uang dengan cara dialirkan ke rekening lain, yang ketika dicek saldo rekening gayus, hanya ditemukan nominal Rp. 400.000.000,00, yang tidak sesuai dengan laporan yang diperoleh dari penyidikan.
Dari pembahasan diatas, kasus ini juga termasuk dalam kasus tindak pidana ekonomi karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan/fiskal negara. Karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan negara, khususnya dalam hal keuangan negara.
Kesimpulan
Kasus gayus dinyatakan bukan kasus pidana perpajakan oleh dirjen pajak karena kasus ini tidak berkaitan dengan SPT wajib pajak, tetapi dalam pendapat kami, kasus ini adalah kasus perpajakan, dimana tindak kejahatan terjadi di dalam lingkup perpajakan. Selain itu, kasus ini juga menyeret secara langsusng beberapa pasal dalam undang-undang yang berbeda.
Kasus Gayus, menurut kami, merupakan suatu concursus atau perbarengan tindak pidana. Pada dasarnya yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan tindak pidana ialah terjadinya dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh satu orang dimana tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama kali belum dijatuhi pidana, atau antara tindak pidana yang awal dengan tindak pidana berikutnya belum dibatasi oleh suatu putusan hakim. Dapat juga di dalam bentuk concursus itu terjadi dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh dua atau lebih orang. Jadi intinya, yang terpenting adalah ada lebih dari satu tindak pidana dan diantara tindak pidana tersebut belum diputus hakim.
Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dituduh melakukan tiga tindak pidana sekaligus, yaitu korupsi, pencucian uang, dan penggelapan. Ini tidak masuk ke dalam suatu penyertaan pidana karena Gayus melakukan delik secara sendiri dan tidak bersama-sama. Penyertaan dalam poin kesatu bentuk-bentuk penyertaan, yaitu “mereka yang melakukan (pembuat pelaksana: Pleger)” adalah berbeda dengan enkelvoudige dader (pembuat tunggal).
Fakta-fakta di dalam kasus mafia pajak dengan tersangka Gayus Halomoan Tambunan, menunjukkan dan mengindikasikan bahwa itu merupakan suatu perbarengan tindak pidana.
Jadi berdasarkan rumusan ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 KUHP, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa masing-masing tindak pidana yang mana tindak pidana dalam perbarengan perbuatan itu satu sama lain adalah terpisah dan berdiri sendiri. Inilah ciri pokok dari perbarengan perbuatan. Kesimpulannya, kasus Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dalam penyelesaiannya dapat diadili dan dipidana sekaligus karena ini merupakan concursus. Nantinya akan diputus dalam satu putusan pidana dan tidak dijatuhkan sendiri-sendiri.
Adapun pasal-pasal pidana yang menjerat tersangka, Gayus Tambunan, adalah :
Pasal 36A (4) UU KUP Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perubahan Ketiga Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 Tentang Ketentuan Umum Dan Tata Cara Perpajakan, Pasal 12 UU Tipikor, di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Pasal 11 Undang-Undang Pemberantasan Korupsi mengatur tentang penerimaan uang oleh pegawai negeri yang patut diduga berhubungan dengan jabatannya dan gratifikasi, Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372 dan pasal 378. Selain jeratan sanksi diatas, kasus ini juga masuk dalam ranah money loundry, diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang.
Dari pembahasan diatas, kasus ini juga termasuk dalam kasus tindak pidana ekonomi karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan/fiskal negara.
Kamis, 21 April 2011
Senin, 18 April 2011
WTO
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization that intends to supervise and liberalize international trade. The organization officially commenced on January 1, 1995 under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948. The organization deals with regulation of trade between participating countries; it provides a framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements, and a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO agreements which are signed by representatives of member governments and ratified by their parliaments.[4][5] Most of the issues that the WTO focuses on derive from previous trade negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round (1986–1994).
The organization is currently endeavoring to persist with a trade negotiation called the Doha Development Agenda (or Doha Round), which was launched in 2001 to enhance equitable participation of poorer countries which represent a majority of the world's population. However, the negotiation has been dogged by "disagreement between exporters of agricultural bulk commodities and countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers on the precise terms of a 'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from surges in imports. At this time, the future of the Doha Round is uncertain."[6]
The WTO has 153 members,[7] representing more than 97% of total world trade[8] and 30 observers, most seeking membership. The WTO is governed by a ministerial conference, meeting every two years; a general council, which implements the conference's policy decisions and is responsible for day-to-day administration; and a director-general, who is appointed by the ministerial conference. The WTO's headquarters is at the Centre William Rappard, Geneva, Switzerland
History
Harry White (l) and John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference — Both economists had been strong advocates of a liberal international trade environment, and recommended the establishment of three institutions: the IMF (fiscal and monetary issues), the World Bank (financial and structural issues), and the ITO (international economic cooperation).
The WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was established after World War II in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedicated to international economic cooperation — notably the Bretton Woods institutions known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A comparable international institution for trade, named the International Trade Organization was successfully negotiated. The ITO was to be a United Nations specialized agency and would address not only trade barriers but other issues indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements. But the ITO treaty was not approved by the U.S. and a few other signatories and never went into effect.
In the absence of an international organization for trade, the GATT would over the years "transform itself" into a de facto international organization.[13]
GATT rounds of negotiations
The GATT was the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1945 until the WTO was established in 1995.[14] Despite attempts in the mid 1950s and 1960s to create some form of institutional mechanism for international trade, the GATT continued to operate for almost half a century as a semi-institutionalized multilateral treaty regime on a provisional basis.
[edit] From Geneva to Tokyo
Seven rounds of negotiations occurred under GATT. The first real GATT trade rounds concentrated on further reducing tariffs. Then, the Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties brought about a GATT anti-dumping Agreement and a section on development. The Tokyo Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to tackle trade barriers that do not take the form of tariffs, and to improve the system, adopting a series of agreements on non-tariff barriers, which in some cases interpreted existing GATT rules, and in others broke entirely new ground. Because these plurilateral agreements were not accepted by the full GATT membership, they were often informally called "codes". Several of these codes were amended in the Uruguay Round, and turned into multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members. Only four remained plurilateral (those on government procurement, bovine meat, civil aircraft and dairy products), but in 1997 WTO members agreed to terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two.
Uruguay Round
During the Doha Round, the US government blamed Brazil and India for being inflexible, and the EU for impeding agricultural imports.[16] The President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, responded to the criticisms by arguing that progress would only be achieved if the richest countries (especially the US and countries in the EU) make deeper cuts in their agricultural subsidies, and further open their markets for agricultural goods.
Main article: Uruguay Round
Well before GATT's 40th anniversary, its members concluded that the GATT system was straining to adapt to a new globalizing world economy.[18][19] In response to the problems identified in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (structural deficiencies, spill-over impacts of certain countries' policies on world trade GATT could not manage etc.), the eighth GATT round — known as the Uruguay Round — was launched in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed: the talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles; all the original GATT articles were up for review.[19] The Final Act concluding the Uruguay Round and officially establishing the WTO regime was signed April 15, 1994, during the ministerial meeting at Marrakesh, Morocco, and hence is known as the Marrakesh Agreement.
The GATT still exists as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations (a distinction is made between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994).[18] GATT 1994 is not however the only legally binding agreement included via the Final Act at Marrakesh; a long list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings was adopted. The agreements fall into a structure with six main parts:
* The Agreement Establishing the WTO
* Goods and investment — the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods including the GATT 1994 and the Trade Related Investment Measures
* Services — the General Agreement on Trade in Services
* Intellectual property — the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
* Dispute settlement (DSU)
* Reviews of governments' trade policies (TPRM)
[edit] Ministerial conferences
The topmost decision-making body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which usually meets every two years. It brings together all members of the WTO, all of which are countries or customs unions. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements. The inaugural ministerial conference was held in Singapore in 1996. Disagreements between largely developed and developing economies emerged during this conference over four issues initiated by this conference, which led to them being collectively referred to as the "Singapore issues". The second ministerial conference was held in Geneva in Switzerland. The third conference in Seattle, Washington ended in failure, with massive demonstrations and police and National Guard crowd control efforts drawing worldwide attention. The fourth ministerial conference was held in Doha in the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar. The Doha Development Round was launched at the conference. The conference also approved the joining of China, which became the 143rd member to join. The fifth ministerial conference was held in Cancún, Mexico, aiming at forging agreement on the Doha round. An alliance of 22 southern states, the G20 developing nations (led by India, China, Brazil, ASEAN led by the Philippines), resisted demands from the North for agreements on the so-called "Singapore issues" and called for an end to agricultural subsidies within the EU and the US. The talks broke down without progress.
The sixth WTO ministerial conference was held in Hong Kong from 13–18 December 2005. It was considered vital if the four-year-old Doha Development Agenda negotiations were to move forward sufficiently to conclude the round in 2006. In this meeting, countries agreed to phase out all their agricultural export subsidies by the end of 2013, and terminate any cotton export subsidies by the end of 2006. Further concessions to developing countries included an agreement to introduce duty free, tariff free access for goods from the Least Developed Countries, following the Everything but Arms initiative of the European Union — but with up to 3% of tariff lines exempted. Other major issues were left for further negotiation to be completed by the end of 2010. The WTO General Council, on 26 May 2009, agreed to hold a seventh WTO ministerial conference session in Geneva from 30 November-3 December 2009. A statement by chairman Amb. Mario Matus acknowledged that the prime purpose was to remedy a breach of protocol requiring two-yearly "regular" meetings, which had lapsed with the Doha Round failure in 2005, and that the "scaled-down" meeting would not be a negotiating session, but "emphasis will be on transparency and open discussion rather than on small group processes and informal negotiating structures". The general theme for discussion was "The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment"
Doha Round
Main article: Doha Round
The Doha Development Round started in 2001 and continues today.
The WTO launched the current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) or Doha Round, at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. The Doha round was to be an ambitious effort to make globalization more inclusive and help the world's poor, particularly by slashing barriers and subsidies in farming. The initial agenda comprised both further trade liberalization and new rule-making, underpinned by commitments to strengthen substantial assistance to developing countries.
The negotiations have been highly contentious and agreement has not been reached, despite the intense negotiations at several ministerial conferences and at other sessions. Disagreements still continue over several key areas including agriculture subsidies.
Functions
Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most important:
* It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered agreements.
* It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.
Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of developing, least-developed and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical cooperation and training.[32]
The WTO is also a center of economic research and analysis: regular assessments of the global trade picture in its annual publications and research reports on specific topics are produced by the organization. Finally, the WTO cooperates closely with the two other components of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank.
Principles of the trading system
The WTO establishes a framework for trade policies; it does not define or specify outcomes. That is, it is concerned with setting the rules of the trade policy games.[34] Five principles are of particular importance in understanding both the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO:
1. Non-Discrimination. It has two major components: the most favoured nation (MFN) rule, and the national treatment policy. Both are embedded in the main WTO rules on goods, services, and intellectual property, but their precise scope and nature differ across these areas. The MFN rule requires that a WTO member must apply the same conditions on all trade with other WTO members, i.e. a WTO member has to grant the most favorable conditions under which it allows trade in a certain product type to all other WTO members.[34] "Grant someone a special favour and you have to do the same for all other WTO members."[35] National treatment means that imported goods should be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods (at least after the foreign goods have entered the market) and was introduced to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade (e.g. technical standards, security standards et al. discriminating against imported goods).[34]
2. Reciprocity. It reflects both a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that may arise because of the MFN rule, and a desire to obtain better access to foreign markets. A related point is that for a nation to negotiate, it is necessary that the gain from doing so be greater than the gain available from unilateral liberalization; reciprocal concessions intend to ensure that such gains will materialise.[36]
3. Binding and enforceable commitments. The tariff commitments made by WTO members in a multilateral trade negotiation and on accession are enumerated in a schedule (list) of concessions. These schedules establish "ceiling bindings": a country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. If satisfaction is not obtained, the complaining country may invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedures.[35][36]
4. Transparency. The WTO members are required to publish their trade regulations, to maintain institutions allowing for the review of administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. These internal transparency requirements are supplemented and facilitated by periodic country-specific reports (trade policy reviews) through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).[37] The WTO system tries also to improve predictability and stability, discouraging the use of quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports.[35]
5. Safety valves. In specific circumstances, governments are able to restrict trade. There are three types of provisions in this direction: articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain noneconomic objectives; articles aimed at ensuring "fair competition"; and provisions permitting intervention in trade for economic reasons.[37] Exceptions to the MFN principle also allow for preferential treatment of developed countries, regional free trade areas and customs unions.[citation needed]
Organizational structure
The General Council has multiple bodies which oversee committees in different areas, re the following:
Council for Trade in Goods
There are 11 committees under the jurisdiction of the Goods Council each with a specific task. All members of the WTO participate in the committees. The Textiles Monitoring Body is separate from the other committees but still under the jurisdiction of Goods Council. The body has its own chairman and only 10 members. The body also has several groups relating to textiles.[38]
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Information on intellectual property in the WTO, news and official records of the activities of the TRIPS Council, and details of the WTO’s work with other international organizations in the field.[39]
Council for Trade in Services
The Council for Trade in Services operates under the guidance of the General Council and is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is open to all WTO members, and can create subsidiary bodies as required.[40]
Trade Negotiations Committee
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) is the committee that deals with the current trade talks round. The chair is WTO’s director-general. The committee is currently tasked with the Doha Development Round.[41]
The Service Council has three subsidiary bodies: financial services, domestic regulations, GATS rules and specific commitments.[38] The General council has several different committees, working groups, and working parties.[42] There are committees on the following: Trade and Environment; Trade and Development (Subcommittee on Least-Developed Countries); Regional Trade Agreements; Balance of Payments Restrictions; and Budget, Finance and Administration. There are working parties on the following: Accession. There are working groups on the following: Trade, debt and finance; and Trade and technology transfer.
[edit] Voting system
The WTO operates on a one country, one vote system, but actual votes have never been taken. Decision making is generally by consensus, and relative market size is the primary source of bargaining power. The advantage of consensus decision-making is that it encourages efforts to find the most widely acceptable decision. Main disadvantages include large time requirements and many rounds of negotiation to develop a consensus decision, and the tendency for final agreements to use ambiguous language on contentious points that makes future interpretation of treaties difficult.[citation needed]
In reality, WTO negotiations proceed not by consensus of all members, but by a process of informal negotiations between small groups of countries. Such negotiations are often called "Green Room" negotiations (after the colour of the WTO Director-General's Office in Geneva), or "Mini-Ministerials", when they occur in other countries. These processes have been regularly criticised by many of the WTO's developing country members which are often totally excluded from the negotiations.[citation needed]
Richard Harold Steinberg (2002) argues that although the WTO's consensus governance model provides law-based initial bargaining, trading rounds close through power-based bargaining favouring Europe and the U.S., and may not lead to Pareto improvement.[43]
[edit] Dispute settlement
Main article: Dispute settlement in the WTO
In 1994, the WTO members agreed on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) annexed to the "Final Act" signed in Marrakesh in 1994.[44] Dispute settlement is regarded by the WTO as the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and as a "unique contribution to the stability of the global economy".[45] WTO members have agreed that, if they believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally.[46]
The operation of the WTO dispute settlement process involves the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions.[47] Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, World Trade Organization.
[edit] Accession and membership
Main article: WTO accession and membership
The process of becoming a WTO member is unique to each applicant country, and the terms of accession are dependent upon the country's stage of economic development and current trade regime.[48] The process takes about five years, on average, but it can last more if the country is less than fully committed to the process or if political issues interfere.[49] As is typical of WTO procedures, an offer of accession is only given once consensus is reached among interested parties.[50]
[edit] Accession process
Status of WTO negotiations:
members (including dual-representation with the European Union)
Draft Working Party Report or Factual Summary adopted
Goods and/or Services offers submitted
Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime submitted
observer, negotiations to start later or no Memorandum on FTR submitted
frozen procedures or no negotiations in the last 3 years
no official interaction with the WTO
A country wishing to accede to the WTO submits an application to the General Council, and has to describe all aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements.[51] The application is submitted to the WTO in a memorandum which is examined by a working party open to all interested WTO Members.[50]
After all necessary background information has been acquired, the working party focuses on issues of discrepancy between the WTO rules and the applicant's international and domestic trade policies and laws. The working party determines the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO for the applicant nation, and may consider transitional periods to allow countries some leeway in complying with the WTO rules.[48]
The final phase of accession involves bilateral negotiations between the applicant nation and other working party members regarding the concessions and commitments on tariff levels and market access for goods and services. The new member's commitments are to apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are negotiated bilaterally.[51]
When the bilateral talks conclude, the working party sends to the general council or ministerial conference an accession package, which includes a summary of all the working party meetings, the Protocol of Accession (a draft membership treaty), and lists ("schedules") of the member-to-be's commitments. Once the general council or ministerial conference approves of the terms of accession, the applicant's parliament must ratify the Protocol of Accession before it can become a member.[52]
[edit] Members and observers
The WTO has 153 members (almost all of the 123 nations participating in the Uruguay Round signed on at its foundation, and the rest had to get membership).[53] The 27 states of the European Union are represented also as the European Communities. WTO members do not have to be full sovereign nation-members. Instead, they must be a customs territory with full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations. Thus Hong Kong (as "Hong Kong, China" since 1997) became a GATT contracting party, and the Republic of China (ROC) (commonly known as Taiwan, whose sovereignty has been disputed by the People's Republic of China or PRC) acceded to the WTO in 2002 under the name of "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" (Chinese Taipei).[54]
A number of non-members (30) are observers at WTO proceedings and are currently negotiating their membership. The full list of WTO observers are:[55] 1. Afghanistan 2. Algeria 3. Andorra 4. Azerbaijan 5. The Bahamas 6. Belarus 7. Bhutan 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 9. Comoros 10. Equatorial Guinea 11. Ethiopia 12. Islamic Republic of Iran 13. Iraq 14. Kazakhstan 15. Lao People's Democratic Republic, or Laos 16. Lebanese Republic 17. Liberia 18. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 19. Montenegro 20. Russian Federation 21. Samoa 22. Sao Tomé and Principe 23. Serbia 24. Seychelles 25. Sudan 26. Syrian Arab Republic 27. Tajikistan 28. Uzbekistan 29. Vanuatu 30. Yemen
Russia is the biggest economy outside WTO and after the completion of Russia's accession, Iran would be the biggest economy outside the WTO.[56] With the exception of the Holy See, observers must start accession negotiations within five years of becoming observers. Some international intergovernmental organizations are also granted observer status to WTO bodies.[57] 14 states and 2 territories so far have no official interaction with the WTO.
Agreements
Main article: Uruguay Round
The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements which have the status of international legal texts. Member countries must sign and ratify all WTO agreements on accession.[58] A discussion of some of the most important agreements follows. The Agreement on Agriculture came into effect with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. The AoA has three central concepts, or "pillars": domestic support, market access and export subsidies. The General Agreement on Trade in Services was created to extend the multilateral trading system to service sector, in the same way the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for merchandise trade. The Agreement entered into force in January 1995. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation. It was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures — also known as the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. Under the SPS agreement, the WTO sets constraints on members' policies relating to food safety (bacterial contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labelling) as well as animal and plant health (imported pests and diseases). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization. It was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the end of 1994. The object ensures that technical negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade".[59] The Agreement on Customs Valuation, formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, prescribes methods of customs valuation that Members are to follow. Chiefly, it adopts the "transaction value" approach.
The organization is currently endeavoring to persist with a trade negotiation called the Doha Development Agenda (or Doha Round), which was launched in 2001 to enhance equitable participation of poorer countries which represent a majority of the world's population. However, the negotiation has been dogged by "disagreement between exporters of agricultural bulk commodities and countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers on the precise terms of a 'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from surges in imports. At this time, the future of the Doha Round is uncertain."[6]
The WTO has 153 members,[7] representing more than 97% of total world trade[8] and 30 observers, most seeking membership. The WTO is governed by a ministerial conference, meeting every two years; a general council, which implements the conference's policy decisions and is responsible for day-to-day administration; and a director-general, who is appointed by the ministerial conference. The WTO's headquarters is at the Centre William Rappard, Geneva, Switzerland
History
Harry White (l) and John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference — Both economists had been strong advocates of a liberal international trade environment, and recommended the establishment of three institutions: the IMF (fiscal and monetary issues), the World Bank (financial and structural issues), and the ITO (international economic cooperation).
The WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was established after World War II in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedicated to international economic cooperation — notably the Bretton Woods institutions known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A comparable international institution for trade, named the International Trade Organization was successfully negotiated. The ITO was to be a United Nations specialized agency and would address not only trade barriers but other issues indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements. But the ITO treaty was not approved by the U.S. and a few other signatories and never went into effect.
In the absence of an international organization for trade, the GATT would over the years "transform itself" into a de facto international organization.[13]
GATT rounds of negotiations
The GATT was the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1945 until the WTO was established in 1995.[14] Despite attempts in the mid 1950s and 1960s to create some form of institutional mechanism for international trade, the GATT continued to operate for almost half a century as a semi-institutionalized multilateral treaty regime on a provisional basis.
[edit] From Geneva to Tokyo
Seven rounds of negotiations occurred under GATT. The first real GATT trade rounds concentrated on further reducing tariffs. Then, the Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties brought about a GATT anti-dumping Agreement and a section on development. The Tokyo Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to tackle trade barriers that do not take the form of tariffs, and to improve the system, adopting a series of agreements on non-tariff barriers, which in some cases interpreted existing GATT rules, and in others broke entirely new ground. Because these plurilateral agreements were not accepted by the full GATT membership, they were often informally called "codes". Several of these codes were amended in the Uruguay Round, and turned into multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members. Only four remained plurilateral (those on government procurement, bovine meat, civil aircraft and dairy products), but in 1997 WTO members agreed to terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two.
Uruguay Round
During the Doha Round, the US government blamed Brazil and India for being inflexible, and the EU for impeding agricultural imports.[16] The President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, responded to the criticisms by arguing that progress would only be achieved if the richest countries (especially the US and countries in the EU) make deeper cuts in their agricultural subsidies, and further open their markets for agricultural goods.
Main article: Uruguay Round
Well before GATT's 40th anniversary, its members concluded that the GATT system was straining to adapt to a new globalizing world economy.[18][19] In response to the problems identified in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (structural deficiencies, spill-over impacts of certain countries' policies on world trade GATT could not manage etc.), the eighth GATT round — known as the Uruguay Round — was launched in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed: the talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles; all the original GATT articles were up for review.[19] The Final Act concluding the Uruguay Round and officially establishing the WTO regime was signed April 15, 1994, during the ministerial meeting at Marrakesh, Morocco, and hence is known as the Marrakesh Agreement.
The GATT still exists as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations (a distinction is made between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994).[18] GATT 1994 is not however the only legally binding agreement included via the Final Act at Marrakesh; a long list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings was adopted. The agreements fall into a structure with six main parts:
* The Agreement Establishing the WTO
* Goods and investment — the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods including the GATT 1994 and the Trade Related Investment Measures
* Services — the General Agreement on Trade in Services
* Intellectual property — the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
* Dispute settlement (DSU)
* Reviews of governments' trade policies (TPRM)
[edit] Ministerial conferences
The topmost decision-making body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which usually meets every two years. It brings together all members of the WTO, all of which are countries or customs unions. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements. The inaugural ministerial conference was held in Singapore in 1996. Disagreements between largely developed and developing economies emerged during this conference over four issues initiated by this conference, which led to them being collectively referred to as the "Singapore issues". The second ministerial conference was held in Geneva in Switzerland. The third conference in Seattle, Washington ended in failure, with massive demonstrations and police and National Guard crowd control efforts drawing worldwide attention. The fourth ministerial conference was held in Doha in the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar. The Doha Development Round was launched at the conference. The conference also approved the joining of China, which became the 143rd member to join. The fifth ministerial conference was held in Cancún, Mexico, aiming at forging agreement on the Doha round. An alliance of 22 southern states, the G20 developing nations (led by India, China, Brazil, ASEAN led by the Philippines), resisted demands from the North for agreements on the so-called "Singapore issues" and called for an end to agricultural subsidies within the EU and the US. The talks broke down without progress.
The sixth WTO ministerial conference was held in Hong Kong from 13–18 December 2005. It was considered vital if the four-year-old Doha Development Agenda negotiations were to move forward sufficiently to conclude the round in 2006. In this meeting, countries agreed to phase out all their agricultural export subsidies by the end of 2013, and terminate any cotton export subsidies by the end of 2006. Further concessions to developing countries included an agreement to introduce duty free, tariff free access for goods from the Least Developed Countries, following the Everything but Arms initiative of the European Union — but with up to 3% of tariff lines exempted. Other major issues were left for further negotiation to be completed by the end of 2010. The WTO General Council, on 26 May 2009, agreed to hold a seventh WTO ministerial conference session in Geneva from 30 November-3 December 2009. A statement by chairman Amb. Mario Matus acknowledged that the prime purpose was to remedy a breach of protocol requiring two-yearly "regular" meetings, which had lapsed with the Doha Round failure in 2005, and that the "scaled-down" meeting would not be a negotiating session, but "emphasis will be on transparency and open discussion rather than on small group processes and informal negotiating structures". The general theme for discussion was "The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment"
Doha Round
Main article: Doha Round
The Doha Development Round started in 2001 and continues today.
The WTO launched the current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) or Doha Round, at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. The Doha round was to be an ambitious effort to make globalization more inclusive and help the world's poor, particularly by slashing barriers and subsidies in farming. The initial agenda comprised both further trade liberalization and new rule-making, underpinned by commitments to strengthen substantial assistance to developing countries.
The negotiations have been highly contentious and agreement has not been reached, despite the intense negotiations at several ministerial conferences and at other sessions. Disagreements still continue over several key areas including agriculture subsidies.
Functions
Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most important:
* It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered agreements.
* It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.
Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of developing, least-developed and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical cooperation and training.[32]
The WTO is also a center of economic research and analysis: regular assessments of the global trade picture in its annual publications and research reports on specific topics are produced by the organization. Finally, the WTO cooperates closely with the two other components of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank.
Principles of the trading system
The WTO establishes a framework for trade policies; it does not define or specify outcomes. That is, it is concerned with setting the rules of the trade policy games.[34] Five principles are of particular importance in understanding both the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO:
1. Non-Discrimination. It has two major components: the most favoured nation (MFN) rule, and the national treatment policy. Both are embedded in the main WTO rules on goods, services, and intellectual property, but their precise scope and nature differ across these areas. The MFN rule requires that a WTO member must apply the same conditions on all trade with other WTO members, i.e. a WTO member has to grant the most favorable conditions under which it allows trade in a certain product type to all other WTO members.[34] "Grant someone a special favour and you have to do the same for all other WTO members."[35] National treatment means that imported goods should be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods (at least after the foreign goods have entered the market) and was introduced to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade (e.g. technical standards, security standards et al. discriminating against imported goods).[34]
2. Reciprocity. It reflects both a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that may arise because of the MFN rule, and a desire to obtain better access to foreign markets. A related point is that for a nation to negotiate, it is necessary that the gain from doing so be greater than the gain available from unilateral liberalization; reciprocal concessions intend to ensure that such gains will materialise.[36]
3. Binding and enforceable commitments. The tariff commitments made by WTO members in a multilateral trade negotiation and on accession are enumerated in a schedule (list) of concessions. These schedules establish "ceiling bindings": a country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. If satisfaction is not obtained, the complaining country may invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedures.[35][36]
4. Transparency. The WTO members are required to publish their trade regulations, to maintain institutions allowing for the review of administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. These internal transparency requirements are supplemented and facilitated by periodic country-specific reports (trade policy reviews) through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).[37] The WTO system tries also to improve predictability and stability, discouraging the use of quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports.[35]
5. Safety valves. In specific circumstances, governments are able to restrict trade. There are three types of provisions in this direction: articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain noneconomic objectives; articles aimed at ensuring "fair competition"; and provisions permitting intervention in trade for economic reasons.[37] Exceptions to the MFN principle also allow for preferential treatment of developed countries, regional free trade areas and customs unions.[citation needed]
Organizational structure
The General Council has multiple bodies which oversee committees in different areas, re the following:
Council for Trade in Goods
There are 11 committees under the jurisdiction of the Goods Council each with a specific task. All members of the WTO participate in the committees. The Textiles Monitoring Body is separate from the other committees but still under the jurisdiction of Goods Council. The body has its own chairman and only 10 members. The body also has several groups relating to textiles.[38]
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Information on intellectual property in the WTO, news and official records of the activities of the TRIPS Council, and details of the WTO’s work with other international organizations in the field.[39]
Council for Trade in Services
The Council for Trade in Services operates under the guidance of the General Council and is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is open to all WTO members, and can create subsidiary bodies as required.[40]
Trade Negotiations Committee
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) is the committee that deals with the current trade talks round. The chair is WTO’s director-general. The committee is currently tasked with the Doha Development Round.[41]
The Service Council has three subsidiary bodies: financial services, domestic regulations, GATS rules and specific commitments.[38] The General council has several different committees, working groups, and working parties.[42] There are committees on the following: Trade and Environment; Trade and Development (Subcommittee on Least-Developed Countries); Regional Trade Agreements; Balance of Payments Restrictions; and Budget, Finance and Administration. There are working parties on the following: Accession. There are working groups on the following: Trade, debt and finance; and Trade and technology transfer.
[edit] Voting system
The WTO operates on a one country, one vote system, but actual votes have never been taken. Decision making is generally by consensus, and relative market size is the primary source of bargaining power. The advantage of consensus decision-making is that it encourages efforts to find the most widely acceptable decision. Main disadvantages include large time requirements and many rounds of negotiation to develop a consensus decision, and the tendency for final agreements to use ambiguous language on contentious points that makes future interpretation of treaties difficult.[citation needed]
In reality, WTO negotiations proceed not by consensus of all members, but by a process of informal negotiations between small groups of countries. Such negotiations are often called "Green Room" negotiations (after the colour of the WTO Director-General's Office in Geneva), or "Mini-Ministerials", when they occur in other countries. These processes have been regularly criticised by many of the WTO's developing country members which are often totally excluded from the negotiations.[citation needed]
Richard Harold Steinberg (2002) argues that although the WTO's consensus governance model provides law-based initial bargaining, trading rounds close through power-based bargaining favouring Europe and the U.S., and may not lead to Pareto improvement.[43]
[edit] Dispute settlement
Main article: Dispute settlement in the WTO
In 1994, the WTO members agreed on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) annexed to the "Final Act" signed in Marrakesh in 1994.[44] Dispute settlement is regarded by the WTO as the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and as a "unique contribution to the stability of the global economy".[45] WTO members have agreed that, if they believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally.[46]
The operation of the WTO dispute settlement process involves the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions.[47] Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, World Trade Organization.
[edit] Accession and membership
Main article: WTO accession and membership
The process of becoming a WTO member is unique to each applicant country, and the terms of accession are dependent upon the country's stage of economic development and current trade regime.[48] The process takes about five years, on average, but it can last more if the country is less than fully committed to the process or if political issues interfere.[49] As is typical of WTO procedures, an offer of accession is only given once consensus is reached among interested parties.[50]
[edit] Accession process
Status of WTO negotiations:
members (including dual-representation with the European Union)
Draft Working Party Report or Factual Summary adopted
Goods and/or Services offers submitted
Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime submitted
observer, negotiations to start later or no Memorandum on FTR submitted
frozen procedures or no negotiations in the last 3 years
no official interaction with the WTO
A country wishing to accede to the WTO submits an application to the General Council, and has to describe all aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements.[51] The application is submitted to the WTO in a memorandum which is examined by a working party open to all interested WTO Members.[50]
After all necessary background information has been acquired, the working party focuses on issues of discrepancy between the WTO rules and the applicant's international and domestic trade policies and laws. The working party determines the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO for the applicant nation, and may consider transitional periods to allow countries some leeway in complying with the WTO rules.[48]
The final phase of accession involves bilateral negotiations between the applicant nation and other working party members regarding the concessions and commitments on tariff levels and market access for goods and services. The new member's commitments are to apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are negotiated bilaterally.[51]
When the bilateral talks conclude, the working party sends to the general council or ministerial conference an accession package, which includes a summary of all the working party meetings, the Protocol of Accession (a draft membership treaty), and lists ("schedules") of the member-to-be's commitments. Once the general council or ministerial conference approves of the terms of accession, the applicant's parliament must ratify the Protocol of Accession before it can become a member.[52]
[edit] Members and observers
The WTO has 153 members (almost all of the 123 nations participating in the Uruguay Round signed on at its foundation, and the rest had to get membership).[53] The 27 states of the European Union are represented also as the European Communities. WTO members do not have to be full sovereign nation-members. Instead, they must be a customs territory with full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations. Thus Hong Kong (as "Hong Kong, China" since 1997) became a GATT contracting party, and the Republic of China (ROC) (commonly known as Taiwan, whose sovereignty has been disputed by the People's Republic of China or PRC) acceded to the WTO in 2002 under the name of "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" (Chinese Taipei).[54]
A number of non-members (30) are observers at WTO proceedings and are currently negotiating their membership. The full list of WTO observers are:[55] 1. Afghanistan 2. Algeria 3. Andorra 4. Azerbaijan 5. The Bahamas 6. Belarus 7. Bhutan 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 9. Comoros 10. Equatorial Guinea 11. Ethiopia 12. Islamic Republic of Iran 13. Iraq 14. Kazakhstan 15. Lao People's Democratic Republic, or Laos 16. Lebanese Republic 17. Liberia 18. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 19. Montenegro 20. Russian Federation 21. Samoa 22. Sao Tomé and Principe 23. Serbia 24. Seychelles 25. Sudan 26. Syrian Arab Republic 27. Tajikistan 28. Uzbekistan 29. Vanuatu 30. Yemen
Russia is the biggest economy outside WTO and after the completion of Russia's accession, Iran would be the biggest economy outside the WTO.[56] With the exception of the Holy See, observers must start accession negotiations within five years of becoming observers. Some international intergovernmental organizations are also granted observer status to WTO bodies.[57] 14 states and 2 territories so far have no official interaction with the WTO.
Agreements
Main article: Uruguay Round
The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements which have the status of international legal texts. Member countries must sign and ratify all WTO agreements on accession.[58] A discussion of some of the most important agreements follows. The Agreement on Agriculture came into effect with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. The AoA has three central concepts, or "pillars": domestic support, market access and export subsidies. The General Agreement on Trade in Services was created to extend the multilateral trading system to service sector, in the same way the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for merchandise trade. The Agreement entered into force in January 1995. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation. It was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures — also known as the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. Under the SPS agreement, the WTO sets constraints on members' policies relating to food safety (bacterial contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labelling) as well as animal and plant health (imported pests and diseases). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization. It was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the end of 1994. The object ensures that technical negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade".[59] The Agreement on Customs Valuation, formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, prescribes methods of customs valuation that Members are to follow. Chiefly, it adopts the "transaction value" approach.
Countervailing duties
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Countervailing duties (CVDs) aka Anti-subsidy are trade import duties imposed under WTO Rules to neutralize the negative effects of subsidies. They are imposed after an investigation finds that a foreign country subsidizes its exports, injuring domestic producers in the importing country. According to World Trade Organization rules, a country can launch its own investigation and decide to charge extra duties, provided such additional duties are in accordance with the GATT Article VI and the GATT "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties".
Since countries can rule domestically whether domestic industries are in danger and whether foreign countries subsidize the products, the institutional process surrounding the investigation and determinations has significant impacts beyond the countervailing duties.
Countervailing duties in the U.S. are assessed by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce which determines whether imports in question are being subsidized and, if so, by how much. If there is a determination that there is material injury to the competing domestic industry, the Department of Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to levy duties in the amount equivalent to subsidy margins.
Petitions for remedies may be filed by domestic manufacturers or unions within the domestic industry, however the law requires that the petitioners represent at least 25% of the domestic production of the goods for which competition is causing material injury.
dari : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervailing_duties
Countervailing duties (CVDs) aka Anti-subsidy are trade import duties imposed under WTO Rules to neutralize the negative effects of subsidies. They are imposed after an investigation finds that a foreign country subsidizes its exports, injuring domestic producers in the importing country. According to World Trade Organization rules, a country can launch its own investigation and decide to charge extra duties, provided such additional duties are in accordance with the GATT Article VI and the GATT "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties".
Since countries can rule domestically whether domestic industries are in danger and whether foreign countries subsidize the products, the institutional process surrounding the investigation and determinations has significant impacts beyond the countervailing duties.
Countervailing duties in the U.S. are assessed by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce which determines whether imports in question are being subsidized and, if so, by how much. If there is a determination that there is material injury to the competing domestic industry, the Department of Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to levy duties in the amount equivalent to subsidy margins.
Petitions for remedies may be filed by domestic manufacturers or unions within the domestic industry, however the law requires that the petitioners represent at least 25% of the domestic production of the goods for which competition is causing material injury.
dari : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervailing_duties
The 15 original Uruguay Round subjects
The 1986 agenda
The 15 original Uruguay Round subjects
Tariffs
Non-tariff barriers
Natural resource products
Textiles and clothing
Agriculture
Tropical products
GATT articles
Tokyo Round codes
Anti-dumping
Subsidies
Intellectual property
Investment measures
Dispute settlement
The GATT system
Services
The 15 original Uruguay Round subjects
Tariffs
Non-tariff barriers
Natural resource products
Textiles and clothing
Agriculture
Tropical products
GATT articles
Tokyo Round codes
Anti-dumping
Subsidies
Intellectual property
Investment measures
Dispute settlement
The GATT system
Services
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: The Uruguay Round
It took seven and a half years, almost twice the original schedule. By the end, 123 countries were taking part. It covered almost all trade, from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatments. It was quite simply the largest trade negotiation ever, and most probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history.
At times it seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system since GATT was created at the end of the Second World War. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay Round did see some early results. Within only two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in import duties on tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They had also revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures implemented on the spot. And they called for regular reports on GATT members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade regimes transparent around the world.
A round to end all rounds? back to top
The seeds of the Uruguay Round were sown in November 1982 at a ministerial meeting of GATT members in Geneva. Although the ministers intended to launch a major new negotiation, the conference stalled on agriculture and was widely regarded as a failure. In fact, the work programme that the ministers agreed formed the basis for what was to become the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda.
Nevertheless, it took four more years of exploring, clarifying issues and painstaking consensus-building, before ministers agreed to launch the new round. They did so in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. They eventually accepted a negotiating agenda that covered virtually every outstanding trade policy issue. The talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles. All the original GATT articles were up for review. It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed, and the ministers gave themselves four years to complete it.
Two years later, in December 1988, ministers met again in Montreal, Canada, for what was supposed to be an assessment of progress at the round’s half-way point. The purpose was to clarify the agenda for the remaining two years, but the talks ended in a deadlock that was not resolved until officials met more quietly in Geneva the following April.
Despite the difficulty, during the Montreal meeting, ministers did agree a package of early results. These included some concessions on market access for tropical products — aimed at assisting developing countries — as well as a streamlined dispute settlement system, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism which provided for the first comprehensive, systematic and regular reviews of national trade policies and practices of GATT members. The round was supposed to end when ministers met once more in Brussels, in December 1990. But they disagreed on how to reform agricultural trade and decided to extend the talks. The Uruguay Round entered its bleakest period.
Despite the poor political outlook, a considerable amount of technical work continued, leading to the first draft of a final legal agreement. This draft “Final Act” was compiled by the then GATT director-general, Arthur Dunkel, who chaired the negotiations at officials’ level. It was put on the table in Geneva in December 1991. The text fulfilled every part of the Punta del Este mandate, with one exception — it did not contain the participating countries’ lists of commitments for cutting import duties and opening their services markets. The draft became the basis for the final agreement.
Over the following two years, the negotiations lurched between impending failure, to predictions of imminent success. Several deadlines came and went. New points of major conflict emerged to join agriculture: services, market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation of a new institution. Differences between the United States and European Union became central to hopes for a final, successful conclusion.
In November 1992, the US and EU settled most of their differences on agriculture in a deal known informally as the “Blair House accord”. By July 1993 the “Quad” (US, EU, Japan and Canada) announced significant progress in negotiations on tariffs and related subjects (“market access”). It took until 15 December 1993 for every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and services to be concluded (although some final touches were completed in talks on market access a few weeks later). On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.
The delay had some merits. It allowed some negotiations to progress further than would have been possible in 1990: for example some aspects of services and intellectual property, and the creation of the WTO itself. But the task had been immense, and negotiation-fatigue was felt in trade bureaucracies around the world. The difficulty of reaching agreement on a complete package containing almost the entire range of current trade issues led some to conclude that a negotiation on this scale would never again be possible. Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new negotiations on a number of topics. And by 1996, some countries were openly calling for a new round early in the next century. The response was mixed; but the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to reopen negotiations on agriculture and services at the turn of the century. These began in early 2000 and were incorporated into the Doha Development Agenda in late 2001.
What happened to GATT? back to top
The WTO replaced GATT as an international organization, but the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Trade lawyers distinguish between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994. Confusing? For most of us, it’s enough to refer simply to “GATT”.
The post-Uruguay Round built-in agenda back to top
Many of the Uruguay Round agreements set timetables for future work. Part of this “built-in agenda” started almost immediately. In some areas, it included new or further negotiations. In other areas, it included assessments or reviews of the situation at specified times. Some negotiations were quickly completed, notably in basic telecommunications, financial services. (Member governments also swiftly agreed a deal for freer trade in information technology products, an issue outside the “built-in agenda”.)
The agenda originally built into the Uruguay Round agreements has seen additions and modifications. A number of items are now part of the Doha Agenda, some of them updated.
There were well over 30 items in the original built-in agenda. This is a selection of highlights:
1996
* Maritime services: market access negotiations to end (30 June 1996, suspended to 2000, now part of Doha Development Agenda)
* Services and environment: deadline for working party report (ministerial conference, December 1996)
* Government procurement of services: negotiations start
1997
* Basic telecoms: negotiations end (15 February)
* Financial services: negotiations end (30 December)
* Intellectual property, creating a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
1998
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
* Services (emergency safeguards): results of negotiations on emergency safeguards to take effect (by 1 January 1998, deadline now March 2004)
* Rules of origin: Work programme on harmonization of rules of origin to be completed (20 July 1998)
* Government procurement: further negotiations start, for improving rules and procedures (by end of 1998)
* Dispute settlement: full review of rules and procedures (to start by end of 1998)
1999
* Intellectual property: certain exceptions to patentability and protection of plant varieties: review starts
2000
* Agriculture: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Services: new round of negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Tariff bindings: review of definition of “principle supplier” having negotiating rights under GATT Art 28 on modifying bindings
* Intellectual property: first of two-yearly reviews of the implementation of the agreement
2002
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
2005
* Textiles and clothing: full integration into GATT and agreement expires 1 January
At times it seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system since GATT was created at the end of the Second World War. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay Round did see some early results. Within only two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in import duties on tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They had also revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures implemented on the spot. And they called for regular reports on GATT members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade regimes transparent around the world.
A round to end all rounds? back to top
The seeds of the Uruguay Round were sown in November 1982 at a ministerial meeting of GATT members in Geneva. Although the ministers intended to launch a major new negotiation, the conference stalled on agriculture and was widely regarded as a failure. In fact, the work programme that the ministers agreed formed the basis for what was to become the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda.
Nevertheless, it took four more years of exploring, clarifying issues and painstaking consensus-building, before ministers agreed to launch the new round. They did so in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. They eventually accepted a negotiating agenda that covered virtually every outstanding trade policy issue. The talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles. All the original GATT articles were up for review. It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed, and the ministers gave themselves four years to complete it.
Two years later, in December 1988, ministers met again in Montreal, Canada, for what was supposed to be an assessment of progress at the round’s half-way point. The purpose was to clarify the agenda for the remaining two years, but the talks ended in a deadlock that was not resolved until officials met more quietly in Geneva the following April.
Despite the difficulty, during the Montreal meeting, ministers did agree a package of early results. These included some concessions on market access for tropical products — aimed at assisting developing countries — as well as a streamlined dispute settlement system, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism which provided for the first comprehensive, systematic and regular reviews of national trade policies and practices of GATT members. The round was supposed to end when ministers met once more in Brussels, in December 1990. But they disagreed on how to reform agricultural trade and decided to extend the talks. The Uruguay Round entered its bleakest period.
Despite the poor political outlook, a considerable amount of technical work continued, leading to the first draft of a final legal agreement. This draft “Final Act” was compiled by the then GATT director-general, Arthur Dunkel, who chaired the negotiations at officials’ level. It was put on the table in Geneva in December 1991. The text fulfilled every part of the Punta del Este mandate, with one exception — it did not contain the participating countries’ lists of commitments for cutting import duties and opening their services markets. The draft became the basis for the final agreement.
Over the following two years, the negotiations lurched between impending failure, to predictions of imminent success. Several deadlines came and went. New points of major conflict emerged to join agriculture: services, market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation of a new institution. Differences between the United States and European Union became central to hopes for a final, successful conclusion.
In November 1992, the US and EU settled most of their differences on agriculture in a deal known informally as the “Blair House accord”. By July 1993 the “Quad” (US, EU, Japan and Canada) announced significant progress in negotiations on tariffs and related subjects (“market access”). It took until 15 December 1993 for every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and services to be concluded (although some final touches were completed in talks on market access a few weeks later). On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.
The delay had some merits. It allowed some negotiations to progress further than would have been possible in 1990: for example some aspects of services and intellectual property, and the creation of the WTO itself. But the task had been immense, and negotiation-fatigue was felt in trade bureaucracies around the world. The difficulty of reaching agreement on a complete package containing almost the entire range of current trade issues led some to conclude that a negotiation on this scale would never again be possible. Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new negotiations on a number of topics. And by 1996, some countries were openly calling for a new round early in the next century. The response was mixed; but the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to reopen negotiations on agriculture and services at the turn of the century. These began in early 2000 and were incorporated into the Doha Development Agenda in late 2001.
What happened to GATT? back to top
The WTO replaced GATT as an international organization, but the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Trade lawyers distinguish between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994. Confusing? For most of us, it’s enough to refer simply to “GATT”.
The post-Uruguay Round built-in agenda back to top
Many of the Uruguay Round agreements set timetables for future work. Part of this “built-in agenda” started almost immediately. In some areas, it included new or further negotiations. In other areas, it included assessments or reviews of the situation at specified times. Some negotiations were quickly completed, notably in basic telecommunications, financial services. (Member governments also swiftly agreed a deal for freer trade in information technology products, an issue outside the “built-in agenda”.)
The agenda originally built into the Uruguay Round agreements has seen additions and modifications. A number of items are now part of the Doha Agenda, some of them updated.
There were well over 30 items in the original built-in agenda. This is a selection of highlights:
1996
* Maritime services: market access negotiations to end (30 June 1996, suspended to 2000, now part of Doha Development Agenda)
* Services and environment: deadline for working party report (ministerial conference, December 1996)
* Government procurement of services: negotiations start
1997
* Basic telecoms: negotiations end (15 February)
* Financial services: negotiations end (30 December)
* Intellectual property, creating a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
1998
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
* Services (emergency safeguards): results of negotiations on emergency safeguards to take effect (by 1 January 1998, deadline now March 2004)
* Rules of origin: Work programme on harmonization of rules of origin to be completed (20 July 1998)
* Government procurement: further negotiations start, for improving rules and procedures (by end of 1998)
* Dispute settlement: full review of rules and procedures (to start by end of 1998)
1999
* Intellectual property: certain exceptions to patentability and protection of plant varieties: review starts
2000
* Agriculture: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Services: new round of negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Tariff bindings: review of definition of “principle supplier” having negotiating rights under GATT Art 28 on modifying bindings
* Intellectual property: first of two-yearly reviews of the implementation of the agreement
2002
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
2005
* Textiles and clothing: full integration into GATT and agreement expires 1 January
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS
Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc
Binding tariffs, and applying them equally to all trading partners (most-favoured-nation treatment, or MFN) are key to the smooth flow of trade in goods. The WTO agreements uphold the principles, but they also allow exceptions — in some circumstances. Three of these issues are:
actions taken against dumping (selling at an unfairly low price)
subsidies and special “countervailing” duties to offset the subsidies
emergency measures to limit imports temporarily, designed to “safeguard” domestic industries.
Anti-dumping actions
If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition? Opinions differ, but many governments take action against dumping in order to defend their domestic industries. The WTO agreement does not pass judgement. Its focus is on how governments can or cannot react to dumping — it disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the “Anti-Dumping Agreement”. (This focus only on the reaction to dumping contrasts with the approach of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.)
The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine (“material”) injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), and show that the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so.
GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners — typically anti-dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.
There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used, two alternatives are available — the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.
Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty.
Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless an investigation shows that ending the measure would lead to injury.
Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly small (defined as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible (i.e. if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product — although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports).
The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure.
Subsidies and countervailing measures
This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. It says a country can use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.
The agreement contains a definition of subsidy. It also introduces the concept of a “specific” subsidy — i.e. a subsidy available only to an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises, or group of industries in the country (or state, etc) that gives the subsidy. The disciplines set out in the agreement only apply to specific subsidies. They can be domestic or export subsidies.
The agreement defines two categories of subsidies: prohibited and actionable. It originally contained a third category: non-actionable subsidies. This category existed for five years, ending on 31 December 1999, and was not extended. The agreement applies to agricultural goods as well as industrial products, except when the subsidies are exempt under the Agriculture Agreement’s “peace clause”, due to expire at the end of 2003.
Prohibited subsidies: subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods. They are prohibited because they are specifically designed to distort international trade, and are therefore likely to hurt other countries’ trade. They can be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement procedure where they are handled under an accelerated timetable. If the dispute settlement procedure confirms that the subsidy is prohibited, it must be withdrawn immediately. Otherwise, the complaining country can take counter measures. If domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Actionable subsidies: in this category the complaining country has to show that the subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. Otherwise the subsidy is permitted. The agreement defines three types of damage they can cause. One country’s subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country. They can hurt rival exporters from another country when the two compete in third markets. And domestic subsidies in one country can hurt exporters trying to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market. If the Dispute Settlement Body rules that the subsidy does have an adverse effect, the subsidy must be withdrawn or its adverse effect must be removed. Again, if domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Some of the disciplines are similar to those of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Countervailing duty (the parallel of anti-dumping duty) can only be charged after the importing country has conducted a detailed investigation similar to that required for anti-dumping action. There are detailed rules for deciding whether a product is being subsidized (not always an easy calculation), criteria for determining whether imports of subsidized products are hurting (“causing injury to”) domestic industry, procedures for initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on the implementation and duration (normally five years) of countervailing measures. The subsidized exporter can also agree to raise its export prices as an alternative to its exports being charged countervailing duty.
Subsidies may play an important role in developing countries and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies. Other developing countries are given until 2003 to get rid of their export subsidies. Least-developed countries must eliminate import-substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies designed to help domestic production and avoid importing) by 2003 — for other developing countries the deadline was 2000. Developing countries also receive preferential treatment if their exports are subject to countervailing duty investigations. For transition economies, prohibited subsidies had to be phased out by 2002.
Safeguards: emergency protection from imports
A WTO member may restrict imports of a product temporarily (take “safeguard” actions) if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in imports. Here, the injury has to be serious. Safeguard measures were always available under GATT (Article 19). However, they were infrequently used, some governments preferring to protect their domestic industries through “grey area” measures — using bilateral negotiations outside GATT’s auspices, they persuaded exporting countries to restrain exports “voluntarily” or to agree to other means of sharing markets. Agreements of this kind were reached for a wide range of products: automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, for example.
The WTO agreement broke new ground. It prohibits “grey-area” measures, and it sets time limits (a “sunset clause”) on all safeguard actions. The agreement says members must not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side. The bilateral measures that were not modified to conform with the agreement were phased out at the end of 1998. Countries were allowed to keep one of these measures an extra year (until the end of 1999), but only the European Union — for restrictions on imports of cars from Japan — made use of this provision.
An import “surge” justifying safeguard action can be a real increase in imports (an absolute increase); or it can be an increase in the imports’ share of a shrinking market, even if the import quantity has not increased (relative increase).
Industries or companies may request safeguard action by their government. The WTO agreement sets out requirements for safeguard investigations by national authorities. The emphasis is on transparency and on following established rules and practices — avoiding arbitrary methods. The authorities conducting investigations have to announce publicly when hearings are to take place and provide other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence. The evidence must include arguments on whether a measure is in the public interest.
The agreement sets out criteria for assessing whether “serious injury” is being caused or threatened, and the factors which must be considered in determining the impact of imports on the domestic industry. When imposed, a safeguard measure should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to help the industry concerned to adjust. Where quantitative restrictions (quotas) are imposed, they normally should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
In principle, safeguard measures cannot be targeted at imports from a particular country. However, the agreement does describe how quotas can be allocated among supplying countries, including in the exceptional circumstance where imports from certain countries have increased disproportionately quickly. A safeguard measure should not last more than four years, although this can be extended up to eight years, subject to a determination by competent national authorities that the measure is needed and that there is evidence the industry is adjusting. Measures imposed for more than a year must be progressively liberalized.
When a country restricts imports in order to safeguard its domestic producers, in principle it must give something in return. The agreement says the exporting country (or exporting countries) can seek compensation through consultations. If no agreement is reached the exporting country can retaliate by taking equivalent action — for instance, it can raise tariffs on exports from the country that is enforcing the safeguard measure. In some circumstances, the exporting country has to wait for three years after the safeguard measure was introduced before it can retaliate in this way — i.e. if the measure conforms with the provisions of the agreement and if it is taken as a result of an increase in the quantity of imports from the exporting country.
To some extent developing countries’ exports are shielded from safeguard actions. An importing country can only apply a safeguard measure to a product from a developing country if the developing country is supplying more than 3% of the imports of that product, or if developing country members with less than 3% import share collectively account for more than 9% of total imports of the product concerned.
The WTO’s Safeguards Committee oversees the operation of the agreement and is responsible for the surveillance of members’ commitments. Governments have to report each phase of a safeguard investigation and related decision-making, and the committee reviews these reports.
dari : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies
Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc
Binding tariffs, and applying them equally to all trading partners (most-favoured-nation treatment, or MFN) are key to the smooth flow of trade in goods. The WTO agreements uphold the principles, but they also allow exceptions — in some circumstances. Three of these issues are:
actions taken against dumping (selling at an unfairly low price)
subsidies and special “countervailing” duties to offset the subsidies
emergency measures to limit imports temporarily, designed to “safeguard” domestic industries.
Anti-dumping actions
If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition? Opinions differ, but many governments take action against dumping in order to defend their domestic industries. The WTO agreement does not pass judgement. Its focus is on how governments can or cannot react to dumping — it disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the “Anti-Dumping Agreement”. (This focus only on the reaction to dumping contrasts with the approach of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.)
The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine (“material”) injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), and show that the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so.
GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners — typically anti-dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.
There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used, two alternatives are available — the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.
Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty.
Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless an investigation shows that ending the measure would lead to injury.
Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly small (defined as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible (i.e. if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product — although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports).
The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure.
Subsidies and countervailing measures
This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. It says a country can use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.
The agreement contains a definition of subsidy. It also introduces the concept of a “specific” subsidy — i.e. a subsidy available only to an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises, or group of industries in the country (or state, etc) that gives the subsidy. The disciplines set out in the agreement only apply to specific subsidies. They can be domestic or export subsidies.
The agreement defines two categories of subsidies: prohibited and actionable. It originally contained a third category: non-actionable subsidies. This category existed for five years, ending on 31 December 1999, and was not extended. The agreement applies to agricultural goods as well as industrial products, except when the subsidies are exempt under the Agriculture Agreement’s “peace clause”, due to expire at the end of 2003.
Prohibited subsidies: subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods. They are prohibited because they are specifically designed to distort international trade, and are therefore likely to hurt other countries’ trade. They can be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement procedure where they are handled under an accelerated timetable. If the dispute settlement procedure confirms that the subsidy is prohibited, it must be withdrawn immediately. Otherwise, the complaining country can take counter measures. If domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Actionable subsidies: in this category the complaining country has to show that the subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. Otherwise the subsidy is permitted. The agreement defines three types of damage they can cause. One country’s subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country. They can hurt rival exporters from another country when the two compete in third markets. And domestic subsidies in one country can hurt exporters trying to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market. If the Dispute Settlement Body rules that the subsidy does have an adverse effect, the subsidy must be withdrawn or its adverse effect must be removed. Again, if domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Some of the disciplines are similar to those of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Countervailing duty (the parallel of anti-dumping duty) can only be charged after the importing country has conducted a detailed investigation similar to that required for anti-dumping action. There are detailed rules for deciding whether a product is being subsidized (not always an easy calculation), criteria for determining whether imports of subsidized products are hurting (“causing injury to”) domestic industry, procedures for initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on the implementation and duration (normally five years) of countervailing measures. The subsidized exporter can also agree to raise its export prices as an alternative to its exports being charged countervailing duty.
Subsidies may play an important role in developing countries and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies. Other developing countries are given until 2003 to get rid of their export subsidies. Least-developed countries must eliminate import-substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies designed to help domestic production and avoid importing) by 2003 — for other developing countries the deadline was 2000. Developing countries also receive preferential treatment if their exports are subject to countervailing duty investigations. For transition economies, prohibited subsidies had to be phased out by 2002.
Safeguards: emergency protection from imports
A WTO member may restrict imports of a product temporarily (take “safeguard” actions) if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in imports. Here, the injury has to be serious. Safeguard measures were always available under GATT (Article 19). However, they were infrequently used, some governments preferring to protect their domestic industries through “grey area” measures — using bilateral negotiations outside GATT’s auspices, they persuaded exporting countries to restrain exports “voluntarily” or to agree to other means of sharing markets. Agreements of this kind were reached for a wide range of products: automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, for example.
The WTO agreement broke new ground. It prohibits “grey-area” measures, and it sets time limits (a “sunset clause”) on all safeguard actions. The agreement says members must not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side. The bilateral measures that were not modified to conform with the agreement were phased out at the end of 1998. Countries were allowed to keep one of these measures an extra year (until the end of 1999), but only the European Union — for restrictions on imports of cars from Japan — made use of this provision.
An import “surge” justifying safeguard action can be a real increase in imports (an absolute increase); or it can be an increase in the imports’ share of a shrinking market, even if the import quantity has not increased (relative increase).
Industries or companies may request safeguard action by their government. The WTO agreement sets out requirements for safeguard investigations by national authorities. The emphasis is on transparency and on following established rules and practices — avoiding arbitrary methods. The authorities conducting investigations have to announce publicly when hearings are to take place and provide other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence. The evidence must include arguments on whether a measure is in the public interest.
The agreement sets out criteria for assessing whether “serious injury” is being caused or threatened, and the factors which must be considered in determining the impact of imports on the domestic industry. When imposed, a safeguard measure should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to help the industry concerned to adjust. Where quantitative restrictions (quotas) are imposed, they normally should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
In principle, safeguard measures cannot be targeted at imports from a particular country. However, the agreement does describe how quotas can be allocated among supplying countries, including in the exceptional circumstance where imports from certain countries have increased disproportionately quickly. A safeguard measure should not last more than four years, although this can be extended up to eight years, subject to a determination by competent national authorities that the measure is needed and that there is evidence the industry is adjusting. Measures imposed for more than a year must be progressively liberalized.
When a country restricts imports in order to safeguard its domestic producers, in principle it must give something in return. The agreement says the exporting country (or exporting countries) can seek compensation through consultations. If no agreement is reached the exporting country can retaliate by taking equivalent action — for instance, it can raise tariffs on exports from the country that is enforcing the safeguard measure. In some circumstances, the exporting country has to wait for three years after the safeguard measure was introduced before it can retaliate in this way — i.e. if the measure conforms with the provisions of the agreement and if it is taken as a result of an increase in the quantity of imports from the exporting country.
To some extent developing countries’ exports are shielded from safeguard actions. An importing country can only apply a safeguard measure to a product from a developing country if the developing country is supplying more than 3% of the imports of that product, or if developing country members with less than 3% import share collectively account for more than 9% of total imports of the product concerned.
The WTO’s Safeguards Committee oversees the operation of the agreement and is responsible for the surveillance of members’ commitments. Governments have to report each phase of a safeguard investigation and related decision-making, and the committee reviews these reports.
dari : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies
ANTI-DUMPING: AGREEMENT, on implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994
ANTI-DUMPING: AGREEMENT
Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(The Anti-dumping Agreement)
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “AD Agreement”) governs the application of anti-dumping measures by Members of the WTO. Anti-dumping measures are unilateral remedies which may be applied by a Member after an investigation and determination by that Member, in accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that an imported product is “dumped” and that the dumped imports are causing material injury to a domestic industry producing the like product.
The AD Agreement sets forth certain substantive requirements that must be fulfilled in order to impose an anti-dumping measure, as well as detailed procedural requirements regarding the conduct of anti-dumping investigations and the imposition and maintenance in place of anti-dumping measures. A failure to respect either the substantive or procedural requirements can be taken to dispute settlement and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure. Unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the AD Agreement does not establish any disciplines on dumping itself, primarily because dumping is a pricing practice engaged in by business enterprises, and thus not within the direct reach of multilateral disciplines.
Substantive rules back to top
Article 1 of the AD Agreement establishes the basic principle that a Member may not impose an anti-dumping measure unless it determines, pursuant to an investigation conducted in conformity with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that there are dumped imports, material injury to a domestic industry, and a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury.
Determination of dumping
Article 2 contains substantive rules for the determination of dumping. Dumping is calculated on the basis of a “fair comparison” between normal value (the price of the imported product in the “ordinary course of trade” in the country of origin or export) and export price (the price of the product in the country of import). Article 2 contains detailed provisions governing the calculation of normal value and export price, and elements of the fair comparison that must be made.
Determination of injury
Article 3 of the AD Agreement contains rules regarding the determination of material injury caused by dumped imports. Material injury is defined as material injury itself, threat of material injury, or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. The basic requirement for determinations of injury, is that there be an objective examination, based on positive evidence of the volume and price effects of dumped imports and the consequent impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. Article 3 contains specific rules regarding factors to be considered in making determinations of material injury, while specifying that no one or several of the factors which must be considered is determinative. Article 3.5 requires, in establishing the causal link between dumped imports and material injury, known factors other than dumped imports which may be causing injury must be examined, and that injury caused by these factors must not be attributed to dumped imports.
A significant new provision, Article 3.3, establishes the conditions in which a cumulative evaluation of the effects of dumped imports from more than one country may be undertaken. Under the rules, authorities must determine that the margin of dumping from each country is not de minimis, that the volume of imports from each country is not negligible, and that a cumulative assessment is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition among the imports and between the imports and the domestic like product.
Definition of industry
Article 4 of the AD Agreement sets forth a definition of the domestic industry to be considered for purposes of assessing injury and causation. The domestic industry is defined as producers of a “like product”, which term is defined in Article 2.6 as a product that is identical to, or in the absence of such a product, one that has characteristics closely resembling those of, the imported dumped product under consideration. Article 4 contains special rules for defining a “regional” domestic industry in exceptional circumstances where production and consumption in the importing country are geographically isolated, and for the evaluation of injury and assessment of duties in such cases. Article 4 also establishes that domestic producers may be excluded from consideration as part of the domestic industry if they are “related” (defined as a situation of legal or effective control) to exporters or importers of the dumped product.
Procedural requirements back to top
Overview
A principal objective of the procedural requirements of the AD Agreement is to ensure transparency of proceedings, a full opportunity for parties to defend their interests, and adequate explanations by investigating authorities of their determinations. The extensive and detailed procedural requirements relating to investigations focus on the sufficiency of petitions (through minimum information and “standing” requirements) to ensure that meritless investigations are not initiated, on the establishment of time periods for the completion of investigations, and on the provision of access to information to all interested parties, along with reasonable opportunities to present their views and arguments. Additional procedural requirements relate to the offering, acceptance, and administration of price undertakings by exporters in lieu of the imposition of anti-dumping measures. The AD Agreement requires investigating authorities to give public notice of and explain their determinations at various stages of the investigative process in substantial detail. It also establishes rules for the timing of the imposition of anti-dumping duties, the duration of such duties, and obliges Members to periodically review the continuing need for anti-dumping duties and price undertakings. There are detailed provisions guiding the imposition and collection of duties under various duty assessment systems, intended to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, and that individual exporters are not subjected to anti-dumping duties in excess of their individual margin of dumping. Article 13 of the AD Agreement requires Members to provide for judicial review of final determinations in anti-dumping investigations and reviews. Other provisions establish that Members may, at their discretion, take anti-dumping actions on behalf of and at the request of a third country, and recognise that “special regard” must be given by developed country Members to the situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping duties.
Specific Provisions
Initiation and conduct of investigations
Article 5 establishes the requirements for the initiation of investigations. The AD Agreement specifies that investigations should generally be initiated based on a written request submitted “by or on behalf of” a domestic industry. This “standing” requirement is supported by numeric limits for determining whether there is sufficient support by domestic producers to conclude that the request is made by or on behalf of the domestic industry, and thereby warrants initiation. The AD Agreement establishes requirements for evidence of dumping, injury, and causality, as well as other information regarding the product, industry, importers, exporters, and other matters, in written applications for anti-dumping relief, and specifies that, in special circumstances when authorities initiate without a written application from a domestic industry, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causality. In order to ensure that meritless investigations are not continued, potentially disrupting legitimate trade, Article 5.8 provides for immediate termination of investigations in the event the volume of imports is negligible or the margin of dumping is de minimis, and establishes numeric thresholds for these determinations. In order to minimize the trade disruptive effect of investigations, Article 5.10 specifies that investigations shall be completed within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after initiation.
Article 6 sets forth detailed rules on the process of investigation, including the collection of evidence and the use of sampling techniques. It requires authorities to guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive information and verify the information on which determinations are based. In addition, to ensure the transparency of proceedings, authorities are required to disclose the information on which determinations are to be based to interested parties and provide them with adequate opportunity to comment, and establishes the rights of parties to participate in the investigation, including the right to meet with parties with adverse interests, for instance in a public hearing.
Imposition of provisional measures
Article 7 relates to the imposition of provisional measures. Article 7 includes the requirement that authorities make a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality before applying provisional measures, and the requirement that no provisional measures may be applied sooner than 60 days after initiation of an investigation.
Price undertakings
Article 8 establishes the principle that undertakings to revise prices or cease exports at dumped prices may be entered into to settle an investigation, but only after a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality has been made. It also establishes that undertakings are voluntary on the part of both exporters and investigating authorities. In addition, an exporter may request that the investigation be continued after an undertaking has been accepted, and if a final determination of no dumping, no injury, or no causality results, the undertaking shall automatically lapse.
Imposition and collection of duties
Article 9 establishes the general principle that imposition of anti-dumping duties is optional, even if all the requirements for imposition have been met, and establishes the desirability of application a “lesser duty” rule. Under a lesser duty rule, authorities impose duties at a level lower than the margin of dumping but adequate to remove injury. Article 9.3 establishes that anti-dumping duties may not exceed the dumping margin calculated during the investigation. In order to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, Article 9.3 requires procedures for determination of the actual amount of duty owed, or refund of excess duties paid, depending on the duty assessment system of a Member, normally within 12 months of a request, and in no case more than 18 months. Article 9.4 establishes rules for calculating the amount of duties to be imposed on exporters not individually examined during the investigation. Article 9.5 provides for expedited reviews to calculate individual margins of dumping for exporters or producers newly entering the market of the importing Member.
Article 10 establishes the general principle that both provisional and final anti-dumping duties may be applied only as of the date on which the determinations of dumping, injury, and causality have been made. However, recognizing that injury may have occurred during the period of investigation, or that exporters may have taken actions to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, Article 10 contains rules for the retroactive imposition of dumping duties in specified circumstances. If the imposition of anti-dumping duties is based on a finding of material injury, as opposed to threat of material injury or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry, anti-dumping duties may be collected as of the date provisional measures were imposed. If provisional duties were collected in an amount greater than the amount of the final duty, or if the imposition of duties is based on a finding of threat of material injury or material retardation, a refund of provisional duties is required. Article 10.6 provides for retroactive application of final duties to a date not more than 90 days prior to the application of provisional measures in certain exceptional circumstances involving a history of dumping, massive dumped imports, and potential undermining of the remedial effects of the final duty.
Duration, termination, and review of anti-dumping measures
Article 11 establishes rules for the duration of anti-dumping duties, and requirements for periodic review of the continuing need, if any, for the imposition of anti-dumping duties or price undertakings. These requirements respond to the concern raised by the practice of some countries of leaving anti-dumping duties in place indefinitely. The “sunset” requirement establishes that dumping duties shall normally terminate no later than five years after first being applied, unless a review investigation prior to that date establishes that expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. This five year “sunset” provision also applies to price undertakings. The AD Agreement requires authorities to review the need for the continued imposition of a duty upon request of an interested party.
Public notice
Article 12 sets forth detailed requirements for public notice by investigating authorities of the initiation of investigations, preliminary and final determinations, and undertakings. The public notice must disclose non-confidential information concerning the parties, the product, the margins of dumping, the facts revealed during the investigation, and the reasons for the determinations made by the authorities, including the reasons for accepting and rejecting relevant arguments or claims made by exporters or importers. These public notice requirements are intended to increase the transparency of determinations, with the hope that this will increase the extent to which determinations are based on fact and solid reasoning.
The committee and dispute settlement back to top
Article 16 establishes the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, and sets forth requirements for Members to notify without delay all preliminary and final actions taken in anti-dumping investigations, and notify semi-annually all actions taken during the relevant reporting period.
Article 17 establishes that the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to disputes under the AD Agreement. However, Article 17.6 establishes a special standard of review to be applied by panels in examining disputes in anti-dumping cases with regard both to matters of fact and questions of interpretation of the Agreement. This standard gives a degree of deference to the factual decisions and legal interpretations of national authorities, and is intended to prevent dispute settlement panels from making decisions based purely on their own views. A Ministerial Decision, which is not part of the AD Agreement, regarding this provision establishes that its operation will be reviewed after three years with a view to consideration whether it is capable of general application.
Final provisions back to top
Article 18.3 establishes the effective date of the AD Agreement, providing that it is applicable to investigations and reviews of existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the entry into force of the AD Agreement. Article 18.4 requires Members to bring their laws into conformity with the AD Agreement by the date of entry into force of the AD Agreement. Under Article 18.5, Members are required to notify their anti-dumping laws and regulations to the Committee.
Annex I to the AD Agreement establishes procedures for “on-the-spot” investigations, which are generally undertaken in the territory of an exporting Member to verify information provided by foreign producers or exporters. Annex II to the AD Agreement sets forth provisions on the use of “best information available” in investigations, specifying the conditions under which investigating authorities may rely on information from a source other than the person concerned.
The Ministerial Decision on Anti-Circumvention, which is not part of the AD Agreement, noted that the negotiators had been unable to agree on a specific text dealing with the problem of anti-circumvention, recognized the desirability of applying uniform rules in this area as soon as possible, and referred the matter to the Committee for resolution. The Committee has established an Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, which is open to participation by all Members, to carry out the task assigned by the Ministers.
contact us : World Trade Organization, rue de Lausanne 154, CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland
Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(The Anti-dumping Agreement)
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “AD Agreement”) governs the application of anti-dumping measures by Members of the WTO. Anti-dumping measures are unilateral remedies which may be applied by a Member after an investigation and determination by that Member, in accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that an imported product is “dumped” and that the dumped imports are causing material injury to a domestic industry producing the like product.
The AD Agreement sets forth certain substantive requirements that must be fulfilled in order to impose an anti-dumping measure, as well as detailed procedural requirements regarding the conduct of anti-dumping investigations and the imposition and maintenance in place of anti-dumping measures. A failure to respect either the substantive or procedural requirements can be taken to dispute settlement and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure. Unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the AD Agreement does not establish any disciplines on dumping itself, primarily because dumping is a pricing practice engaged in by business enterprises, and thus not within the direct reach of multilateral disciplines.
Substantive rules back to top
Article 1 of the AD Agreement establishes the basic principle that a Member may not impose an anti-dumping measure unless it determines, pursuant to an investigation conducted in conformity with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that there are dumped imports, material injury to a domestic industry, and a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury.
Determination of dumping
Article 2 contains substantive rules for the determination of dumping. Dumping is calculated on the basis of a “fair comparison” between normal value (the price of the imported product in the “ordinary course of trade” in the country of origin or export) and export price (the price of the product in the country of import). Article 2 contains detailed provisions governing the calculation of normal value and export price, and elements of the fair comparison that must be made.
Determination of injury
Article 3 of the AD Agreement contains rules regarding the determination of material injury caused by dumped imports. Material injury is defined as material injury itself, threat of material injury, or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. The basic requirement for determinations of injury, is that there be an objective examination, based on positive evidence of the volume and price effects of dumped imports and the consequent impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. Article 3 contains specific rules regarding factors to be considered in making determinations of material injury, while specifying that no one or several of the factors which must be considered is determinative. Article 3.5 requires, in establishing the causal link between dumped imports and material injury, known factors other than dumped imports which may be causing injury must be examined, and that injury caused by these factors must not be attributed to dumped imports.
A significant new provision, Article 3.3, establishes the conditions in which a cumulative evaluation of the effects of dumped imports from more than one country may be undertaken. Under the rules, authorities must determine that the margin of dumping from each country is not de minimis, that the volume of imports from each country is not negligible, and that a cumulative assessment is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition among the imports and between the imports and the domestic like product.
Definition of industry
Article 4 of the AD Agreement sets forth a definition of the domestic industry to be considered for purposes of assessing injury and causation. The domestic industry is defined as producers of a “like product”, which term is defined in Article 2.6 as a product that is identical to, or in the absence of such a product, one that has characteristics closely resembling those of, the imported dumped product under consideration. Article 4 contains special rules for defining a “regional” domestic industry in exceptional circumstances where production and consumption in the importing country are geographically isolated, and for the evaluation of injury and assessment of duties in such cases. Article 4 also establishes that domestic producers may be excluded from consideration as part of the domestic industry if they are “related” (defined as a situation of legal or effective control) to exporters or importers of the dumped product.
Procedural requirements back to top
Overview
A principal objective of the procedural requirements of the AD Agreement is to ensure transparency of proceedings, a full opportunity for parties to defend their interests, and adequate explanations by investigating authorities of their determinations. The extensive and detailed procedural requirements relating to investigations focus on the sufficiency of petitions (through minimum information and “standing” requirements) to ensure that meritless investigations are not initiated, on the establishment of time periods for the completion of investigations, and on the provision of access to information to all interested parties, along with reasonable opportunities to present their views and arguments. Additional procedural requirements relate to the offering, acceptance, and administration of price undertakings by exporters in lieu of the imposition of anti-dumping measures. The AD Agreement requires investigating authorities to give public notice of and explain their determinations at various stages of the investigative process in substantial detail. It also establishes rules for the timing of the imposition of anti-dumping duties, the duration of such duties, and obliges Members to periodically review the continuing need for anti-dumping duties and price undertakings. There are detailed provisions guiding the imposition and collection of duties under various duty assessment systems, intended to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, and that individual exporters are not subjected to anti-dumping duties in excess of their individual margin of dumping. Article 13 of the AD Agreement requires Members to provide for judicial review of final determinations in anti-dumping investigations and reviews. Other provisions establish that Members may, at their discretion, take anti-dumping actions on behalf of and at the request of a third country, and recognise that “special regard” must be given by developed country Members to the situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping duties.
Specific Provisions
Initiation and conduct of investigations
Article 5 establishes the requirements for the initiation of investigations. The AD Agreement specifies that investigations should generally be initiated based on a written request submitted “by or on behalf of” a domestic industry. This “standing” requirement is supported by numeric limits for determining whether there is sufficient support by domestic producers to conclude that the request is made by or on behalf of the domestic industry, and thereby warrants initiation. The AD Agreement establishes requirements for evidence of dumping, injury, and causality, as well as other information regarding the product, industry, importers, exporters, and other matters, in written applications for anti-dumping relief, and specifies that, in special circumstances when authorities initiate without a written application from a domestic industry, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causality. In order to ensure that meritless investigations are not continued, potentially disrupting legitimate trade, Article 5.8 provides for immediate termination of investigations in the event the volume of imports is negligible or the margin of dumping is de minimis, and establishes numeric thresholds for these determinations. In order to minimize the trade disruptive effect of investigations, Article 5.10 specifies that investigations shall be completed within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after initiation.
Article 6 sets forth detailed rules on the process of investigation, including the collection of evidence and the use of sampling techniques. It requires authorities to guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive information and verify the information on which determinations are based. In addition, to ensure the transparency of proceedings, authorities are required to disclose the information on which determinations are to be based to interested parties and provide them with adequate opportunity to comment, and establishes the rights of parties to participate in the investigation, including the right to meet with parties with adverse interests, for instance in a public hearing.
Imposition of provisional measures
Article 7 relates to the imposition of provisional measures. Article 7 includes the requirement that authorities make a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality before applying provisional measures, and the requirement that no provisional measures may be applied sooner than 60 days after initiation of an investigation.
Price undertakings
Article 8 establishes the principle that undertakings to revise prices or cease exports at dumped prices may be entered into to settle an investigation, but only after a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality has been made. It also establishes that undertakings are voluntary on the part of both exporters and investigating authorities. In addition, an exporter may request that the investigation be continued after an undertaking has been accepted, and if a final determination of no dumping, no injury, or no causality results, the undertaking shall automatically lapse.
Imposition and collection of duties
Article 9 establishes the general principle that imposition of anti-dumping duties is optional, even if all the requirements for imposition have been met, and establishes the desirability of application a “lesser duty” rule. Under a lesser duty rule, authorities impose duties at a level lower than the margin of dumping but adequate to remove injury. Article 9.3 establishes that anti-dumping duties may not exceed the dumping margin calculated during the investigation. In order to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, Article 9.3 requires procedures for determination of the actual amount of duty owed, or refund of excess duties paid, depending on the duty assessment system of a Member, normally within 12 months of a request, and in no case more than 18 months. Article 9.4 establishes rules for calculating the amount of duties to be imposed on exporters not individually examined during the investigation. Article 9.5 provides for expedited reviews to calculate individual margins of dumping for exporters or producers newly entering the market of the importing Member.
Article 10 establishes the general principle that both provisional and final anti-dumping duties may be applied only as of the date on which the determinations of dumping, injury, and causality have been made. However, recognizing that injury may have occurred during the period of investigation, or that exporters may have taken actions to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, Article 10 contains rules for the retroactive imposition of dumping duties in specified circumstances. If the imposition of anti-dumping duties is based on a finding of material injury, as opposed to threat of material injury or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry, anti-dumping duties may be collected as of the date provisional measures were imposed. If provisional duties were collected in an amount greater than the amount of the final duty, or if the imposition of duties is based on a finding of threat of material injury or material retardation, a refund of provisional duties is required. Article 10.6 provides for retroactive application of final duties to a date not more than 90 days prior to the application of provisional measures in certain exceptional circumstances involving a history of dumping, massive dumped imports, and potential undermining of the remedial effects of the final duty.
Duration, termination, and review of anti-dumping measures
Article 11 establishes rules for the duration of anti-dumping duties, and requirements for periodic review of the continuing need, if any, for the imposition of anti-dumping duties or price undertakings. These requirements respond to the concern raised by the practice of some countries of leaving anti-dumping duties in place indefinitely. The “sunset” requirement establishes that dumping duties shall normally terminate no later than five years after first being applied, unless a review investigation prior to that date establishes that expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. This five year “sunset” provision also applies to price undertakings. The AD Agreement requires authorities to review the need for the continued imposition of a duty upon request of an interested party.
Public notice
Article 12 sets forth detailed requirements for public notice by investigating authorities of the initiation of investigations, preliminary and final determinations, and undertakings. The public notice must disclose non-confidential information concerning the parties, the product, the margins of dumping, the facts revealed during the investigation, and the reasons for the determinations made by the authorities, including the reasons for accepting and rejecting relevant arguments or claims made by exporters or importers. These public notice requirements are intended to increase the transparency of determinations, with the hope that this will increase the extent to which determinations are based on fact and solid reasoning.
The committee and dispute settlement back to top
Article 16 establishes the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, and sets forth requirements for Members to notify without delay all preliminary and final actions taken in anti-dumping investigations, and notify semi-annually all actions taken during the relevant reporting period.
Article 17 establishes that the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to disputes under the AD Agreement. However, Article 17.6 establishes a special standard of review to be applied by panels in examining disputes in anti-dumping cases with regard both to matters of fact and questions of interpretation of the Agreement. This standard gives a degree of deference to the factual decisions and legal interpretations of national authorities, and is intended to prevent dispute settlement panels from making decisions based purely on their own views. A Ministerial Decision, which is not part of the AD Agreement, regarding this provision establishes that its operation will be reviewed after three years with a view to consideration whether it is capable of general application.
Final provisions back to top
Article 18.3 establishes the effective date of the AD Agreement, providing that it is applicable to investigations and reviews of existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the entry into force of the AD Agreement. Article 18.4 requires Members to bring their laws into conformity with the AD Agreement by the date of entry into force of the AD Agreement. Under Article 18.5, Members are required to notify their anti-dumping laws and regulations to the Committee.
Annex I to the AD Agreement establishes procedures for “on-the-spot” investigations, which are generally undertaken in the territory of an exporting Member to verify information provided by foreign producers or exporters. Annex II to the AD Agreement sets forth provisions on the use of “best information available” in investigations, specifying the conditions under which investigating authorities may rely on information from a source other than the person concerned.
The Ministerial Decision on Anti-Circumvention, which is not part of the AD Agreement, noted that the negotiators had been unable to agree on a specific text dealing with the problem of anti-circumvention, recognized the desirability of applying uniform rules in this area as soon as possible, and referred the matter to the Committee for resolution. The Committee has established an Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, which is open to participation by all Members, to carry out the task assigned by the Ministers.
contact us : World Trade Organization, rue de Lausanne 154, CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland
SAFEGUARDS: SG AGREEMENT
Introduction
“The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations”, signed by ministers in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 is 550 pages long and contains legal texts which spell out the results of the negotiations since the Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. In addition to the texts of the agreements, the Final Act also contains texts of Ministerial Decisions and Declarations which further clarify certain provisions of some of the agreements.
The Final Act covers all the negotiating areas cited in the Punta del Este Declaration with two important exceptions. The first is the results of the “market access negotiations” in which individual countries have made binding commitments to reduce or eliminate specific tariffs and non-tariff barriers to merchandise trade. These concessions are recorded in national schedules that form an integral part of the Final Act. The second is the “initial commitments” on liberalization of trade in services. These commitments on liberalization are also recorded in national schedules.
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Back to top
The agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) calls for a single institutional framework encompassing the GATT, as modified by the Uruguay Round, all agreements and arrangements concluded under its auspices and the complete results of the Uruguay Round. Its structure is headed by a Ministerial Conference meeting at least once every two years. A General Council oversees the operation of the agreement and ministerial decisions on a regular basis. This General Council acts as a Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which concern themselves with the full range of trade issues covered by the WTO, and has also established subsidiary bodies such as a Goods Council, a Services Council and a TRIPs Council. The WTO framework ensures a “single undertaking approach” to the results of the Uruguay Round — thus, membership in the WTO entails accepting all the results of the Round without exception.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Back to top
Texts on the interpretation of the following GATT articles are included in the Final Act:
Article II — Schedules of Concessions. Agreement to record in national schedules “other duties or charges” levied in addition to the recorded tariff and to bind them at the levels prevailing at the date established in the Uruguay Round Protocol.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII — State-trading Enterprises. Agreement increasing surveillance of their activities through stronger notification and review procedures.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Articles XII and XVIII:B
Balance-of-payments provisions. Agreement that contracting parties imposing restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes should do so in the least trade-disruptive manner and should favour price-based measures, like import surcharges and import deposits, rather than quantitative restrictions. Agreement also on procedures for consultations by the GATT Balance-of-Payments Committee as well as for notification of BOP measures.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV — Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas. Agreement clarifying and reinforcing the criteria and procedures for the review of new or enlarged customs unions or free-trade areas and for the evaluation of their effects on third parties. The agreement also clarifies the procedure to be followed for achieving any necessary compensatory adjustment in the event of contracting parties forming a customs union seeking to increase a bound tariff. The obligations of contracting parties in regard to measures taken by regional or local governments or authorities within their territories are also clarified.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXV — Waivers. Agreement of new procedures for the granting of waivers from GATT disciplines, to specify termination dates for any waivers to be granted in the future, and to fix expiry dates for existing waivers. The main provisions concerning the granting of waivers are, however, contained in the Agreement on the WTO.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII — Modification of GATT Schedules. Agreement on new procedures for the negotiation of compensation when tariff bindings are modified or withdrawn, including the creation of a new negotiating right for the country for which the product in question accounts for the highest proportion of its exports. This is intended to increase the ability of smaller and developing countries to participate in negotiations.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXXV — Non-application of the General Agreement. Agreement to allow a contracting party or a newly acceding country to invoke GATT’s non-application provisions vis-à-vis the other party after having entered into tariff negotiations with each other. The WTO Agreement foresees that any invocation of the non-application provisions under that Agreement must extend to all the multilateral agreements.
Uruguay Round Protocol GATT 1994 Back to top
The results of the market access negotiations in which participants have made commitments to eliminate or reduce tariff rates and non-tariff measures applicable to trade in goods are recorded in national schedules of concessions annexed to the Uruguay Round Protocol that forms an integral part of the Final Act.
The Protocol has five appendices: Appendix I Section A: Agricultural Products — Tariff concessions on a Most-Favoured Nation basis; Appendix I Section B: Agricultural Products — Tariff Quotas; Appendix II:Tariff Concessions on a Most-Favoured Nation Basis on Other Products; Appendix III: Preferential Tariff — Part II of Schedules (if applicable); Appendix IV: Concessions on Non-Tariff Measures — Part III of Schedules; Appendix V: Agriculture Products: Commitments Limiting Subsidization — Part IV of Schedules, Section I: Domestic Support: Total AMS Commitments, Section II: Export Subsidies: Budgetary Outlay and Quantity, Reduction Commitments Section III: Commitments Limiting the Scope of Export Subsidies.
The schedule annexed to the Protocol relating to a Member shall become a Schedule to the GATT 1994 relating to that Member on the day on which the Agreement Establishing the WTO enters into force for that Member.
For non-agricultural products the tariff reduction agreed upon by each Member shall be implemented in five equal rate reductions, except as may be otherwise specified in a Member’s Schedule. The first such reduction shall be made effective on the date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. Each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years, and the final rate shall become effective no later than the date four years after the date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. However, participants may implement reduction in fewer stages or at earlier dates than those indicated in the Protocol, if they so wish.
For agricultural products, as defined in Article 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the staging of reductions shall be implemented as specified in the relevant parts of the schedules. Details are given in the section of this paper concerning the Agricultural Agreement.
A related Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries establishes, among other things, that these countries will not be required to undertake any commitments and concessions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Alongside other more specific provisions for flexible and favourable treatment, it also allows for the completion of their schedules of concessions and commitments in Market Access and in Services by April 1995 rather than 15 December 1993.
Agreement on Agriculture Back to top
The negotiations have resulted in four main portions of the Agreement; the Agreement on Agriculture itself; the concessions and commitments Members are to undertake on market access, domestic support and export subsidies; the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and the Ministerial Decision concerning Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing countries.
Overall, the results of the negotiations provide a framework for the long-term reform of agricultural trade and domestic policies over the years to come. It makes a decisive move towards the objective of increased market orientation in agricultural trade. The rules governing agricultural trade are strengthened which will lead to improved predictability and stability for importing and exporting countries alike.
The agricultural package also addresses many other issues of vital economic and political importance to many Members. These include provisions that encourage the use of less trade-distorting domestic support policies to maintain the rural economy, that allow actions to be taken to ease any adjustment burden, and also the introduction of tightly prescribed provisions that allow some flexibility in the implementation of commitments. Specific concerns of developing countries have been addressed including the concerns of net-food importing countries and least-developed countries.
The agricultural package provides for commitments in the area of market access, domestic support and export competition. The text of the Agricultural Agreement is mirrored in the GATT Schedules of legal commitments relating to individual countries (see above).
In the area of market access, non-tariff border measures are replaced by tariffs that provide substantially the same level of protection. Tariffs resulting from this “tariffication” process, as well as other tariffs on agricultural products, are to be reduced by an average 36 per cent in the case of developed countries and 24 per cent in the case of developing countries, with minimum reductions for each tariff line being required. Reductions are to be undertaken over six years in the case of developed countries and over ten years in the case of developing countries. Least-developed countries are not required to reduce their tariffs.
The tariffication package also provides for the maintenance of current access opportunities and the establishment of minimum access tariff quotas (at reduced-tariff rates) where current access is less than 3 per cent of domestic consumption. These minimum access tariff quotas are to be expanded to 5 per cent over the implementation period. In the case of “tariffied” products “special safeguard” provisions will allow additional duties to be applied in case shipments at prices denominated in domestic currencies below a certain reference level or in case of a surge of imports. The trigger in the safeguard for import surges depends on the “import penetration” currently existing in the market, i.e. where imports currently make up a large proportion of consumption, the import surge required to trigger the special safeguard action is lower.
Domestic support measures that have, at most, a minimal impact on trade (“green box” policies) are excluded from reduction commitments. Such policies include general government services, for example in the areas of research, disease control, infrastructure and food security. It also includes direct payments to producers, for example certain forms of “decoupled” (from production) income support, structural adjustment assistance, direct payments under environmental programmes and under regional assistance programmes.
In addition to the green box policies, other policies need not be included in the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Total AMS) reduction commitments. These policies are direct payments under production-limiting programmes, certain government assistance measures to encourage agricultural and rural development in developing countries and other support which makes up only a low proportion (5 per cent in the case of developed countries and 10 per cent in the case of developing countries) of the value of production of individual products or, in the case of non-product-specific support, the value of total agricultural production.
The Total AMS covers all support provided on either a product-specific or non-product-specific basis that does not qualify for exemption and is to be reduced by 20 per cent (13.3 per cent for developing countries with no reduction for least-developed countries) during the implementation period.
Members are required to reduce the value of mainly direct export subsidies to a level 36 per cent below the 1986-90 base period level over the six-year implementation period, and the quantity of subsidised exports by 21 per cent over the same period. In the case of developing countries, the reductions are two-thirds those of developed countries over a ten-year period (with no reductions applying to the least-developed countries) and subject to certain conditions, there are no commitments on subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products or internal transport and freight charges on export shipments. Where subsidised exports have increased since the 1986-90 base period, 1991-92 may be used, in certain circumstances, as the beginning point of reductions although the end-point remains that based on the 1986-90 base period level. The Agreement on Agriculture provides for some limited flexibility between years in terms of export subsidy reduction commitments and contains provisions aimed at preventing the circumvention of the export subsidy commitments and sets out criteria for food aid donations and the use of export credits.
“Peace” provisions within the agreement include: an understanding that certain actions available under the Subsidies Agreement will not be applied with respect to green box policies and domestic support and export subsidies maintained in conformity with commitments; an understanding that “due restraint” will be used in the application of countervailing duty rights under the General Agreement; and setting out limits in terms of the applicability of nullification or impairment actions. These peace provisions will apply for a period of 9 years.
The agreement sets up a committee that will monitor the implementation of commitments, and also monitor the follow-up to the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.
The package is conceived as part of a continuing process with the long-term objective of securing substantial progressive reductions in support and protection. In this light, it calls for further negotiations in the fifth year of implementation which, along with an assessment of the first five years, would take into account non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment for developing countries, the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and other concerns and objectives noted in the preamble to the agreement.
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Back to top
This agreement concerns the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures — in other words food safety and animal and plant health regulations. The agreement recognises that governments have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures but that they should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail.
In order to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members are encouraged to base their measures on international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist. However, Members may maintain or introduce measures which result in higher standards if there is scientific justification or as a consequence of consistent risk decisions based on an appropriate risk assessment. The Agreement spells out procedures and criteria for the assessment of risk and the determination of appropriate levels of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
It is expected that Members would accept the sanitary and phytosanitary measures of others as equivalent if the exporting country demonstrates to the importing country that its measures achieve the importing country’s appropriate level of health protection. The agreement includes provisions on control, inspection and approval procedures.
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries Back to top
It is recognized that during the reform programme least-developed and net food-i mporting developing countries may experience negative effects with respect to supplies of food impor ts on reasonable terms and conditions. Therefore, a special Decision sets out objectives with regard to the provision of food aid, the provision of basic foodstuffs in full grant form and aid for agricultural development. It also refers to the possibility of assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank with respect to the short-term financing of commercial food imports. The Committee of Agriculture, set up under the Agreement on Agriculture, monitors the follow-up to the Decision.
Note: this Agreement was terminated on 1 January 2005.
See Textiles
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing Back to top
The object of this negotiation has been to secure the eventual integration of the textiles and clothing sector — where much of the trade is currently subject to bilateral quotas negotiated under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) — into the GATT on the basis of strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.
Integration of the sector into the GATT would take place as follows : first, on 1 January 1995; each party would integrate into the GATT products from the specific list in the Agreement which accounted for not less than 16 per cent of its total volume of imports in 1990. Integration means that trade in these products will be governed by the general rules of GATT.
At the beginning of Phase 2, on 1 January 1998, products which accounted for not less than 17 per cent of 1990 imports would be integrated. On 1 January 2002, products which accounted for not less than 18 per cent of 1990 imports would be integrated. All remaining products would be integrated at the end of the transition period on 1 January 2005. At each of the first three stages, products should be chosen from each of the following categories: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing.
All MFA restrictions in place on 31 December 1994 would be carried over into the new agreement and maintained until such time as the restrictions are removed or the products integrated into GATT. For products remaining under restraint, at whatever stage, the agreement lays down a formula for increasing the existing growth rates. Thus, during Stage 1, and for each restriction previously under MFA bilateral agreements in force for 1994, annual growth should be not less than 16 per cent higher than the growth rate established for the previous MFA restriction. For Stage 2 (1998 to 2001 inclusive), annual growth rates should be 25 per cent higher than the Stage 1 rates. For Stage 3 (2002 to 2004 inclusive), annual growth rates should be 27 per cent higher than the Stage 2 rates.
While the agreement focuses largely on the phasing-out of MFA restrictions, it also recognizes that some members maintain non-MFA restrictions not justified under a GATT provision. These would also be brought into conformity with GATT within one year of the entry into force of the Agreement or phased out progressively during a period not exceeding the duration of the Agreement (that is, by 2005).
It also contains a specific transitional safeguard mechanism which could be applied to products not yet integrated into the GATT at any stage. Action under the safeguard mechanism could be taken against individual exporting countries if it were demonstrated by the importing country that overall imports of a product were entering the country in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage — or to threaten it — to the relevant domestic industry, and that there was a sharp and substantial increase of imports from the individual country concerned. Action under the safeguard mechanism could be taken either by mutual agreement, following consultations, or unilaterally but subject to review by the Textiles Monitoring Body. If taken, the level of restraints should be fixed at a level not lower than the actual level of exports or imports from the country concerned during the twelve-month period ending two months before the month in which a request for consultation was made. Safeguard restraints could remain in place for up to three years without extension or until the product is removed from the scope of the agreement (that is, integrated into the GATT), whichever comes first.
The agreement includes provisions to cope with possible circumvention of commitments through transshipment, re-routing, false declaration concerning country or place of origin and falsification of official documents.
The agreement also stipulates that, as part of the integration process, all members shall take such actions in the area of textiles and clothing as may be necessary to abide by GATT rules and disciplines so as to improve market access, ensure the application of policies relating to fair and equitable trading conditions, and avoid discrimination against imports when taking measures for general trade policy reasons.
In the context of a major review of the operation of the agreement to be conducted by the Council for Trade in Goods before the end of each stage of the integration process, the Council for Trade in Goods shall by consensus take such decisions as it deems appropriate to ensure that the balance of rights and obligations in this agreement is not upset. Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Body may authorise adjustments to the annual growth of quotas for the stage subsequent to the review with respect to Members it has found not to be complying with their obligations under this agreement.
A Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) oversees the implementation of commitments and to prepare reports for the major reviews mentioned above. The agreement also has provisions for special treatment to certain categories of countries — for example, those which have not been MFA members since 1986, new entrants, small suppliers, and least-developed countries.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Back to top
This agreement will extend and clarify the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade reached in the Tokyo Round. It seeks to ensure that technical negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. However, it recognizes that countries have the right to establish protection, at levels they consider appropriate, for example for human, animal or plant life or health or the environment, and should not be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure those levels of protection are met. The agreement therefore encourages countries to use international standards where these are appropriate, but it does not require them to change their levels of protection as a result of standardization.
Innovative features of the revised agreement are that it covers processing and production methods related to the characteristics of the product itself. The coverage of conformity assessment procedures is enlarged and the disciplines made more precise. Notification provisions applying to local government and non-governmental bodies are elaborated in more detail than in the Tokyo Round agreement. A Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards by standardizing bodies, which is open to acceptance by private sector bodies as well as the public sector, is included as an annex to the agreement.
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures Back to top
The agreement recognizes that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade. It provides that no contracting party shall apply any TRIM inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) of the GATT. To this end, an illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these articles is appended to the agreement. The list includes measures which require particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise (“local content requirements”) or which restrict the volume or value of imports such an enterprise can purchase or use to an amount related to the level of products it exports (“trade balancing requirements”).
The agreement requires mandatory notification of all non-conforming TRIMs and their elimination within two years for developed countries, within five years for developing countries and within seven years for least-developed countries. It establishes a Committee on TRIMs which will, among other things, monitor the implementation of these commitments. The agreement also provides for consideration, at a later date, of whether it should be complemented with provisions on investment and competition policy more broadly.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-dumping) Back to top
Article VI of the GATT provides for the right of contracting parties to apply anti-dumping measures, i.e. measures against imports of a product at an export price below its “normal value” (usually the price of the product in the domestic market of the exporting country) if such dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry in the territory of the importing contracting party. More detailed rules governing the application of such measures are currently provided in an Anti-dumping Agreement concluded at the end of the Tokyo Round. Negotiations in the Uruguay Round have resulted in a revision of this Agreement which addresses many areas in which the current Agreement lacks precision and detail.
In particular, the revised Agreement provides for greater clarity and more detailed rules in relation to the method of determining that a product is dumped, the criteria to be taken into account in a determination that dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry, the procedures to be followed in initiating and conducting anti-dumping investigations, and the implementation and duration of anti-dumping measures. In addition, the new agreement clarifies the role of dispute settlement panels in disputes relating to anti-dumping actions taken by domestic authorities.
On the methodology for determining that a product is exported at a dumped price, the new Agreement adds relatively specific provisions on such issues as criteria for allocating costs when the export price is compared with a “constructed” normal value and rules to ensure that a fair comparison is made between the export price and the normal value of a product so as not to arbitrarily create or inflate margins of dumping.
The agreement strengthens the requirement for the importing country to establish a clear causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the domestic industry. The examination of the dumped imports on the industry concerned must include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors bearing on the state of the industry concerned. The agreement confirms the existing interpretation of the term “domestic industry”. Subject to a few exceptions, “domestic industry” refers to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.
Clear-cut procedures have been established on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated and how such investigations are to be conducted. Conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence are set out. Provisions on the application of provisional measures, the use of price undertakings in anti-dumping cases, and on the duration of anti-dumping measures have been strengthened. Thus, a significant improvement over the existing Agreement consists of the addition of a new provision under which anti-dumping measures shall expire five years after the date of imposition, unless a determination is made that, in the event of termination of the measures, dumping and injury would be likely to continue or recur.
A new provision requires the immediate termination of an anti-dumping investigation in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis (which is defined as less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price of the product) or that the volume of dumped imports is negligible (generally when the volume of dumped imports from an individual country accounts for less than 3 per cent of the imports of the product in question into the importing country).
The agreement calls for prompt and detailed notification of all preliminary or final anti-dumping actions to a Committee on Anti-dumping Practices. The agreement will afford parties the opportunity of consulting on any matter relating to the operation of the agreement or the furtherance of its objectives, and to request the establishment of panels to examine disputes.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII (Customs Valuation)
Back to top
The Decision on Customs Valuation would give customs administrations the right to request further information of importers where they have reason to doubt the accuracy of the declared value of imported goods. If the administration maintains a reasonable doubt, despite any additional information, it may be deemed that the customs value of the imported goods cannot be determined on the basis of the declared value, and customs would need to establish the value taking into account the provisions of the Agreement. In addition, two accompanying texts further clarify certain of the Agreement’s provisions relevant to developing countries and relating to minimum values and importations by sole agents, sole distributors and sole concessionaires.
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection Back to top
Preshipment inspection (PSI) is the practice of employing specialized private companies to check shipment details — essentially price, quantity, quality — of goods ordered overseas. Used by governments of developing countries, the purpose is to safeguard national financial interests (prevention of capital flight and commercial fraud as well as customs duty evasion, for instance) and to compensate for inadequacies in administrative infrastructures.
The agreement recognizes that GATT principles and obligations apply to the activities of preshipment inspection agencies mandated by governments. The obligations placed on PSI-user governments include non-discrimination, transparency, protection of confidential business information, avoidance of unreasonable delay, the use of specific guidelines for conducting price verification and the avoidance of conflicts of interest by the PSI agencies.
The obligations of exporting contracting parties towards PSI users include non-discrimination in the application of domestic laws and regulations, prompt publication of such laws and regulations and the provision of technical assistance where requested.
The agreement establishes an independent review procedure — administered jointly by an organization representing PSI agencies and an organization representing exporters — to resolve disputes between an exporter and a PSI agency.
Agreement on Rules of Origin Back to top
The agreement aims at long-term harmonization of rules of origin, other than rules of origin relating to the granting of tariff preferences, and to ensure that such rules do not themselves create unnecessary obstacles to trade.
The agreement sets up a harmonization programme, to be initiated as soon as possible after the completion of the Uruguay Round and to be completed within three years of initiation. It would be based upon a set of principles, including making rules of origin objective, understandable and predictable. The work would be conducted by a Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) in the WTO and a technical committee (TCRO) under the auspices of the Customs Cooperation Council in Brussels.
Much work was done in the CRO and the TCRO and substantial progress has been achieved in the three years foreseen in the Agreement for the completion of the work. However, due to the complexity of the issues the HWP could not be finalized within the foreseen deadline. The CRO continued its work in 2000. In December 2000, the General Council Special Session agreed to set, as the new deadline for completion of the remainder of the work, the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference, or at the latest the end of 2001. The negotiating texts are contained in documents G/RO/41 and G/RO/45.
Until the completion of the harmonization programme, contracting parties would be expected to ensure that their rules of origin are transparent; that they do not have restricting, distorting or disruptive effects on international trade; that they are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, and that they are based on a positive standard (in other words, they should state what does confer origin rather than what does not).
An annex to the agreement sets out a “common declaration” with respect to the operation of rules of origin on goods which qualify for preferential treatment.
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures Back to top
The revised agreement strengthens the disciplines on the users of import licensing systems — which, in any event, are much less widely used now than in the past — and increases transparency and predictability. For example, the agreement requires parties to publish sufficient information for traders to know the basis on which licences are granted. It contains strengthened rules for the notification of the institution of import licensing procedures or changes therein. It also offers guidance on the assessment of applications.
With respect to automatic licensing procedures, the revised agreement sets out criteria under which they are assumed not to have trade restrictive effects. With respect to non-automatic licensing procedures, their administrative burden for importers and exporters should be limited to what is absolutely necessary to administer the measures to which they apply. The revised agreement also sets a maximum of 60 days for applications to be considered.
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Back to top
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is intended to build on the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII which was negotiated in the Tokyo Round.
Unlike its predecessor, the agreement contains a definition of subsidy and introduces the concept of a “specific” subsidy — for the most part, a subsidy available only to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the authority granting the subsidy. Only specific subsidies would be subject to the disciplines set out in the agreement.
The agreement establishes three categories of subsidies. First, it deems the following subsidies to be “prohibited”: those contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance; and those contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. Prohibited subsidies are subject to new dispute settlement procedures. The main features include an expedited timetable for action by the Dispute Settlement body, and if it is found that the subsidy is indeed prohibited, it must be immediately withdrawn. If this is not done within the specified time period, the complaining member is authorized to take countermeasures. (See the section on “Dispute Settlement” for details on the procedures).
The second category is “actionable” subsidies. The agreement stipulates that no member should cause, through the use of subsidies, adverse effects to the interests of other signatories, i.e. injury to domestic industry of another signatory, nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other signatories under the General Agreement (in particular the benefits of bound tariff concessions), and serious prejudice to the interests of another member. “Serious prejudice” shall be presumed to exist for certain subsidies including when the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeds 5 per cent. In such a situation, the burden of proof is on the subsidizing member to show that the subsidies in question do not cause serious prejudice to the complaining member. Members affected by actionable subsidies may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement body. In the event that it is determined that such adverse effects exist, the subsidizing member must withdraw the subsidy or remove the adverse effects.
The third category involves non-actionable subsidies, which could either be non-specific subsidies, or specific subsidies involving assistance to industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, assistance to disadvantaged regions, or certain type of assistance for adapting existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations. Where another member believes that an otherwise non-actionable subsidy is resulting in serious adverse effects to a domestic industry, it may seek a determination and recommendation on the matter.
One part of the agreement concerns the use of countervailing measures on subsidized imported goods. It sets out disciplines on the initiation of countervailing cases, investigations by national authorities and rules of evidence to ensure that all interested parties can present information and argument. Certain disciplines on the calculation of the amount of a subsidy are outlined as is the basis for the determination of injury to the domestic industry. The agreement would require that all relevant economic factors be taken into account in assessing the state of the industry and that a causal link be established between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury. Countervailing investigations shall be terminated immediately in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis (the subsidy is less than 1 per cent ad valorem) or where the volume of subsidized imports, actual or potential, or the injury is negligible. Except under exceptional circumstances, investigations shall be concluded within one year after their initiation and in no case more than 18 months. All countervailing duties have to be terminated within 5 years of their imposition unless the authorities determine on the basis of a review that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury.
The agreement recognizes that subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of developing countries, and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries that have less than $1,000 per capita GNP are thus exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies, and have a time-bound exemption from other prohibited subsidies. For other developing countries, the export subsidy prohibition would take effect 8 years after the entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO, and they have a time-bound (though fewer years than for poorer developing countries) exemption from the other prohibited subsidies. Countervailing investigation of a product originating from a developing-country member would be terminated if the overall level of subsidies does not exceed 2 per cent (and from certain developing countries 3 per cent) of the value of the product, or if the volume of the subsidized imports represents less than 4 per cent of the total imports for the like product in the importing signatory. For countries in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market economy, prohibited subsidies shall be phased out within a period of seven years from the date of entry into force of the agreement.
In anticipation of the negotiation of special rules in the civil aircraft sector, under the subsidies agreement, civil aircraft products are not subject to the presumption that ad valorem subsidization in excess of 5 per cent causes serious prejudice to the interests of other Members. In addition, the Agreement provides that where repayment of financing in the civil aircraft sector is dependent on the level of sales of a product and sales fall below expectations, this does not in itself give rise to such presumption of serious prejudice.
Agreement on Safeguards Back to top
Article XIX of the General Agreement allows a GATT member to take a “safeguard” action to protect a specific domestic industry from an unforeseen increase of imports of any product which is causing, or which is likely to cause, serious injury to the industry.
The agreement breaks major ground in establishing a prohibition against so-called “grey area” measures, and in setting a “sunset clause” on all safeguard actions. The agreement stipulates that a member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side. Any such measure in effect at the time of entry into force of the agreement would be brought into conformity with this agreement, or would have to be phased out within four years after the entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO. An exception could be made for one specific measure for each importing member, subject to mutual agreement with the directly concerned member, where the phase-out date would be 31 December 1999.
All existing safeguard measures taken under Article XIX of the General Agreement 1947 shall be terminated not later than eight years after the date on which they were first applied or five years after the date of entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO, whichever comes later.
The agreement sets out requirements for safeguard investigation which include public notice for hearings and other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence, including on whether a measure would be in the public interest. In the event of critical circumstances, a provisional safeguard measure may be imposed based upon a preliminary determination of serious injury. The duration of such a provisional measure would not exceed 200 days.
The agreement sets out the criteria for “serious injury” and the factors which must be considered in determining the impact of imports. The safeguard measure should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. Where quantitative restrictions are imposed, they normally should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
In principle, safeguard measures have to be applied irrespective of source. In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries, the member applying restrictions may seek agreement with others. Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. Normally, allocation of shares would be on the basis of proportion of total quantity or value of the imported product over a previous representative period. However, it would be possible for the importing country to depart from this approach if it could demonstrate, in consultations under the auspices of the Safeguards Committee, that imports from certain contracting parties had increased disproportionately in relation to the total increase and that such a departure would be justified and equitable to all suppliers. The duration of the safeguard measure in this case cannot exceed four years.
The agreement lays down time limits for all safeguard measures. Generally, the duration of a measure should not exceed four years though this could be extended up to a maximum of eight years, subject to confirmation of continued necessity by the competent national authorities and if there is evidence that the industry is adjusting. Any measure imposed for a period greater than one year should be progressively liberalized during its lifetime. No safeguard measure could be applied again to a product that had been subject to such action for a period equal to the duration of the previous measure, subject to a non-application period of at least two years. A safeguard measure with a duration of 180 days or less may be applied again to the import of a product if at least one year had elapsed since the date of introduction of the measure on that product, and if such a measure had not been applied on the same product more than twice in the five-year period immediately preceding the date of introduction of the measure.
The agreement envisages consultations on compensation for safeguard measures. Where consultations are not successful, the affected members may withdraw equivalent concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994. However, such action is not allowed for the first three years of the safeguard measure if it conforms to the provisions of the agreement, and is taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports.
Safeguard measures would not be applicable to a product from a developing country member, if the share of the developing country member in the imports of the product concerned does not exceed 3 per cent, and that developing country members with less than 3 per cent import share collectively account for no more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned. A developing country member has the right to extend the period of application of a safeguard measure for a period of up to two years beyond the normal maximum. It can also apply a safeguard measure again to a product that had been subject to such an action after a period equal to half of the duration of the previous measure, subject to a non-application period of at least two years.
The agreement would establish a Safeguards Committee which would oversee the operation of its provisions and, in particular, be responsible for surveillance of its commitments.
General Agreement on Trade in Services Back to top
The Services Agreement which forms part of the Final Act rests on three pillars. The first is a Framework Agreement containing basic obligations which apply to all member countries. The second concerns national schedules of commitments containing specific further national commitments which will be the subject of a continuing process of liberalization. The third is a number of annexes addressing the special situations of individual services sectors.
Part I of the basic agreement defines its scope — specifically, services supplied from the territory of one party to the territory of another; services supplied in the territory of one party to the consumers of any other (for example, tourism); services provided through the presence of service providing entities of one party in the territory of any other (for example, banking); and services provided by nationals of one party in the territory of any other (for example, construction projects or consultancies).
Part II sets out general obligations and disciplines. A basic most-favoured-nation (m.f.n.) obligation states that each party “shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service providers of any other Party, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service providers of any other country”. However, it is recognized that m.f.n. treatment may not be possible for every service activity and, therefore, it is envisaged that parties may indicate specific m.f.n. exemptions. Conditions for such exemptions are included as an annex and provide for reviews after five years and a normal limitation of 10 years on their duration.
Transparency requirements include publication of all relevant laws and regulations. Provisions to facilitate the increased participation of developing countries in world services trade envisage negotiated commitments on access to technology, improvements in access to distribution channels and information networks and the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest. The provisions covering economic integration are analogous to those in Article XXIV of GATT, requiring arrangements to have “substantial sectoral coverage” and to “provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination” between the parties.
Since domestic regulations, not border measures, provide the most significant influence on services trade, provisions spell out that all such measures of general application should be administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. There would be a requirement that parties establish the means for prompt reviews of administrative decisions relating to the supply of services.
The agreement contains obligations with respect to recognition requirements (educational background, for instance) for the purpose of securing authorizations, licenses or certification in the services area. It encourages recognition requirements achieved through harmonization and internationally-agreed criteria. Further provisions state that parties are required to ensure that monopolies and exclusive service providers do not abuse their positions. Restrictive business practices should be subject to consultations between parties with a view to their elimination.
While parties are normally obliged not to restrict international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to commitments under the agreement, there are provisions allowing limited restrictions in the event of balance-of-payments difficulties. However, where such restrictions are imposed they would be subject to conditions; including that they are non-discriminatory, that they avoid unnecessary commercial damage to other parties and that they are of a temporary nature.
The agreement contains both general exceptions and security exceptions provisions which are similar to Articles XX and XXI of the GATT. It also envisages negotiations with a view to the development of disciplines on trade-distorting subsidies in the services area.
Part III contains provisions on market access and national treatment which would not be general obligations but would be commitments made in national schedules. Thus, in the case of market access, each party “shall accord services and service providers of other Parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its schedule”. The intention of the market-access provision is to progressively eliminate the following types of measures: limitations on numbers of service providers, on the total value of service transactions or on the total number of service operations or people employed. Equally, restrictions on the kind of legal entity or joint venture through which a service is provided or any foreign capital limitations relating to maximum levels of foreign participation are to be progressively eliminated.
The national-treatment provision contains the obligation to treat foreign service suppliers and domestic service suppliers in the same manner. However, it does provide the possibility of different treatment being accorded the service providers of other parties to that accorded to domestic service providers. However, in such cases the conditions of competition should not, as a result, be modified in favour of the domestic service providers.
Part IV of the agreement establishes the basis for progressive liberalization in the services area through successive rounds of negotiations and the development of national schedules. It also permits, after a period of three years, parties to withdraw or modify commitments made in their schedules. Where commitments are modified or withdrawn, negotiations should be undertaken with interested parties to agree on compensatory adjustments. Where agreement cannot be reached, compensation would be decided by arbitration.
Part V of the agreement contains institutional provisions, including consultation and dispute settlement and the establishment of a Council on Services. The responsibilities of the Council are set out in a Ministerial Decision.
The first of the annexes to the agreement concerns the movement of labour. It permits parties to negotiate specific commitments applying to the movement of people providing services under the agreement. It requires that people covered by a specific commitment shall be allowed to provide the service in accordance with the terms of the commitment. Nevertheless, the agreement would not apply to measures affecting employment, citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis. The annex on financial services (largely banking and insurance) lays down the right of parties, notwithstanding other provisions, to take prudential measures, including for the protection of investors, deposit holders and policy holders, and to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. However, a further understanding on financial services would allow those participants who choose to do so to undertake commitments on financial services through a different method. With respect to market access, the understanding contains more detailed obligations on, among other things, monopoly rights, cross-border trade (certain insurance and reinsurance policy writing as well as financial data processing and transfer), the right to establish or expand a commercial presence, and the temporary entry of personnel. The provisions on national treatment refer explicitly to access to payments and clearing systems operated by public entities and to official funding and refinancing facilities. They also relate to membership of, or participation in, self-regulatory bodies, securities or futures exchanges and clearing agencies.
The annex on telecommunications relates to measures which affect access to and use of public telecommunications services and networks. In particular, it requires that such access be accorded to another party, on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to permit the supply of a service included in its schedule. Conditions attached to the use of public networks should be no more than is necessary to safeguard the public service responsibilities of their operators, to protect the technical integrity of the network and to ensure that foreign service suppliers do not supply services unless permitted to do so through a specific commitment. The annex also encourages technical cooperation to assist developing countries in the strengthening of their own domestic telecommunications sectors. The annex on air-transport services excludes from the agreement’s coverage traffic rights (largely bilateral air-service agreements conferring landing rights) and directly related activities which might affect the negotiation of traffic rights. Nevertheless, the annex, in its current form, also states that the agreement should apply to aircraft repair and maintenance services, the marketing of air-transport services and computer-reservation services. The operation of the annex would be reviewed at least every five years.
In the final days of the services negotiations, three Decisions were taken — on Financial Services, Professional Services and the Movement of Natural Persons. The Decision on Financial Services confirmed that commitments in this sector would be implemented on an MFN basis, and permits Members to revise and finalize their schedules of commitments and their MFN exemptions six months after the entry into force of the Agreement. Contrary to some media reports, the audio-visual and maritime sectors have not been removed from the scope of the GATS.
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods Back to top
The agreement recognises that widely varying standards in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and the lack of a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods have been a growing source of tension in international economic relations. Rules and disciplines were needed to cope with these tensions. To that end, the agreement addresses the applicability of basic GATT principles and those of relevant international intellectual property agreements; the provision of adequate intellectual property rights; the provision of effective enforcement measures for those rights; multilateral dispute settlement; and transitional arrangements.
Part I of the agreement sets out general provisions and basic principles, notably a national-treatment commitment under which the nationals of other parties must be given treatment no less favourable than that accorded to a party’s own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. It also contains a most-favoured-nation clause, a novelty in an international intellectual property agreement, under which any advantage a party gives to the nationals of another country must be extended immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other parties, even if such treatment is more favourable than that which it gives to its own nationals.
Part II addresses each intellectual property right in succession. With respect to copyright, parties are required to comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works, in its latest version (Paris 1971), though they will not be obliged to protect moral rights as stipulated in Article 6bis of that Convention. It ensures that computer programs will be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention and lays down on what basis data bases should be protected by copyright. Important additions to existing international rules in the area of copyright and related rights are the provisions on rental rights. The draft requires authors of computer programmes and producers of sound recordings to be given the right to authorize or prohibit the commercial rental of their works to the public. A similar exclusive right applies to films where commercial rental has led to widespread copying which is materially impairing the right of reproduction. The draft also requires performers to be given protection from unauthorized recording and broadcast of live performances (bootlegging). The protection for performers and producers of sound recordings would be for no less than 50 years. Broadcasting organizations would have control over the use that can be made of broadcast signals without their authorization. This right would last for at least 20 years.
With respect to trademarks and service marks, the agreement defines what types of signs must be eligible for protection as a trademark or service mark and what the minimum rights conferred on their owners must be. Marks that have become well-known in a particular country shall enjoy additional protection. In addition, the agreement lays down a number of obligations with regard to the use of trademarks and service marks, their term of protection, and their licensing or assignment. For example, requirements that foreign marks be used in conjunction with local marks would, as a general rule, be prohibited.
In respect of geographical indications, the agreement lays down that all parties must provide means to prevent the use of any indication which misleads the consumer as to the origin of goods, and any use which would constitute an act of unfair competition. A higher level of protection is provided for geographical indications for wines and spirits, which are protected even where there is no danger of the public’s being misled as to the true origin. Exceptions are allowed for names that have already become generic terms, but any country using such an exception must be willing to negotiate with a view to protecting the geographical indications in question. Furthermore, provision is made for further negotiations to establish a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines.
Industrial designs are also protected under the agreement for a period of 10 years. Owners of protected designs would be able to prevent the manufacture, sale or importation of articles bearing or embodying a design which is a copy of the protected design.
As regards patents, there is a general obligation to comply with the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention (1967). In addition, the agreement requires that 20-year patent protection be available for all inventions, whether of products or processes, in almost all fields of technology. Inventions may be excluded from patentability if their commercial exploitation is prohibited for reasons of public order or morality; otherwise, the permitted exclusions are for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, and for plants and (other than microorganisms) animals and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals (other than microbiological processes). Plant varieties, however, must be protectable either by patents or by a sui generis system (such as the breeder’s rights provided in a UPOV Convention). Detailed conditions are laid down for compulsory licensing or governmental use of patents without the authorization of the patent owner. Rights conferred in respect of patents for processes must extend to the products directly obtained by the process; under certain conditions alleged infringers may be ordered by a court to prove that they have not used the patented process.
With respect to the protection of layout designs of integrated circuits, the agreement requires parties to provide protection on the basis of the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits which was opened for signature in May 1989, but with a number of additions: protection must be available for a minimum period of 10 years; the rights must extend to articles incorporating infringing layout designs; innocent infringers must be allowed to use or sell stock in hand or ordered before learning of the infringement against a suitable royalty: and compulsory licensing and government use is only allowed under a number of strict conditions.
Trade secrets and know-how which have commercial value must be protected against breach of confidence and other acts contrary to honest commercial practices. Test data submitted to governments in order to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals must also be protected against unfair commercial use.
The final section in this part of the agreement concerns anti-competitive practices in contractual licences. It provides for consultations between governments where there is reason to believe that licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights constitute an abuse of these rights and have an adverse effect on competition. Remedies against such abuses must be consistent with the other provisions of the agreement.
Part III of the agreement sets out the obligations of member governments to provide procedures and remedies under their domestic law to ensure that intellectual property rights can be effectively enforced, by foreign right holders as well as by their own nationals. Procedures should permit effective action against infringement of intellectual property rights but should be fair and equitable, not unnecessarily complicated or costly, and should not entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. They should allow for judicial review of final administrative decisions. There is no obligation to put in place a judicial system distinct from that for the enforcement of laws in general, nor to give priority to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the allocation of resources or staff.
The civil and administrative procedures and remedies spelled out in the text include provisions on evidence of proof, injunctions, damages and other remedies which would include the right of judicial authorities to order the disposal or destruction of infringing goods. Judicial authorities must also have the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where evidence is likely to be destroyed. Further provisions relate to measures to be taken at the border for the suspension by customs authorities of release, into domestic circulation, of counterfeit and pirated goods. Finally, parties should provide for criminal procedures and penalties at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies should include imprisonment and fines sufficient to act as a deterrent.
The agreement would establish a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to monitor the operation of the agreement and governments’ compliance with it. Dispute settlement would take place under the integrated GATT dispute-settlement procedures as revised in the Uruguay Round.
With respect to the implementation of the agreement, it envisages a one-year transition period for developed countries to bring their legislation and practices into conformity. Developing countries and countries in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market economy would have a five-year transition period, and least-developed countries 11 years. Developing countries which do not at present provide product patent protection in an area of technology would have up to 10 years to introduce such protection. However, in the case of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, they must accept the filing of patent applications from the beginning of the transitional period. Though the patent need not be granted until the end of this period, the novelty of the invention is preserved as of the date of filing the application. If authorization for the marketing of the relevant pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical is obtained during the transitional period, the developing country concerned must offer an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years, or until a product patent is granted, whichever is shorter.
Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule is that the obligations in the agreement would apply to existing intellectual property rights as well as to new ones.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Back to top
The dispute settlement system of the GATT is generally considered to be one of the cornerstones of the multilateral trade order. The system has already been strengthened and streamlined as a result of reforms agreed following the Mid-Term Review Ministerial Meeting held in Montreal in December 1988. Disputes currently being dealt with by the Council are subject to these new rules, which include greater automaticity in decisions on the establishment, terms of reference and composition of panels, such that these decisions are no longer dependent upon the consent of the parties to a dispute. The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) will further strengthen the existing system significantly, extending the greater automaticity agreed in the Mid-Term Review to the adoption of the panels’ and a new Appellate Body’s findings. Moreover, the DSU will establish an integrated system permitting WTO Members to base their claims on any of the multilateral trade agreements included in the Annexes to the Agreement establishing the WTO. For this purpose, a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will exercise the authority of the General Council and the Councils and committees of the covered agreements.
The DSU emphasizes the importance of consultations in securing dispute resolution, requiring a Member to enter into consultations within 30 days of a request for consultations from another Member. If after 60 days from the request for consultations there is no settlement, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. Where consultations are denied, the complaining party may move directly to request a panel. The parties may voluntarily agree to follow alternative means of dispute settlement, including good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration.
Where a dispute is not settled through consultations, the DSU requires the establishment of a panel, at the latest, at the meeting of the DSB following that at which a request is made, unless the DSB decides by consensus against establishment. The DSU also sets out specific rules and deadlines for deciding the terms of reference and composition of panels. Standard terms of reference will apply unless the parties agree to special terms within 20 days of the panel’s establishment. And where the parties do not agree on the composition of the panel within the same 20 days, this can be decided by the Director-General. Panels normally consist of three persons of appropriate background and experience from countries not party to the dispute. The Secretariat will maintain a list of experts satisfying the criteria.
Panel procedures are set out in detail in the DSU. It is envisaged that a panel will normally complete its work within six months or, in cases of urgency, within three months. Panel reports may be considered by the DSB for adoption 20 days after they are issued to Members. Within 60 days of their issuance, they will be adopted, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report or one of the parties notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal.
The concept of appellate review is an important new feature of the DSU. An Appellate Body will be established, composed of seven members, three of whom will serve on any one case. An appeal will be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. Appellate proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party formally notifies its decision to appeal. The resulting report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties within 30 days following its issuance to Members, unless the DSB decides by consensus against its adoption.
Once the panel report or the Appellate Body report is adopted, the party concerned will have to notify its intentions with respect to implementation of adopted recommendations. If it is impracticable to comply immediately, the party concerned shall be given a reasonable period of time, the latter to be decided either by agreement of the parties and approval by the DSB within 45 days of adoption of the report or through arbitration within 90 days of adoption. In any event, the DSB will keep the implementation under regular surveillance until the issue is resolved.
Further provisions set out rules for compensation or the suspension of concessions in the event of non-implementation. Within a specified time-frame, parties can enter into negotiations to agree on mutually acceptable compensation. Where this has not been agreed, a party to the dispute may request authorization of the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations to the other party concerned. The DSB will grant such authorization within 30 days of the expiry of the agreed time-frame for implementation. Disagreements over the proposed level of suspension may be referred to arbitration. In principle, concessions should be suspended in the same sector as that in issue in the panel case. If this is not practicable or effective, the suspension can be made in a different sector of the same agreement. In turn, if this is not effective or practicable and if the circumstances are serious enough, the suspension of concessions may be made under another agreement.
One of the central provisions of the DSU reaffirms that Members shall not themselves make determinations of violations or suspend concessions, but shall make use of the dispute settlement rules and procedures of the DSU.
The DSU contains a number of provisions taking into account the specific interests of the developing and the least-developed countries. It also provides some special rules for the resolution of disputes which do not involve a violation of obligations under a covered agreement but where a Member believes nevertheless that benefits are being nullified or impaired. Special decisions to be adopted by Ministers in 1994 foresee that the Montreal Dispute Settlement Rules which would otherwise have expired at the time of the April 1994 meeting are extended until the entry into force of the WTO. Another decision foresees that the new rules and procedures will be reviewed within four years after the entry into force of the WTO.
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
An agreement confirms the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, introduced at the time of the Mid-term Review, and encourages greater transparency in national trade policy-making. A further Ministerial decision reforms the notification requirements and procedures generally.
Decision on achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making Back to top
This will set out concepts and proposals with respect to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making. Among other things, the text notes that greater exchange rate stability based on more orderly underlying economic and financial conditions should contribute to “the expansion of trade, sustainable growth and development, and the timely correction of external imbalances”. It recognizes that while difficulties whose origins lie outside the trade field cannot be redressed through measures taken in the trade field alone, there are nevertheless interlinkages between the different aspects of economic policy. Therefore, WTO is called upon to develop its cooperation with the international organizations responsible for monetary and financial matters. In particular, the Director-General of WTO is called upon to review, with his opposite numbers in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the implications of WTO’s future responsibilities for its cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions.
Government Procurement
The Final Act contains an agreement related to accession procedures to the Government Procurement Agreement which is designed to facilitate the membership of developing countries. It envisages consultations between the existing members and applicant governments. These would be followed by the establishment of accession working parties to examine the offers made by applicant countries (in other words, the public entities whose procurement will be opened up to international competition) as well as the export opportunities for the applicant country in the markets of existing signatories.
This agreement should be distinguished from the new Agreement on Government Procurement.
contact us : World Trade Organization, rue de Lausanne 154, CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland
dari : http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#lAgreement
“The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations”, signed by ministers in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 is 550 pages long and contains legal texts which spell out the results of the negotiations since the Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. In addition to the texts of the agreements, the Final Act also contains texts of Ministerial Decisions and Declarations which further clarify certain provisions of some of the agreements.
The Final Act covers all the negotiating areas cited in the Punta del Este Declaration with two important exceptions. The first is the results of the “market access negotiations” in which individual countries have made binding commitments to reduce or eliminate specific tariffs and non-tariff barriers to merchandise trade. These concessions are recorded in national schedules that form an integral part of the Final Act. The second is the “initial commitments” on liberalization of trade in services. These commitments on liberalization are also recorded in national schedules.
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Back to top
The agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) calls for a single institutional framework encompassing the GATT, as modified by the Uruguay Round, all agreements and arrangements concluded under its auspices and the complete results of the Uruguay Round. Its structure is headed by a Ministerial Conference meeting at least once every two years. A General Council oversees the operation of the agreement and ministerial decisions on a regular basis. This General Council acts as a Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which concern themselves with the full range of trade issues covered by the WTO, and has also established subsidiary bodies such as a Goods Council, a Services Council and a TRIPs Council. The WTO framework ensures a “single undertaking approach” to the results of the Uruguay Round — thus, membership in the WTO entails accepting all the results of the Round without exception.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Back to top
Texts on the interpretation of the following GATT articles are included in the Final Act:
Article II — Schedules of Concessions. Agreement to record in national schedules “other duties or charges” levied in addition to the recorded tariff and to bind them at the levels prevailing at the date established in the Uruguay Round Protocol.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII — State-trading Enterprises. Agreement increasing surveillance of their activities through stronger notification and review procedures.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Articles XII and XVIII:B
Balance-of-payments provisions. Agreement that contracting parties imposing restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes should do so in the least trade-disruptive manner and should favour price-based measures, like import surcharges and import deposits, rather than quantitative restrictions. Agreement also on procedures for consultations by the GATT Balance-of-Payments Committee as well as for notification of BOP measures.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV — Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas. Agreement clarifying and reinforcing the criteria and procedures for the review of new or enlarged customs unions or free-trade areas and for the evaluation of their effects on third parties. The agreement also clarifies the procedure to be followed for achieving any necessary compensatory adjustment in the event of contracting parties forming a customs union seeking to increase a bound tariff. The obligations of contracting parties in regard to measures taken by regional or local governments or authorities within their territories are also clarified.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXV — Waivers. Agreement of new procedures for the granting of waivers from GATT disciplines, to specify termination dates for any waivers to be granted in the future, and to fix expiry dates for existing waivers. The main provisions concerning the granting of waivers are, however, contained in the Agreement on the WTO.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII — Modification of GATT Schedules. Agreement on new procedures for the negotiation of compensation when tariff bindings are modified or withdrawn, including the creation of a new negotiating right for the country for which the product in question accounts for the highest proportion of its exports. This is intended to increase the ability of smaller and developing countries to participate in negotiations.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXXV — Non-application of the General Agreement. Agreement to allow a contracting party or a newly acceding country to invoke GATT’s non-application provisions vis-à-vis the other party after having entered into tariff negotiations with each other. The WTO Agreement foresees that any invocation of the non-application provisions under that Agreement must extend to all the multilateral agreements.
Uruguay Round Protocol GATT 1994 Back to top
The results of the market access negotiations in which participants have made commitments to eliminate or reduce tariff rates and non-tariff measures applicable to trade in goods are recorded in national schedules of concessions annexed to the Uruguay Round Protocol that forms an integral part of the Final Act.
The Protocol has five appendices: Appendix I Section A: Agricultural Products — Tariff concessions on a Most-Favoured Nation basis; Appendix I Section B: Agricultural Products — Tariff Quotas; Appendix II:Tariff Concessions on a Most-Favoured Nation Basis on Other Products; Appendix III: Preferential Tariff — Part II of Schedules (if applicable); Appendix IV: Concessions on Non-Tariff Measures — Part III of Schedules; Appendix V: Agriculture Products: Commitments Limiting Subsidization — Part IV of Schedules, Section I: Domestic Support: Total AMS Commitments, Section II: Export Subsidies: Budgetary Outlay and Quantity, Reduction Commitments Section III: Commitments Limiting the Scope of Export Subsidies.
The schedule annexed to the Protocol relating to a Member shall become a Schedule to the GATT 1994 relating to that Member on the day on which the Agreement Establishing the WTO enters into force for that Member.
For non-agricultural products the tariff reduction agreed upon by each Member shall be implemented in five equal rate reductions, except as may be otherwise specified in a Member’s Schedule. The first such reduction shall be made effective on the date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. Each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years, and the final rate shall become effective no later than the date four years after the date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. However, participants may implement reduction in fewer stages or at earlier dates than those indicated in the Protocol, if they so wish.
For agricultural products, as defined in Article 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the staging of reductions shall be implemented as specified in the relevant parts of the schedules. Details are given in the section of this paper concerning the Agricultural Agreement.
A related Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries establishes, among other things, that these countries will not be required to undertake any commitments and concessions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Alongside other more specific provisions for flexible and favourable treatment, it also allows for the completion of their schedules of concessions and commitments in Market Access and in Services by April 1995 rather than 15 December 1993.
Agreement on Agriculture Back to top
The negotiations have resulted in four main portions of the Agreement; the Agreement on Agriculture itself; the concessions and commitments Members are to undertake on market access, domestic support and export subsidies; the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and the Ministerial Decision concerning Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing countries.
Overall, the results of the negotiations provide a framework for the long-term reform of agricultural trade and domestic policies over the years to come. It makes a decisive move towards the objective of increased market orientation in agricultural trade. The rules governing agricultural trade are strengthened which will lead to improved predictability and stability for importing and exporting countries alike.
The agricultural package also addresses many other issues of vital economic and political importance to many Members. These include provisions that encourage the use of less trade-distorting domestic support policies to maintain the rural economy, that allow actions to be taken to ease any adjustment burden, and also the introduction of tightly prescribed provisions that allow some flexibility in the implementation of commitments. Specific concerns of developing countries have been addressed including the concerns of net-food importing countries and least-developed countries.
The agricultural package provides for commitments in the area of market access, domestic support and export competition. The text of the Agricultural Agreement is mirrored in the GATT Schedules of legal commitments relating to individual countries (see above).
In the area of market access, non-tariff border measures are replaced by tariffs that provide substantially the same level of protection. Tariffs resulting from this “tariffication” process, as well as other tariffs on agricultural products, are to be reduced by an average 36 per cent in the case of developed countries and 24 per cent in the case of developing countries, with minimum reductions for each tariff line being required. Reductions are to be undertaken over six years in the case of developed countries and over ten years in the case of developing countries. Least-developed countries are not required to reduce their tariffs.
The tariffication package also provides for the maintenance of current access opportunities and the establishment of minimum access tariff quotas (at reduced-tariff rates) where current access is less than 3 per cent of domestic consumption. These minimum access tariff quotas are to be expanded to 5 per cent over the implementation period. In the case of “tariffied” products “special safeguard” provisions will allow additional duties to be applied in case shipments at prices denominated in domestic currencies below a certain reference level or in case of a surge of imports. The trigger in the safeguard for import surges depends on the “import penetration” currently existing in the market, i.e. where imports currently make up a large proportion of consumption, the import surge required to trigger the special safeguard action is lower.
Domestic support measures that have, at most, a minimal impact on trade (“green box” policies) are excluded from reduction commitments. Such policies include general government services, for example in the areas of research, disease control, infrastructure and food security. It also includes direct payments to producers, for example certain forms of “decoupled” (from production) income support, structural adjustment assistance, direct payments under environmental programmes and under regional assistance programmes.
In addition to the green box policies, other policies need not be included in the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Total AMS) reduction commitments. These policies are direct payments under production-limiting programmes, certain government assistance measures to encourage agricultural and rural development in developing countries and other support which makes up only a low proportion (5 per cent in the case of developed countries and 10 per cent in the case of developing countries) of the value of production of individual products or, in the case of non-product-specific support, the value of total agricultural production.
The Total AMS covers all support provided on either a product-specific or non-product-specific basis that does not qualify for exemption and is to be reduced by 20 per cent (13.3 per cent for developing countries with no reduction for least-developed countries) during the implementation period.
Members are required to reduce the value of mainly direct export subsidies to a level 36 per cent below the 1986-90 base period level over the six-year implementation period, and the quantity of subsidised exports by 21 per cent over the same period. In the case of developing countries, the reductions are two-thirds those of developed countries over a ten-year period (with no reductions applying to the least-developed countries) and subject to certain conditions, there are no commitments on subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products or internal transport and freight charges on export shipments. Where subsidised exports have increased since the 1986-90 base period, 1991-92 may be used, in certain circumstances, as the beginning point of reductions although the end-point remains that based on the 1986-90 base period level. The Agreement on Agriculture provides for some limited flexibility between years in terms of export subsidy reduction commitments and contains provisions aimed at preventing the circumvention of the export subsidy commitments and sets out criteria for food aid donations and the use of export credits.
“Peace” provisions within the agreement include: an understanding that certain actions available under the Subsidies Agreement will not be applied with respect to green box policies and domestic support and export subsidies maintained in conformity with commitments; an understanding that “due restraint” will be used in the application of countervailing duty rights under the General Agreement; and setting out limits in terms of the applicability of nullification or impairment actions. These peace provisions will apply for a period of 9 years.
The agreement sets up a committee that will monitor the implementation of commitments, and also monitor the follow-up to the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.
The package is conceived as part of a continuing process with the long-term objective of securing substantial progressive reductions in support and protection. In this light, it calls for further negotiations in the fifth year of implementation which, along with an assessment of the first five years, would take into account non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment for developing countries, the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and other concerns and objectives noted in the preamble to the agreement.
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Back to top
This agreement concerns the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures — in other words food safety and animal and plant health regulations. The agreement recognises that governments have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures but that they should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail.
In order to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members are encouraged to base their measures on international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist. However, Members may maintain or introduce measures which result in higher standards if there is scientific justification or as a consequence of consistent risk decisions based on an appropriate risk assessment. The Agreement spells out procedures and criteria for the assessment of risk and the determination of appropriate levels of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
It is expected that Members would accept the sanitary and phytosanitary measures of others as equivalent if the exporting country demonstrates to the importing country that its measures achieve the importing country’s appropriate level of health protection. The agreement includes provisions on control, inspection and approval procedures.
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries Back to top
It is recognized that during the reform programme least-developed and net food-i mporting developing countries may experience negative effects with respect to supplies of food impor ts on reasonable terms and conditions. Therefore, a special Decision sets out objectives with regard to the provision of food aid, the provision of basic foodstuffs in full grant form and aid for agricultural development. It also refers to the possibility of assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank with respect to the short-term financing of commercial food imports. The Committee of Agriculture, set up under the Agreement on Agriculture, monitors the follow-up to the Decision.
Note: this Agreement was terminated on 1 January 2005.
See Textiles
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing Back to top
The object of this negotiation has been to secure the eventual integration of the textiles and clothing sector — where much of the trade is currently subject to bilateral quotas negotiated under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) — into the GATT on the basis of strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.
Integration of the sector into the GATT would take place as follows : first, on 1 January 1995; each party would integrate into the GATT products from the specific list in the Agreement which accounted for not less than 16 per cent of its total volume of imports in 1990. Integration means that trade in these products will be governed by the general rules of GATT.
At the beginning of Phase 2, on 1 January 1998, products which accounted for not less than 17 per cent of 1990 imports would be integrated. On 1 January 2002, products which accounted for not less than 18 per cent of 1990 imports would be integrated. All remaining products would be integrated at the end of the transition period on 1 January 2005. At each of the first three stages, products should be chosen from each of the following categories: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing.
All MFA restrictions in place on 31 December 1994 would be carried over into the new agreement and maintained until such time as the restrictions are removed or the products integrated into GATT. For products remaining under restraint, at whatever stage, the agreement lays down a formula for increasing the existing growth rates. Thus, during Stage 1, and for each restriction previously under MFA bilateral agreements in force for 1994, annual growth should be not less than 16 per cent higher than the growth rate established for the previous MFA restriction. For Stage 2 (1998 to 2001 inclusive), annual growth rates should be 25 per cent higher than the Stage 1 rates. For Stage 3 (2002 to 2004 inclusive), annual growth rates should be 27 per cent higher than the Stage 2 rates.
While the agreement focuses largely on the phasing-out of MFA restrictions, it also recognizes that some members maintain non-MFA restrictions not justified under a GATT provision. These would also be brought into conformity with GATT within one year of the entry into force of the Agreement or phased out progressively during a period not exceeding the duration of the Agreement (that is, by 2005).
It also contains a specific transitional safeguard mechanism which could be applied to products not yet integrated into the GATT at any stage. Action under the safeguard mechanism could be taken against individual exporting countries if it were demonstrated by the importing country that overall imports of a product were entering the country in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage — or to threaten it — to the relevant domestic industry, and that there was a sharp and substantial increase of imports from the individual country concerned. Action under the safeguard mechanism could be taken either by mutual agreement, following consultations, or unilaterally but subject to review by the Textiles Monitoring Body. If taken, the level of restraints should be fixed at a level not lower than the actual level of exports or imports from the country concerned during the twelve-month period ending two months before the month in which a request for consultation was made. Safeguard restraints could remain in place for up to three years without extension or until the product is removed from the scope of the agreement (that is, integrated into the GATT), whichever comes first.
The agreement includes provisions to cope with possible circumvention of commitments through transshipment, re-routing, false declaration concerning country or place of origin and falsification of official documents.
The agreement also stipulates that, as part of the integration process, all members shall take such actions in the area of textiles and clothing as may be necessary to abide by GATT rules and disciplines so as to improve market access, ensure the application of policies relating to fair and equitable trading conditions, and avoid discrimination against imports when taking measures for general trade policy reasons.
In the context of a major review of the operation of the agreement to be conducted by the Council for Trade in Goods before the end of each stage of the integration process, the Council for Trade in Goods shall by consensus take such decisions as it deems appropriate to ensure that the balance of rights and obligations in this agreement is not upset. Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Body may authorise adjustments to the annual growth of quotas for the stage subsequent to the review with respect to Members it has found not to be complying with their obligations under this agreement.
A Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) oversees the implementation of commitments and to prepare reports for the major reviews mentioned above. The agreement also has provisions for special treatment to certain categories of countries — for example, those which have not been MFA members since 1986, new entrants, small suppliers, and least-developed countries.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Back to top
This agreement will extend and clarify the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade reached in the Tokyo Round. It seeks to ensure that technical negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. However, it recognizes that countries have the right to establish protection, at levels they consider appropriate, for example for human, animal or plant life or health or the environment, and should not be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure those levels of protection are met. The agreement therefore encourages countries to use international standards where these are appropriate, but it does not require them to change their levels of protection as a result of standardization.
Innovative features of the revised agreement are that it covers processing and production methods related to the characteristics of the product itself. The coverage of conformity assessment procedures is enlarged and the disciplines made more precise. Notification provisions applying to local government and non-governmental bodies are elaborated in more detail than in the Tokyo Round agreement. A Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards by standardizing bodies, which is open to acceptance by private sector bodies as well as the public sector, is included as an annex to the agreement.
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures Back to top
The agreement recognizes that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade. It provides that no contracting party shall apply any TRIM inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) of the GATT. To this end, an illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these articles is appended to the agreement. The list includes measures which require particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise (“local content requirements”) or which restrict the volume or value of imports such an enterprise can purchase or use to an amount related to the level of products it exports (“trade balancing requirements”).
The agreement requires mandatory notification of all non-conforming TRIMs and their elimination within two years for developed countries, within five years for developing countries and within seven years for least-developed countries. It establishes a Committee on TRIMs which will, among other things, monitor the implementation of these commitments. The agreement also provides for consideration, at a later date, of whether it should be complemented with provisions on investment and competition policy more broadly.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-dumping) Back to top
Article VI of the GATT provides for the right of contracting parties to apply anti-dumping measures, i.e. measures against imports of a product at an export price below its “normal value” (usually the price of the product in the domestic market of the exporting country) if such dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry in the territory of the importing contracting party. More detailed rules governing the application of such measures are currently provided in an Anti-dumping Agreement concluded at the end of the Tokyo Round. Negotiations in the Uruguay Round have resulted in a revision of this Agreement which addresses many areas in which the current Agreement lacks precision and detail.
In particular, the revised Agreement provides for greater clarity and more detailed rules in relation to the method of determining that a product is dumped, the criteria to be taken into account in a determination that dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry, the procedures to be followed in initiating and conducting anti-dumping investigations, and the implementation and duration of anti-dumping measures. In addition, the new agreement clarifies the role of dispute settlement panels in disputes relating to anti-dumping actions taken by domestic authorities.
On the methodology for determining that a product is exported at a dumped price, the new Agreement adds relatively specific provisions on such issues as criteria for allocating costs when the export price is compared with a “constructed” normal value and rules to ensure that a fair comparison is made between the export price and the normal value of a product so as not to arbitrarily create or inflate margins of dumping.
The agreement strengthens the requirement for the importing country to establish a clear causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the domestic industry. The examination of the dumped imports on the industry concerned must include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors bearing on the state of the industry concerned. The agreement confirms the existing interpretation of the term “domestic industry”. Subject to a few exceptions, “domestic industry” refers to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.
Clear-cut procedures have been established on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated and how such investigations are to be conducted. Conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence are set out. Provisions on the application of provisional measures, the use of price undertakings in anti-dumping cases, and on the duration of anti-dumping measures have been strengthened. Thus, a significant improvement over the existing Agreement consists of the addition of a new provision under which anti-dumping measures shall expire five years after the date of imposition, unless a determination is made that, in the event of termination of the measures, dumping and injury would be likely to continue or recur.
A new provision requires the immediate termination of an anti-dumping investigation in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis (which is defined as less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price of the product) or that the volume of dumped imports is negligible (generally when the volume of dumped imports from an individual country accounts for less than 3 per cent of the imports of the product in question into the importing country).
The agreement calls for prompt and detailed notification of all preliminary or final anti-dumping actions to a Committee on Anti-dumping Practices. The agreement will afford parties the opportunity of consulting on any matter relating to the operation of the agreement or the furtherance of its objectives, and to request the establishment of panels to examine disputes.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII (Customs Valuation)
Back to top
The Decision on Customs Valuation would give customs administrations the right to request further information of importers where they have reason to doubt the accuracy of the declared value of imported goods. If the administration maintains a reasonable doubt, despite any additional information, it may be deemed that the customs value of the imported goods cannot be determined on the basis of the declared value, and customs would need to establish the value taking into account the provisions of the Agreement. In addition, two accompanying texts further clarify certain of the Agreement’s provisions relevant to developing countries and relating to minimum values and importations by sole agents, sole distributors and sole concessionaires.
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection Back to top
Preshipment inspection (PSI) is the practice of employing specialized private companies to check shipment details — essentially price, quantity, quality — of goods ordered overseas. Used by governments of developing countries, the purpose is to safeguard national financial interests (prevention of capital flight and commercial fraud as well as customs duty evasion, for instance) and to compensate for inadequacies in administrative infrastructures.
The agreement recognizes that GATT principles and obligations apply to the activities of preshipment inspection agencies mandated by governments. The obligations placed on PSI-user governments include non-discrimination, transparency, protection of confidential business information, avoidance of unreasonable delay, the use of specific guidelines for conducting price verification and the avoidance of conflicts of interest by the PSI agencies.
The obligations of exporting contracting parties towards PSI users include non-discrimination in the application of domestic laws and regulations, prompt publication of such laws and regulations and the provision of technical assistance where requested.
The agreement establishes an independent review procedure — administered jointly by an organization representing PSI agencies and an organization representing exporters — to resolve disputes between an exporter and a PSI agency.
Agreement on Rules of Origin Back to top
The agreement aims at long-term harmonization of rules of origin, other than rules of origin relating to the granting of tariff preferences, and to ensure that such rules do not themselves create unnecessary obstacles to trade.
The agreement sets up a harmonization programme, to be initiated as soon as possible after the completion of the Uruguay Round and to be completed within three years of initiation. It would be based upon a set of principles, including making rules of origin objective, understandable and predictable. The work would be conducted by a Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) in the WTO and a technical committee (TCRO) under the auspices of the Customs Cooperation Council in Brussels.
Much work was done in the CRO and the TCRO and substantial progress has been achieved in the three years foreseen in the Agreement for the completion of the work. However, due to the complexity of the issues the HWP could not be finalized within the foreseen deadline. The CRO continued its work in 2000. In December 2000, the General Council Special Session agreed to set, as the new deadline for completion of the remainder of the work, the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference, or at the latest the end of 2001. The negotiating texts are contained in documents G/RO/41 and G/RO/45.
Until the completion of the harmonization programme, contracting parties would be expected to ensure that their rules of origin are transparent; that they do not have restricting, distorting or disruptive effects on international trade; that they are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, and that they are based on a positive standard (in other words, they should state what does confer origin rather than what does not).
An annex to the agreement sets out a “common declaration” with respect to the operation of rules of origin on goods which qualify for preferential treatment.
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures Back to top
The revised agreement strengthens the disciplines on the users of import licensing systems — which, in any event, are much less widely used now than in the past — and increases transparency and predictability. For example, the agreement requires parties to publish sufficient information for traders to know the basis on which licences are granted. It contains strengthened rules for the notification of the institution of import licensing procedures or changes therein. It also offers guidance on the assessment of applications.
With respect to automatic licensing procedures, the revised agreement sets out criteria under which they are assumed not to have trade restrictive effects. With respect to non-automatic licensing procedures, their administrative burden for importers and exporters should be limited to what is absolutely necessary to administer the measures to which they apply. The revised agreement also sets a maximum of 60 days for applications to be considered.
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Back to top
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is intended to build on the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII which was negotiated in the Tokyo Round.
Unlike its predecessor, the agreement contains a definition of subsidy and introduces the concept of a “specific” subsidy — for the most part, a subsidy available only to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the authority granting the subsidy. Only specific subsidies would be subject to the disciplines set out in the agreement.
The agreement establishes three categories of subsidies. First, it deems the following subsidies to be “prohibited”: those contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance; and those contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. Prohibited subsidies are subject to new dispute settlement procedures. The main features include an expedited timetable for action by the Dispute Settlement body, and if it is found that the subsidy is indeed prohibited, it must be immediately withdrawn. If this is not done within the specified time period, the complaining member is authorized to take countermeasures. (See the section on “Dispute Settlement” for details on the procedures).
The second category is “actionable” subsidies. The agreement stipulates that no member should cause, through the use of subsidies, adverse effects to the interests of other signatories, i.e. injury to domestic industry of another signatory, nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other signatories under the General Agreement (in particular the benefits of bound tariff concessions), and serious prejudice to the interests of another member. “Serious prejudice” shall be presumed to exist for certain subsidies including when the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeds 5 per cent. In such a situation, the burden of proof is on the subsidizing member to show that the subsidies in question do not cause serious prejudice to the complaining member. Members affected by actionable subsidies may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement body. In the event that it is determined that such adverse effects exist, the subsidizing member must withdraw the subsidy or remove the adverse effects.
The third category involves non-actionable subsidies, which could either be non-specific subsidies, or specific subsidies involving assistance to industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, assistance to disadvantaged regions, or certain type of assistance for adapting existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations. Where another member believes that an otherwise non-actionable subsidy is resulting in serious adverse effects to a domestic industry, it may seek a determination and recommendation on the matter.
One part of the agreement concerns the use of countervailing measures on subsidized imported goods. It sets out disciplines on the initiation of countervailing cases, investigations by national authorities and rules of evidence to ensure that all interested parties can present information and argument. Certain disciplines on the calculation of the amount of a subsidy are outlined as is the basis for the determination of injury to the domestic industry. The agreement would require that all relevant economic factors be taken into account in assessing the state of the industry and that a causal link be established between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury. Countervailing investigations shall be terminated immediately in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis (the subsidy is less than 1 per cent ad valorem) or where the volume of subsidized imports, actual or potential, or the injury is negligible. Except under exceptional circumstances, investigations shall be concluded within one year after their initiation and in no case more than 18 months. All countervailing duties have to be terminated within 5 years of their imposition unless the authorities determine on the basis of a review that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury.
The agreement recognizes that subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of developing countries, and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries that have less than $1,000 per capita GNP are thus exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies, and have a time-bound exemption from other prohibited subsidies. For other developing countries, the export subsidy prohibition would take effect 8 years after the entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO, and they have a time-bound (though fewer years than for poorer developing countries) exemption from the other prohibited subsidies. Countervailing investigation of a product originating from a developing-country member would be terminated if the overall level of subsidies does not exceed 2 per cent (and from certain developing countries 3 per cent) of the value of the product, or if the volume of the subsidized imports represents less than 4 per cent of the total imports for the like product in the importing signatory. For countries in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market economy, prohibited subsidies shall be phased out within a period of seven years from the date of entry into force of the agreement.
In anticipation of the negotiation of special rules in the civil aircraft sector, under the subsidies agreement, civil aircraft products are not subject to the presumption that ad valorem subsidization in excess of 5 per cent causes serious prejudice to the interests of other Members. In addition, the Agreement provides that where repayment of financing in the civil aircraft sector is dependent on the level of sales of a product and sales fall below expectations, this does not in itself give rise to such presumption of serious prejudice.
Agreement on Safeguards Back to top
Article XIX of the General Agreement allows a GATT member to take a “safeguard” action to protect a specific domestic industry from an unforeseen increase of imports of any product which is causing, or which is likely to cause, serious injury to the industry.
The agreement breaks major ground in establishing a prohibition against so-called “grey area” measures, and in setting a “sunset clause” on all safeguard actions. The agreement stipulates that a member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side. Any such measure in effect at the time of entry into force of the agreement would be brought into conformity with this agreement, or would have to be phased out within four years after the entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO. An exception could be made for one specific measure for each importing member, subject to mutual agreement with the directly concerned member, where the phase-out date would be 31 December 1999.
All existing safeguard measures taken under Article XIX of the General Agreement 1947 shall be terminated not later than eight years after the date on which they were first applied or five years after the date of entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO, whichever comes later.
The agreement sets out requirements for safeguard investigation which include public notice for hearings and other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence, including on whether a measure would be in the public interest. In the event of critical circumstances, a provisional safeguard measure may be imposed based upon a preliminary determination of serious injury. The duration of such a provisional measure would not exceed 200 days.
The agreement sets out the criteria for “serious injury” and the factors which must be considered in determining the impact of imports. The safeguard measure should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. Where quantitative restrictions are imposed, they normally should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
In principle, safeguard measures have to be applied irrespective of source. In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries, the member applying restrictions may seek agreement with others. Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. Normally, allocation of shares would be on the basis of proportion of total quantity or value of the imported product over a previous representative period. However, it would be possible for the importing country to depart from this approach if it could demonstrate, in consultations under the auspices of the Safeguards Committee, that imports from certain contracting parties had increased disproportionately in relation to the total increase and that such a departure would be justified and equitable to all suppliers. The duration of the safeguard measure in this case cannot exceed four years.
The agreement lays down time limits for all safeguard measures. Generally, the duration of a measure should not exceed four years though this could be extended up to a maximum of eight years, subject to confirmation of continued necessity by the competent national authorities and if there is evidence that the industry is adjusting. Any measure imposed for a period greater than one year should be progressively liberalized during its lifetime. No safeguard measure could be applied again to a product that had been subject to such action for a period equal to the duration of the previous measure, subject to a non-application period of at least two years. A safeguard measure with a duration of 180 days or less may be applied again to the import of a product if at least one year had elapsed since the date of introduction of the measure on that product, and if such a measure had not been applied on the same product more than twice in the five-year period immediately preceding the date of introduction of the measure.
The agreement envisages consultations on compensation for safeguard measures. Where consultations are not successful, the affected members may withdraw equivalent concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994. However, such action is not allowed for the first three years of the safeguard measure if it conforms to the provisions of the agreement, and is taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports.
Safeguard measures would not be applicable to a product from a developing country member, if the share of the developing country member in the imports of the product concerned does not exceed 3 per cent, and that developing country members with less than 3 per cent import share collectively account for no more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned. A developing country member has the right to extend the period of application of a safeguard measure for a period of up to two years beyond the normal maximum. It can also apply a safeguard measure again to a product that had been subject to such an action after a period equal to half of the duration of the previous measure, subject to a non-application period of at least two years.
The agreement would establish a Safeguards Committee which would oversee the operation of its provisions and, in particular, be responsible for surveillance of its commitments.
General Agreement on Trade in Services Back to top
The Services Agreement which forms part of the Final Act rests on three pillars. The first is a Framework Agreement containing basic obligations which apply to all member countries. The second concerns national schedules of commitments containing specific further national commitments which will be the subject of a continuing process of liberalization. The third is a number of annexes addressing the special situations of individual services sectors.
Part I of the basic agreement defines its scope — specifically, services supplied from the territory of one party to the territory of another; services supplied in the territory of one party to the consumers of any other (for example, tourism); services provided through the presence of service providing entities of one party in the territory of any other (for example, banking); and services provided by nationals of one party in the territory of any other (for example, construction projects or consultancies).
Part II sets out general obligations and disciplines. A basic most-favoured-nation (m.f.n.) obligation states that each party “shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service providers of any other Party, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service providers of any other country”. However, it is recognized that m.f.n. treatment may not be possible for every service activity and, therefore, it is envisaged that parties may indicate specific m.f.n. exemptions. Conditions for such exemptions are included as an annex and provide for reviews after five years and a normal limitation of 10 years on their duration.
Transparency requirements include publication of all relevant laws and regulations. Provisions to facilitate the increased participation of developing countries in world services trade envisage negotiated commitments on access to technology, improvements in access to distribution channels and information networks and the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest. The provisions covering economic integration are analogous to those in Article XXIV of GATT, requiring arrangements to have “substantial sectoral coverage” and to “provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination” between the parties.
Since domestic regulations, not border measures, provide the most significant influence on services trade, provisions spell out that all such measures of general application should be administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. There would be a requirement that parties establish the means for prompt reviews of administrative decisions relating to the supply of services.
The agreement contains obligations with respect to recognition requirements (educational background, for instance) for the purpose of securing authorizations, licenses or certification in the services area. It encourages recognition requirements achieved through harmonization and internationally-agreed criteria. Further provisions state that parties are required to ensure that monopolies and exclusive service providers do not abuse their positions. Restrictive business practices should be subject to consultations between parties with a view to their elimination.
While parties are normally obliged not to restrict international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to commitments under the agreement, there are provisions allowing limited restrictions in the event of balance-of-payments difficulties. However, where such restrictions are imposed they would be subject to conditions; including that they are non-discriminatory, that they avoid unnecessary commercial damage to other parties and that they are of a temporary nature.
The agreement contains both general exceptions and security exceptions provisions which are similar to Articles XX and XXI of the GATT. It also envisages negotiations with a view to the development of disciplines on trade-distorting subsidies in the services area.
Part III contains provisions on market access and national treatment which would not be general obligations but would be commitments made in national schedules. Thus, in the case of market access, each party “shall accord services and service providers of other Parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its schedule”. The intention of the market-access provision is to progressively eliminate the following types of measures: limitations on numbers of service providers, on the total value of service transactions or on the total number of service operations or people employed. Equally, restrictions on the kind of legal entity or joint venture through which a service is provided or any foreign capital limitations relating to maximum levels of foreign participation are to be progressively eliminated.
The national-treatment provision contains the obligation to treat foreign service suppliers and domestic service suppliers in the same manner. However, it does provide the possibility of different treatment being accorded the service providers of other parties to that accorded to domestic service providers. However, in such cases the conditions of competition should not, as a result, be modified in favour of the domestic service providers.
Part IV of the agreement establishes the basis for progressive liberalization in the services area through successive rounds of negotiations and the development of national schedules. It also permits, after a period of three years, parties to withdraw or modify commitments made in their schedules. Where commitments are modified or withdrawn, negotiations should be undertaken with interested parties to agree on compensatory adjustments. Where agreement cannot be reached, compensation would be decided by arbitration.
Part V of the agreement contains institutional provisions, including consultation and dispute settlement and the establishment of a Council on Services. The responsibilities of the Council are set out in a Ministerial Decision.
The first of the annexes to the agreement concerns the movement of labour. It permits parties to negotiate specific commitments applying to the movement of people providing services under the agreement. It requires that people covered by a specific commitment shall be allowed to provide the service in accordance with the terms of the commitment. Nevertheless, the agreement would not apply to measures affecting employment, citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis. The annex on financial services (largely banking and insurance) lays down the right of parties, notwithstanding other provisions, to take prudential measures, including for the protection of investors, deposit holders and policy holders, and to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. However, a further understanding on financial services would allow those participants who choose to do so to undertake commitments on financial services through a different method. With respect to market access, the understanding contains more detailed obligations on, among other things, monopoly rights, cross-border trade (certain insurance and reinsurance policy writing as well as financial data processing and transfer), the right to establish or expand a commercial presence, and the temporary entry of personnel. The provisions on national treatment refer explicitly to access to payments and clearing systems operated by public entities and to official funding and refinancing facilities. They also relate to membership of, or participation in, self-regulatory bodies, securities or futures exchanges and clearing agencies.
The annex on telecommunications relates to measures which affect access to and use of public telecommunications services and networks. In particular, it requires that such access be accorded to another party, on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to permit the supply of a service included in its schedule. Conditions attached to the use of public networks should be no more than is necessary to safeguard the public service responsibilities of their operators, to protect the technical integrity of the network and to ensure that foreign service suppliers do not supply services unless permitted to do so through a specific commitment. The annex also encourages technical cooperation to assist developing countries in the strengthening of their own domestic telecommunications sectors. The annex on air-transport services excludes from the agreement’s coverage traffic rights (largely bilateral air-service agreements conferring landing rights) and directly related activities which might affect the negotiation of traffic rights. Nevertheless, the annex, in its current form, also states that the agreement should apply to aircraft repair and maintenance services, the marketing of air-transport services and computer-reservation services. The operation of the annex would be reviewed at least every five years.
In the final days of the services negotiations, three Decisions were taken — on Financial Services, Professional Services and the Movement of Natural Persons. The Decision on Financial Services confirmed that commitments in this sector would be implemented on an MFN basis, and permits Members to revise and finalize their schedules of commitments and their MFN exemptions six months after the entry into force of the Agreement. Contrary to some media reports, the audio-visual and maritime sectors have not been removed from the scope of the GATS.
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods Back to top
The agreement recognises that widely varying standards in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and the lack of a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods have been a growing source of tension in international economic relations. Rules and disciplines were needed to cope with these tensions. To that end, the agreement addresses the applicability of basic GATT principles and those of relevant international intellectual property agreements; the provision of adequate intellectual property rights; the provision of effective enforcement measures for those rights; multilateral dispute settlement; and transitional arrangements.
Part I of the agreement sets out general provisions and basic principles, notably a national-treatment commitment under which the nationals of other parties must be given treatment no less favourable than that accorded to a party’s own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. It also contains a most-favoured-nation clause, a novelty in an international intellectual property agreement, under which any advantage a party gives to the nationals of another country must be extended immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other parties, even if such treatment is more favourable than that which it gives to its own nationals.
Part II addresses each intellectual property right in succession. With respect to copyright, parties are required to comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works, in its latest version (Paris 1971), though they will not be obliged to protect moral rights as stipulated in Article 6bis of that Convention. It ensures that computer programs will be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention and lays down on what basis data bases should be protected by copyright. Important additions to existing international rules in the area of copyright and related rights are the provisions on rental rights. The draft requires authors of computer programmes and producers of sound recordings to be given the right to authorize or prohibit the commercial rental of their works to the public. A similar exclusive right applies to films where commercial rental has led to widespread copying which is materially impairing the right of reproduction. The draft also requires performers to be given protection from unauthorized recording and broadcast of live performances (bootlegging). The protection for performers and producers of sound recordings would be for no less than 50 years. Broadcasting organizations would have control over the use that can be made of broadcast signals without their authorization. This right would last for at least 20 years.
With respect to trademarks and service marks, the agreement defines what types of signs must be eligible for protection as a trademark or service mark and what the minimum rights conferred on their owners must be. Marks that have become well-known in a particular country shall enjoy additional protection. In addition, the agreement lays down a number of obligations with regard to the use of trademarks and service marks, their term of protection, and their licensing or assignment. For example, requirements that foreign marks be used in conjunction with local marks would, as a general rule, be prohibited.
In respect of geographical indications, the agreement lays down that all parties must provide means to prevent the use of any indication which misleads the consumer as to the origin of goods, and any use which would constitute an act of unfair competition. A higher level of protection is provided for geographical indications for wines and spirits, which are protected even where there is no danger of the public’s being misled as to the true origin. Exceptions are allowed for names that have already become generic terms, but any country using such an exception must be willing to negotiate with a view to protecting the geographical indications in question. Furthermore, provision is made for further negotiations to establish a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines.
Industrial designs are also protected under the agreement for a period of 10 years. Owners of protected designs would be able to prevent the manufacture, sale or importation of articles bearing or embodying a design which is a copy of the protected design.
As regards patents, there is a general obligation to comply with the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention (1967). In addition, the agreement requires that 20-year patent protection be available for all inventions, whether of products or processes, in almost all fields of technology. Inventions may be excluded from patentability if their commercial exploitation is prohibited for reasons of public order or morality; otherwise, the permitted exclusions are for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, and for plants and (other than microorganisms) animals and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals (other than microbiological processes). Plant varieties, however, must be protectable either by patents or by a sui generis system (such as the breeder’s rights provided in a UPOV Convention). Detailed conditions are laid down for compulsory licensing or governmental use of patents without the authorization of the patent owner. Rights conferred in respect of patents for processes must extend to the products directly obtained by the process; under certain conditions alleged infringers may be ordered by a court to prove that they have not used the patented process.
With respect to the protection of layout designs of integrated circuits, the agreement requires parties to provide protection on the basis of the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits which was opened for signature in May 1989, but with a number of additions: protection must be available for a minimum period of 10 years; the rights must extend to articles incorporating infringing layout designs; innocent infringers must be allowed to use or sell stock in hand or ordered before learning of the infringement against a suitable royalty: and compulsory licensing and government use is only allowed under a number of strict conditions.
Trade secrets and know-how which have commercial value must be protected against breach of confidence and other acts contrary to honest commercial practices. Test data submitted to governments in order to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals must also be protected against unfair commercial use.
The final section in this part of the agreement concerns anti-competitive practices in contractual licences. It provides for consultations between governments where there is reason to believe that licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights constitute an abuse of these rights and have an adverse effect on competition. Remedies against such abuses must be consistent with the other provisions of the agreement.
Part III of the agreement sets out the obligations of member governments to provide procedures and remedies under their domestic law to ensure that intellectual property rights can be effectively enforced, by foreign right holders as well as by their own nationals. Procedures should permit effective action against infringement of intellectual property rights but should be fair and equitable, not unnecessarily complicated or costly, and should not entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. They should allow for judicial review of final administrative decisions. There is no obligation to put in place a judicial system distinct from that for the enforcement of laws in general, nor to give priority to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the allocation of resources or staff.
The civil and administrative procedures and remedies spelled out in the text include provisions on evidence of proof, injunctions, damages and other remedies which would include the right of judicial authorities to order the disposal or destruction of infringing goods. Judicial authorities must also have the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where evidence is likely to be destroyed. Further provisions relate to measures to be taken at the border for the suspension by customs authorities of release, into domestic circulation, of counterfeit and pirated goods. Finally, parties should provide for criminal procedures and penalties at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies should include imprisonment and fines sufficient to act as a deterrent.
The agreement would establish a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to monitor the operation of the agreement and governments’ compliance with it. Dispute settlement would take place under the integrated GATT dispute-settlement procedures as revised in the Uruguay Round.
With respect to the implementation of the agreement, it envisages a one-year transition period for developed countries to bring their legislation and practices into conformity. Developing countries and countries in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market economy would have a five-year transition period, and least-developed countries 11 years. Developing countries which do not at present provide product patent protection in an area of technology would have up to 10 years to introduce such protection. However, in the case of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, they must accept the filing of patent applications from the beginning of the transitional period. Though the patent need not be granted until the end of this period, the novelty of the invention is preserved as of the date of filing the application. If authorization for the marketing of the relevant pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical is obtained during the transitional period, the developing country concerned must offer an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years, or until a product patent is granted, whichever is shorter.
Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule is that the obligations in the agreement would apply to existing intellectual property rights as well as to new ones.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Back to top
The dispute settlement system of the GATT is generally considered to be one of the cornerstones of the multilateral trade order. The system has already been strengthened and streamlined as a result of reforms agreed following the Mid-Term Review Ministerial Meeting held in Montreal in December 1988. Disputes currently being dealt with by the Council are subject to these new rules, which include greater automaticity in decisions on the establishment, terms of reference and composition of panels, such that these decisions are no longer dependent upon the consent of the parties to a dispute. The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) will further strengthen the existing system significantly, extending the greater automaticity agreed in the Mid-Term Review to the adoption of the panels’ and a new Appellate Body’s findings. Moreover, the DSU will establish an integrated system permitting WTO Members to base their claims on any of the multilateral trade agreements included in the Annexes to the Agreement establishing the WTO. For this purpose, a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will exercise the authority of the General Council and the Councils and committees of the covered agreements.
The DSU emphasizes the importance of consultations in securing dispute resolution, requiring a Member to enter into consultations within 30 days of a request for consultations from another Member. If after 60 days from the request for consultations there is no settlement, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. Where consultations are denied, the complaining party may move directly to request a panel. The parties may voluntarily agree to follow alternative means of dispute settlement, including good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration.
Where a dispute is not settled through consultations, the DSU requires the establishment of a panel, at the latest, at the meeting of the DSB following that at which a request is made, unless the DSB decides by consensus against establishment. The DSU also sets out specific rules and deadlines for deciding the terms of reference and composition of panels. Standard terms of reference will apply unless the parties agree to special terms within 20 days of the panel’s establishment. And where the parties do not agree on the composition of the panel within the same 20 days, this can be decided by the Director-General. Panels normally consist of three persons of appropriate background and experience from countries not party to the dispute. The Secretariat will maintain a list of experts satisfying the criteria.
Panel procedures are set out in detail in the DSU. It is envisaged that a panel will normally complete its work within six months or, in cases of urgency, within three months. Panel reports may be considered by the DSB for adoption 20 days after they are issued to Members. Within 60 days of their issuance, they will be adopted, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report or one of the parties notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal.
The concept of appellate review is an important new feature of the DSU. An Appellate Body will be established, composed of seven members, three of whom will serve on any one case. An appeal will be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. Appellate proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party formally notifies its decision to appeal. The resulting report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties within 30 days following its issuance to Members, unless the DSB decides by consensus against its adoption.
Once the panel report or the Appellate Body report is adopted, the party concerned will have to notify its intentions with respect to implementation of adopted recommendations. If it is impracticable to comply immediately, the party concerned shall be given a reasonable period of time, the latter to be decided either by agreement of the parties and approval by the DSB within 45 days of adoption of the report or through arbitration within 90 days of adoption. In any event, the DSB will keep the implementation under regular surveillance until the issue is resolved.
Further provisions set out rules for compensation or the suspension of concessions in the event of non-implementation. Within a specified time-frame, parties can enter into negotiations to agree on mutually acceptable compensation. Where this has not been agreed, a party to the dispute may request authorization of the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations to the other party concerned. The DSB will grant such authorization within 30 days of the expiry of the agreed time-frame for implementation. Disagreements over the proposed level of suspension may be referred to arbitration. In principle, concessions should be suspended in the same sector as that in issue in the panel case. If this is not practicable or effective, the suspension can be made in a different sector of the same agreement. In turn, if this is not effective or practicable and if the circumstances are serious enough, the suspension of concessions may be made under another agreement.
One of the central provisions of the DSU reaffirms that Members shall not themselves make determinations of violations or suspend concessions, but shall make use of the dispute settlement rules and procedures of the DSU.
The DSU contains a number of provisions taking into account the specific interests of the developing and the least-developed countries. It also provides some special rules for the resolution of disputes which do not involve a violation of obligations under a covered agreement but where a Member believes nevertheless that benefits are being nullified or impaired. Special decisions to be adopted by Ministers in 1994 foresee that the Montreal Dispute Settlement Rules which would otherwise have expired at the time of the April 1994 meeting are extended until the entry into force of the WTO. Another decision foresees that the new rules and procedures will be reviewed within four years after the entry into force of the WTO.
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
An agreement confirms the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, introduced at the time of the Mid-term Review, and encourages greater transparency in national trade policy-making. A further Ministerial decision reforms the notification requirements and procedures generally.
Decision on achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making Back to top
This will set out concepts and proposals with respect to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making. Among other things, the text notes that greater exchange rate stability based on more orderly underlying economic and financial conditions should contribute to “the expansion of trade, sustainable growth and development, and the timely correction of external imbalances”. It recognizes that while difficulties whose origins lie outside the trade field cannot be redressed through measures taken in the trade field alone, there are nevertheless interlinkages between the different aspects of economic policy. Therefore, WTO is called upon to develop its cooperation with the international organizations responsible for monetary and financial matters. In particular, the Director-General of WTO is called upon to review, with his opposite numbers in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the implications of WTO’s future responsibilities for its cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions.
Government Procurement
The Final Act contains an agreement related to accession procedures to the Government Procurement Agreement which is designed to facilitate the membership of developing countries. It envisages consultations between the existing members and applicant governments. These would be followed by the establishment of accession working parties to examine the offers made by applicant countries (in other words, the public entities whose procurement will be opened up to international competition) as well as the export opportunities for the applicant country in the markets of existing signatories.
This agreement should be distinguished from the new Agreement on Government Procurement.
contact us : World Trade Organization, rue de Lausanne 154, CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland
dari : http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#lAgreement
Langganan:
Postingan (Atom)