hmmmmm..... serah terima diundur sehari. PKLI yang seharusnya dimulai pada hari Senin tanggal 11 Juli 2011 mundur sehari dikarenakan pihak pembimbing PKLI dari pengadilan agama kota Kediri dan para pengurus desa sedang pergi ke Bojonegoro untuk mengantar tim KADARKUM Bandar Lor lomba tingkat daerah, entah kawasan mana, akuu lupa. hohohohooooooo....... tim cewek datang pada hari Minggu siang dan para cowokers datang pada malam hari. ternyata mereka belum pada nemu kontrakan yang cocok... OWh God!!!
tim putri maen kerumahku dan tim putra berjuang mencari tempat untuk tinggal selama masa PKLI ini. Alhamdulillah mereka telah dapat. di RT 31.....
Jumat, 15 Juli 2011
Senin, 23 Mei 2011
menangislah kalau itu membuatmu lega
Akhir-akhir ini Azka sering melamun. Syarif memperhatikan adik satu-satunya itu sesekali memandang jauh kemana tak tentu arah. Demikian juga bunda, ia bertanya-tanya, ada apa gerangan dengan putrinya ini.
'Apa yang sedang engkau risaukan sayang...?'
Bunda cukup mengenal buah hatinya. Azka sedang ada suatu hal yang dipikirkan dengan sangat. Tak semua hal selalu disampaikan pada bunda, dan baginya tak semua hal mudah untuk dibagi. Pun bunda tak ingin memaksa putrinya itu untuk menceritakan permasalahannya padanya. Apapun itu. Tapi bila melihat keadaan putrinya seperti itu, bunda mana yang tidak akan kuatir.
Kemaren wali kelas Azka berkunjung ke rumah Azka dan menceritakan kondisi Azka yang beberapa ini dinilai kurang konsentrasi dan tidak memperhatikan penjelasan guru-gurunya. Raut mukanya juga terlihat sedih.
Malam itu Syarif mengunjungi kamar adiknya. Memang kamar ini selalu rapi, tapi kali ini terasa murung.
"Assalamualaikum" Syarif menyapa adiknya yang duduk bersandar pada kusen jendela.
"Waalaikum salam mas"
"adhe kenapa? ko kayaknya sedih gitu..."
"perasaan, mas udah ngembalikan boneka teddy adhe..."Syarif mencoba memancing komunikasi dengan adiknya.
hening. Azka tak berkata apapun. no reaction.
"hei...." Syarif tidak bisa lagi menutupi rasa sedih dan prihatinnya. Ia mengelus lengan adiknya, mencoba menguatkan.
"mas, bisa berbalik?"
syarif terkejut sejenak lalu membalikkan tubuhnya, membelakangi sang adik. Azka mendekap kakaknya dari belakang, tangisnya bagai tak terbendung lagi. tak hanya terisak, kini ia meraung.
Bunda terkejut dan segera menuju kamar Azka. Mendapati kedua anaknya disana, memandang Azka dan Syarif, bunda segera memeluk Azka.
"Sayang, kenapa...?" bunda tak lagi bisa menyimpan kecemasannya. Ia tak mau putrinya sakit lagi.
Syarif berbalik dan memandang adiknya yang bermuka basah. Sesak tiba-tiba menyumbat aliran nafasnya. 'Ya Allah, kuatkan adikku tersayang ini, lindungi ia Ya Rabb...'
setelah Azka cukup tenang, ia kembali tersenyum dan kemudian tertawa.
"ah, adhe ini terlalu ceria menutupi semua sedih hati adhe.... kenapa nggak berusaha berbagi?"
"Apa adhe nggak bisa percaya sama mas?"
Azka menggeleng. "Justru kalau Azka cerita, malah rasanya tambah sedih mas."
Syarif menggeleng. Kadang adiknya ini memang terlalu keras kepala.
"Bunda, apa Azka punya salah ya sama Deo? kalo Azka nyapa Deo, Deo nggak menjawabnya. Kalo Azka pingin bantu, Deo nggak menanggapi. Apa mungkin Azka terlalu mengganggu Deo ya bun?"
"Mungkin deo sedang sibuk. siapa tau dia juga sedang punya masalah. Bunda juga nggak tau."
"Azka sedih bunda. Deo sering seperti itu. Kenapa kalo seandainya Azka ini mengganggu Deo, Deo ko nggak bilang langsung sama Azka? Biar Azka tau, dimana salah Azka."
"Sayang, terkadang kamu ini terlalu peka pada orang lain, terlalu peduli. bisa jadi, Deo nggak marah ma Azka, tapi Azka pikir Deo marah sama Azka." bunda mencoba menghibur.
"Bunda tau nggak, Deo kayak gitu udah lama banget lho bun... Azka mencoba bersabar bun... tapi akhirnya Azka nggak tahan juga bun dibegituin."
Syarif menyimak cerita sang adik. dalam hati, kemarahan lahir secara perlahan. 'Deo, beraninya kamu berbuat begitu sama Azka!'
"emang udah berapa lama sih sayang?"
"Dua tahun, mungkin juga lebih bunda...."
Astaghfirullah. Ada apa ini? Apakah ini karena perbedaan karakter mereka? meski hanya berteman, Azka mengganggap teman-temannya sebagai saudara. Rasa sosialitas dan solidaritasnya cukup tinggi, padahal ia masih kecil. Kamu? apakah kamu pernah memperhatikan orang-orang disekitarmu? memperhatikan perasaan mereka? rasanya aku malu, aku hanya memperhatikan diriku sendiri....
bunda sedikit terkejut. menurutnya semua baik-baik saja. Azka juga selalu cerita tentang Deo, seolah tak ada masalah yang terjadi diantara mereka.
"Sayang, temen Azka kan nggak cuma Deo, banyak yang lainnya kan...? bunda nggak mau azka sakit karena terlalu memikirkan hal ini."
"gimana nggak kepikiran bunda...?"
"untuk sementara, Azka nggak usah mengusik Deo dulu. Azka simpan semua hal yang mengingatkan pada Deo. nanti juga semuanya akan baik-baik lagi." Bunda tersenyum, mencoba meyakinkan putrinya.
Syarif beranjak keluar kamar Azka. Bunda dan Azka berpandangan, heran. tak berapa lama kemudian ia kembali dengan sebuah kotak.
"Ayo mas bantu." Syarif menyemangati adiknya. Azka tersenyum dan menerima kotak yang disodorkan oleh kakanya. Azka mulai memilah pernak-pernik dikamarnya dan memasukkannya ke dalam kardus.
"Mas Syarif, bunda nggak mau mas buat masalah sama Deo. bunda nggak mau Azka tambah sedih." bunda mengingatkan putranya. ia tahu, Syarif sangat sayang pada adiknya itu. dan tentu saja ia takkan terima kalau ada yang membuat Azka sedih. Syarif memahami posisinya sebagai seorang kakak yang harus menjaga dan melindungi adiknya itu.
"semoga sedih itu segera menguap... dan tak tersisa."
'Apa yang sedang engkau risaukan sayang...?'
Bunda cukup mengenal buah hatinya. Azka sedang ada suatu hal yang dipikirkan dengan sangat. Tak semua hal selalu disampaikan pada bunda, dan baginya tak semua hal mudah untuk dibagi. Pun bunda tak ingin memaksa putrinya itu untuk menceritakan permasalahannya padanya. Apapun itu. Tapi bila melihat keadaan putrinya seperti itu, bunda mana yang tidak akan kuatir.
Kemaren wali kelas Azka berkunjung ke rumah Azka dan menceritakan kondisi Azka yang beberapa ini dinilai kurang konsentrasi dan tidak memperhatikan penjelasan guru-gurunya. Raut mukanya juga terlihat sedih.
Malam itu Syarif mengunjungi kamar adiknya. Memang kamar ini selalu rapi, tapi kali ini terasa murung.
"Assalamualaikum" Syarif menyapa adiknya yang duduk bersandar pada kusen jendela.
"Waalaikum salam mas"
"adhe kenapa? ko kayaknya sedih gitu..."
"perasaan, mas udah ngembalikan boneka teddy adhe..."Syarif mencoba memancing komunikasi dengan adiknya.
hening. Azka tak berkata apapun. no reaction.
"hei...." Syarif tidak bisa lagi menutupi rasa sedih dan prihatinnya. Ia mengelus lengan adiknya, mencoba menguatkan.
"mas, bisa berbalik?"
syarif terkejut sejenak lalu membalikkan tubuhnya, membelakangi sang adik. Azka mendekap kakaknya dari belakang, tangisnya bagai tak terbendung lagi. tak hanya terisak, kini ia meraung.
Bunda terkejut dan segera menuju kamar Azka. Mendapati kedua anaknya disana, memandang Azka dan Syarif, bunda segera memeluk Azka.
"Sayang, kenapa...?" bunda tak lagi bisa menyimpan kecemasannya. Ia tak mau putrinya sakit lagi.
Syarif berbalik dan memandang adiknya yang bermuka basah. Sesak tiba-tiba menyumbat aliran nafasnya. 'Ya Allah, kuatkan adikku tersayang ini, lindungi ia Ya Rabb...'
setelah Azka cukup tenang, ia kembali tersenyum dan kemudian tertawa.
"ah, adhe ini terlalu ceria menutupi semua sedih hati adhe.... kenapa nggak berusaha berbagi?"
"Apa adhe nggak bisa percaya sama mas?"
Azka menggeleng. "Justru kalau Azka cerita, malah rasanya tambah sedih mas."
Syarif menggeleng. Kadang adiknya ini memang terlalu keras kepala.
"Bunda, apa Azka punya salah ya sama Deo? kalo Azka nyapa Deo, Deo nggak menjawabnya. Kalo Azka pingin bantu, Deo nggak menanggapi. Apa mungkin Azka terlalu mengganggu Deo ya bun?"
"Mungkin deo sedang sibuk. siapa tau dia juga sedang punya masalah. Bunda juga nggak tau."
"Azka sedih bunda. Deo sering seperti itu. Kenapa kalo seandainya Azka ini mengganggu Deo, Deo ko nggak bilang langsung sama Azka? Biar Azka tau, dimana salah Azka."
"Sayang, terkadang kamu ini terlalu peka pada orang lain, terlalu peduli. bisa jadi, Deo nggak marah ma Azka, tapi Azka pikir Deo marah sama Azka." bunda mencoba menghibur.
"Bunda tau nggak, Deo kayak gitu udah lama banget lho bun... Azka mencoba bersabar bun... tapi akhirnya Azka nggak tahan juga bun dibegituin."
Syarif menyimak cerita sang adik. dalam hati, kemarahan lahir secara perlahan. 'Deo, beraninya kamu berbuat begitu sama Azka!'
"emang udah berapa lama sih sayang?"
"Dua tahun, mungkin juga lebih bunda...."
Astaghfirullah. Ada apa ini? Apakah ini karena perbedaan karakter mereka? meski hanya berteman, Azka mengganggap teman-temannya sebagai saudara. Rasa sosialitas dan solidaritasnya cukup tinggi, padahal ia masih kecil. Kamu? apakah kamu pernah memperhatikan orang-orang disekitarmu? memperhatikan perasaan mereka? rasanya aku malu, aku hanya memperhatikan diriku sendiri....
bunda sedikit terkejut. menurutnya semua baik-baik saja. Azka juga selalu cerita tentang Deo, seolah tak ada masalah yang terjadi diantara mereka.
"Sayang, temen Azka kan nggak cuma Deo, banyak yang lainnya kan...? bunda nggak mau azka sakit karena terlalu memikirkan hal ini."
"gimana nggak kepikiran bunda...?"
"untuk sementara, Azka nggak usah mengusik Deo dulu. Azka simpan semua hal yang mengingatkan pada Deo. nanti juga semuanya akan baik-baik lagi." Bunda tersenyum, mencoba meyakinkan putrinya.
Syarif beranjak keluar kamar Azka. Bunda dan Azka berpandangan, heran. tak berapa lama kemudian ia kembali dengan sebuah kotak.
"Ayo mas bantu." Syarif menyemangati adiknya. Azka tersenyum dan menerima kotak yang disodorkan oleh kakanya. Azka mulai memilah pernak-pernik dikamarnya dan memasukkannya ke dalam kardus.
"Mas Syarif, bunda nggak mau mas buat masalah sama Deo. bunda nggak mau Azka tambah sedih." bunda mengingatkan putranya. ia tahu, Syarif sangat sayang pada adiknya itu. dan tentu saja ia takkan terima kalau ada yang membuat Azka sedih. Syarif memahami posisinya sebagai seorang kakak yang harus menjaga dan melindungi adiknya itu.
"semoga sedih itu segera menguap... dan tak tersisa."
Rahasia bank
Apa yang perlu diketahui dari rahasia Bank?
Kita perlu mengetahui apa yang dimaksud dengan rahasia Bank, sehingga kalau kita menjadi nasabah Bank, kita akan mengetahui secara pasti apa-apa yang boleh dan tidak boleh diberikan pada pihak luar oleh Bank. Dalam dunia modern sekarang ini, hampir setiap orang yang telah cukup umur berhubungan dengan Bank, entah sekedar menyimpan uang, ataupun mengirim uang melalui transfer, meminjam uang dan sebagainya.
Dasar Hukum ketentuan rahasia bank di Indonesia, mula-mula adalah Undang-undang no.7 tahun 1992 tentang Perbankan, tetapi kemudian diubah dengan Undang-undang no.10/1998. Sesuai pasal 1 ayat 28 Undang-undang no.10/1998, berbunyi sebagai berikut:
Rahasia Bank adalah segala sesuatu yang berhubungan dengan keterangan mengenai Nasabah Penyimpan dan Simpanannya.
Lingkup Rahasia Bank
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang sering muncul adalah: Apakah yang harus dirahasiakan ini hanya terbatas kepada keuangan nasabah penyimpan dana saja? Apakah juga menyangkut keadaan keuangan nasabah debitur? Apakah lingkup rahasia Bank hanya menyangkut pasiva (liabilities) bank berupa dana nasabah bank, ataukah juga meliputi aktiva (assets) bank berupa kredit Bank kepada nasabah. Apakah juga menyangkut penggunaan jasa-jasa bank yang lain, selain jasa penyimpanan dana dan jasa pemberian kredit?
Dari rumusan pasal 40 Undang-undang No.10/1998, secara eksplisit disebutkan bahwa lingkup rahasia bank adalah bukan saja menyangkut simpanan nasabah, tetapi juga (identitas) nasabah penyimpan yang memiliki simpanan tersebut. Bahkan dalam rumusan pasal 40, “Nasabah Penyimpan” disebut lebih dahulu daripada “Simpanannya”.
Di beberapa negara, lingkup dari rahasia bank tidak ditentukan hanya terbatas kepada keadaan keuangan nasabah, tetapi meliputi juga identitas nasabah yang bersangkutan.
Informasi mengenai mantan nasabah
Di dalam praktek perbankan atau praktek bisnis, sangat lazim seorang nasabah berpindah-pindah atau berganti-ganti bank, seperti juga adalah lazim seorang nasabah mempunyai simpanan pada beberapa bank. Timbul pertanyaan, apakah bank masih terikat terhadap kewajiban rahasia bank setelah nasabahnya tidak lagi menjadi nasabah bank yang bersangkutan? Hal ini ternyata tidak diatur atau ditentukan oleh undang-undang, baik oleh undang-undang no.7/1992 maupun undang-undang no.10/1998.
Mengingat tujuan dari diadakannya ketentuan mengenai kewajiban rahasia bank, sebaiknya undang-undang perbankan Indonesia menentukan kewajiban rahasia bank tetap diberlakukan sekalipun nasabah yang bersangkutan telah tidak lagi menjadi nasabah bank yang bersangkutan.
Siapa yang berkewajiban memegang teguh rahasia Bank?
Menurut pasal 47 ayat (2) Undang-undang no.10/1998, yang berkewajiban memegang teguh rahasia bank adalah:
* Anggota Dewan Komisaris Bank
* Anggota Direksi Bank
* Pegawai Bank
* Pihak terafiliasi lainnya dari Bank
Siapakah yang dikategorikan sebagai “pegawai bank”
Menurut penjelasan pasal 47 ayat (2) yang dimaksudkan “pegawai bank” adalah “semua pejabat dan karyawan bank”. Lingkup sasaran tindak pidana rahasia bank menurut pasal tsb terlalu luas, karena berarti rahasia bank berlaku bagi siapa saja yang menjadi pegawai bank, sekalipun pegawai bank tersebut tidak mempunyai akses atau tak mempunyai hubungan sama sekali dengan nasabah penyimpan dan simpanannya, seperti: pramubakti, satpam, pengemudi, pegawai di unit yang mengurusi kendaraan dan masih banyak lagi.
Kewajiban merahasiakan bagi mantan pegawai bank
Seorang pegawai bank, ada kemungkinan tak selamanya menjadi pegawai bank tersebut, bisa karena telah tiba masa pensiun, keluar dan menjadi pegawai di perusahaan lain, meninggal dan sebagainya. Pada krisis moneter, banyak pegawai bank yang terkena PHK karena bank nya terkena likuidasi.
Pertanyaan yang muncul, apakah mantan pegawai bank masih tetap terkena oleh kewajiban memegang teguh rahasia bank yang menjadi kewajibannya sewaktu yang bersangkutan masih menjadi pegawai aktif di bank yang bersangkutan? Ternyata Undang-undang no.7/1992 maupun Undang-undang no.10/1998 tak mengaturnya.
Beberapa negara menentukan bahwa mantan pengurus dan pegawai bank terikat oleh kewajiban rahasia bank. Ada yang menentukan keterikatannya itu berakhir setelah beberapa tahun sejak saat yang bersangkutan berhenti sebagai pengurus atau pegawai bank, ada pula yang menentukan kewajiban tersebut melekat terus sampai seumur hidup.
Pengertian pihak terafiliasi lainnya
Sebagaimana ditentukan dalam pasal 1 ayat (22) Undang-undang no.10/1998, yang dimaksud pihak terafiliasi adalah:
1. anggota dewan komisaris, pengawas, pengelola atau kuasanya, pejabat atau karyawan bank
2. anggota pengurus, pengawas, pengelola, atau kuasanya, pejabat atau karyawan bank, khusus bagi bank yang berbentuk hukum koperasi sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku
3. pihak yang memberikan jasanya kepada bank, antara lain: akuntan publik, penilai, konsultan hukum, dan konsultan lainnya
4. pihak yang menurut penilaian Bank Indonesia, turut serta mempengaruhi pengelolaan bank, antara lain pemegang saham dan keluarganya, keluarga komisaris, keluarga pengawas, keluarga direksi, keluarga pengurus.
Pengecualian atas kewajiban rahasia bank
Undang-undang no.10/1998 memberikan pengecualian dalam 7 (tujuh) hal. Pengecualian tersebut tidak bersifat limitatif, artinya di luar 7 (tujuh) hal yang telah dikecualikan itu tidak terdapat pengecualian yang lain. Pengecualian itu adalah:
1. Untuk kepentingan perpajakan dapat diberikan pengecualian kepada pejabat pajak berdasarkan perintah Pimpinan Bank Indonesia atas permintaan Menteri Keuangan (pasal 41)
2. Untuk penyelesaian piutang bank yang sudah diserahkan kepada Badan Urusan Piutang dan Lelang Negara/Panitia Urusan Piutang Negara, dapat diberikan pengecualian kepada Pejabat Badan Urusan Piutang dan Lelang Negara/PUPN atas izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 41A)
3. Untuk kepentingan peradilan dalam perkara pidana dapat diberikan pengecualian kepada polisi, jaksa atau hakim atas izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 42)
4. Dalam perkara perdata antara bank dengan nasabahnya dapat diberikan pengecualian tanpa harus memperoleh izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 43)
5. Dalam rangka tukar menukar informasi di antara bank kepada bank lain dapat diberikan pengecualian tanpa harus memperoleh izin dari Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 44)
6. Atas persetujuan, permintaan atau kuasa dari nasabah penyimpan secara tertulis dapat diberikan pengecualian tanpa harus memperoleh izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 44A ayat 1)
7. Atas permintaan ahli waris yang sah dari nasabah penyimpan dana yang telah meninggal dunia (pasal 44A ayat 2)
Sehubungan dengan pengecualian yang bersifat limitatif tersebut, apabila ada pihak-pihak lain (selain yang telah ditentukan sebagai pihak-pihak yang boleh memperoleh pengecualian) meminta penjelasan mengenai keadaan keuangan suatu nasabah dari suatu bank, jelas jawabannya adalah “tidak boleh”.
Sifat limitatif dari pengecualian itu bukan tidak dapat diperluas, asal perluasannya ditentukan oleh undang-undang. Apabila pengecualian di dalam undang-undang perlu ditambah, maka penambahan dapat dilakukan dengan:
* Mengubah Undang-undang no.10/1998, atau
* Memberikan tambahannya dengan mencantumkannya dalam undang-undang tersendiri.
Dari ulasan di atas terlihat, bahwa Bank merupakan lembaga yang harus beroperasi secara prudent. Mengapa? Bank adalah bagian dari sistim keuangan dan sistim pembayaran suatu negara. Kepentingan masyarakat untuk menjaga eksistensi bank sangat penting, karena ambruknya bank dapat mengakibatkan domino effect, yaitu menular kepada bank-bank lain, yang akan mengganggu fungsi sistim keuangan dan sistim pembayaran negara yang bersangkutan.
Bank adalah lembaga keuangan yang eksistensinya tergantung pada kepercayaan para nasabahnya, yang mempercayakan dana dan jasa-jasa lain, yang dilakukan nasabah melalui bank. Oleh karena itu bank sangat berkepentingan agar kadar kepercayaan masyarakat, yang telah maupun yang akan menyimpan dananya, maupun yang telah atau akan menggunakan jasa-jasa bank lainnya, terpelihara dengan baik. Salah satu faktor untuk memelihara kepercayaan masyarakat terhadap suatu bank, adalah kepatuhan bank terhadap kewajiban rahasia bank.
Bahan bacaan:
1. Undang-undang Republik Indonesia No.10 tahun 1998 tentang Perubahan Undang-undang No.7 tahun 1992 tentang Perbankan.
2. Dari berbagai sumber, hasil diskusi, dan seminar.
dari : http://edratna.wordpress.com/2008/01/09/apa-yang-perlu-diketahui-dari-rahasia-bank/
Kita perlu mengetahui apa yang dimaksud dengan rahasia Bank, sehingga kalau kita menjadi nasabah Bank, kita akan mengetahui secara pasti apa-apa yang boleh dan tidak boleh diberikan pada pihak luar oleh Bank. Dalam dunia modern sekarang ini, hampir setiap orang yang telah cukup umur berhubungan dengan Bank, entah sekedar menyimpan uang, ataupun mengirim uang melalui transfer, meminjam uang dan sebagainya.
Dasar Hukum ketentuan rahasia bank di Indonesia, mula-mula adalah Undang-undang no.7 tahun 1992 tentang Perbankan, tetapi kemudian diubah dengan Undang-undang no.10/1998. Sesuai pasal 1 ayat 28 Undang-undang no.10/1998, berbunyi sebagai berikut:
Rahasia Bank adalah segala sesuatu yang berhubungan dengan keterangan mengenai Nasabah Penyimpan dan Simpanannya.
Lingkup Rahasia Bank
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang sering muncul adalah: Apakah yang harus dirahasiakan ini hanya terbatas kepada keuangan nasabah penyimpan dana saja? Apakah juga menyangkut keadaan keuangan nasabah debitur? Apakah lingkup rahasia Bank hanya menyangkut pasiva (liabilities) bank berupa dana nasabah bank, ataukah juga meliputi aktiva (assets) bank berupa kredit Bank kepada nasabah. Apakah juga menyangkut penggunaan jasa-jasa bank yang lain, selain jasa penyimpanan dana dan jasa pemberian kredit?
Dari rumusan pasal 40 Undang-undang No.10/1998, secara eksplisit disebutkan bahwa lingkup rahasia bank adalah bukan saja menyangkut simpanan nasabah, tetapi juga (identitas) nasabah penyimpan yang memiliki simpanan tersebut. Bahkan dalam rumusan pasal 40, “Nasabah Penyimpan” disebut lebih dahulu daripada “Simpanannya”.
Di beberapa negara, lingkup dari rahasia bank tidak ditentukan hanya terbatas kepada keadaan keuangan nasabah, tetapi meliputi juga identitas nasabah yang bersangkutan.
Informasi mengenai mantan nasabah
Di dalam praktek perbankan atau praktek bisnis, sangat lazim seorang nasabah berpindah-pindah atau berganti-ganti bank, seperti juga adalah lazim seorang nasabah mempunyai simpanan pada beberapa bank. Timbul pertanyaan, apakah bank masih terikat terhadap kewajiban rahasia bank setelah nasabahnya tidak lagi menjadi nasabah bank yang bersangkutan? Hal ini ternyata tidak diatur atau ditentukan oleh undang-undang, baik oleh undang-undang no.7/1992 maupun undang-undang no.10/1998.
Mengingat tujuan dari diadakannya ketentuan mengenai kewajiban rahasia bank, sebaiknya undang-undang perbankan Indonesia menentukan kewajiban rahasia bank tetap diberlakukan sekalipun nasabah yang bersangkutan telah tidak lagi menjadi nasabah bank yang bersangkutan.
Siapa yang berkewajiban memegang teguh rahasia Bank?
Menurut pasal 47 ayat (2) Undang-undang no.10/1998, yang berkewajiban memegang teguh rahasia bank adalah:
* Anggota Dewan Komisaris Bank
* Anggota Direksi Bank
* Pegawai Bank
* Pihak terafiliasi lainnya dari Bank
Siapakah yang dikategorikan sebagai “pegawai bank”
Menurut penjelasan pasal 47 ayat (2) yang dimaksudkan “pegawai bank” adalah “semua pejabat dan karyawan bank”. Lingkup sasaran tindak pidana rahasia bank menurut pasal tsb terlalu luas, karena berarti rahasia bank berlaku bagi siapa saja yang menjadi pegawai bank, sekalipun pegawai bank tersebut tidak mempunyai akses atau tak mempunyai hubungan sama sekali dengan nasabah penyimpan dan simpanannya, seperti: pramubakti, satpam, pengemudi, pegawai di unit yang mengurusi kendaraan dan masih banyak lagi.
Kewajiban merahasiakan bagi mantan pegawai bank
Seorang pegawai bank, ada kemungkinan tak selamanya menjadi pegawai bank tersebut, bisa karena telah tiba masa pensiun, keluar dan menjadi pegawai di perusahaan lain, meninggal dan sebagainya. Pada krisis moneter, banyak pegawai bank yang terkena PHK karena bank nya terkena likuidasi.
Pertanyaan yang muncul, apakah mantan pegawai bank masih tetap terkena oleh kewajiban memegang teguh rahasia bank yang menjadi kewajibannya sewaktu yang bersangkutan masih menjadi pegawai aktif di bank yang bersangkutan? Ternyata Undang-undang no.7/1992 maupun Undang-undang no.10/1998 tak mengaturnya.
Beberapa negara menentukan bahwa mantan pengurus dan pegawai bank terikat oleh kewajiban rahasia bank. Ada yang menentukan keterikatannya itu berakhir setelah beberapa tahun sejak saat yang bersangkutan berhenti sebagai pengurus atau pegawai bank, ada pula yang menentukan kewajiban tersebut melekat terus sampai seumur hidup.
Pengertian pihak terafiliasi lainnya
Sebagaimana ditentukan dalam pasal 1 ayat (22) Undang-undang no.10/1998, yang dimaksud pihak terafiliasi adalah:
1. anggota dewan komisaris, pengawas, pengelola atau kuasanya, pejabat atau karyawan bank
2. anggota pengurus, pengawas, pengelola, atau kuasanya, pejabat atau karyawan bank, khusus bagi bank yang berbentuk hukum koperasi sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku
3. pihak yang memberikan jasanya kepada bank, antara lain: akuntan publik, penilai, konsultan hukum, dan konsultan lainnya
4. pihak yang menurut penilaian Bank Indonesia, turut serta mempengaruhi pengelolaan bank, antara lain pemegang saham dan keluarganya, keluarga komisaris, keluarga pengawas, keluarga direksi, keluarga pengurus.
Pengecualian atas kewajiban rahasia bank
Undang-undang no.10/1998 memberikan pengecualian dalam 7 (tujuh) hal. Pengecualian tersebut tidak bersifat limitatif, artinya di luar 7 (tujuh) hal yang telah dikecualikan itu tidak terdapat pengecualian yang lain. Pengecualian itu adalah:
1. Untuk kepentingan perpajakan dapat diberikan pengecualian kepada pejabat pajak berdasarkan perintah Pimpinan Bank Indonesia atas permintaan Menteri Keuangan (pasal 41)
2. Untuk penyelesaian piutang bank yang sudah diserahkan kepada Badan Urusan Piutang dan Lelang Negara/Panitia Urusan Piutang Negara, dapat diberikan pengecualian kepada Pejabat Badan Urusan Piutang dan Lelang Negara/PUPN atas izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 41A)
3. Untuk kepentingan peradilan dalam perkara pidana dapat diberikan pengecualian kepada polisi, jaksa atau hakim atas izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 42)
4. Dalam perkara perdata antara bank dengan nasabahnya dapat diberikan pengecualian tanpa harus memperoleh izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 43)
5. Dalam rangka tukar menukar informasi di antara bank kepada bank lain dapat diberikan pengecualian tanpa harus memperoleh izin dari Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 44)
6. Atas persetujuan, permintaan atau kuasa dari nasabah penyimpan secara tertulis dapat diberikan pengecualian tanpa harus memperoleh izin Pimpinan Bank Indonesia (pasal 44A ayat 1)
7. Atas permintaan ahli waris yang sah dari nasabah penyimpan dana yang telah meninggal dunia (pasal 44A ayat 2)
Sehubungan dengan pengecualian yang bersifat limitatif tersebut, apabila ada pihak-pihak lain (selain yang telah ditentukan sebagai pihak-pihak yang boleh memperoleh pengecualian) meminta penjelasan mengenai keadaan keuangan suatu nasabah dari suatu bank, jelas jawabannya adalah “tidak boleh”.
Sifat limitatif dari pengecualian itu bukan tidak dapat diperluas, asal perluasannya ditentukan oleh undang-undang. Apabila pengecualian di dalam undang-undang perlu ditambah, maka penambahan dapat dilakukan dengan:
* Mengubah Undang-undang no.10/1998, atau
* Memberikan tambahannya dengan mencantumkannya dalam undang-undang tersendiri.
Dari ulasan di atas terlihat, bahwa Bank merupakan lembaga yang harus beroperasi secara prudent. Mengapa? Bank adalah bagian dari sistim keuangan dan sistim pembayaran suatu negara. Kepentingan masyarakat untuk menjaga eksistensi bank sangat penting, karena ambruknya bank dapat mengakibatkan domino effect, yaitu menular kepada bank-bank lain, yang akan mengganggu fungsi sistim keuangan dan sistim pembayaran negara yang bersangkutan.
Bank adalah lembaga keuangan yang eksistensinya tergantung pada kepercayaan para nasabahnya, yang mempercayakan dana dan jasa-jasa lain, yang dilakukan nasabah melalui bank. Oleh karena itu bank sangat berkepentingan agar kadar kepercayaan masyarakat, yang telah maupun yang akan menyimpan dananya, maupun yang telah atau akan menggunakan jasa-jasa bank lainnya, terpelihara dengan baik. Salah satu faktor untuk memelihara kepercayaan masyarakat terhadap suatu bank, adalah kepatuhan bank terhadap kewajiban rahasia bank.
Bahan bacaan:
1. Undang-undang Republik Indonesia No.10 tahun 1998 tentang Perubahan Undang-undang No.7 tahun 1992 tentang Perbankan.
2. Dari berbagai sumber, hasil diskusi, dan seminar.
dari : http://edratna.wordpress.com/2008/01/09/apa-yang-perlu-diketahui-dari-rahasia-bank/
Kamis, 21 April 2011
Analisis kasus Tindak Pidana Perpajakan
Kasus :
Satgas: Dampak Kasus Gayus Sangat Merusak
Kategori beratnya kasus ini karena bukan hanya menyangkut aparat pajak.
Minggu, 28 Maret 2010, 13:36 WIB
Heri Susanto
VIVAnews - Satuan Tugas Pemberantas Mafia Hukum mengungkapkan bahwa kasus Gayus Tambunan merupakan kasus mafia yang tergolong berat. Dampak kerusakannya juga sangat besar.
"Bayangkan, jika kasus ini dibiarkan, dampaknya akan sangat merusak," ujar
Sekretaris Satgas Mafia Hukum, Denny Indrayana saat dihubungi VIVAnews di Jakarta, Minggu, 28 Maret 2010.
Dia menekankan kategori beratnya kasus ini karena bukan hanya menyangkut aparat pajak, melainkan juga terkait dengan aparat penegak hukum lainnya, seperti kepolisian dan kejaksaan.
Di sisi lain, dampak besar dari kasus ini adalah dari sisi penerimaan negara. Padahal, penerimaan negara selama ini sebagian besar disumbang dari pajak. "Bayangkan, jika kasus ini dibiarkan terjadi," katanya.
Karena itu, kata Denny, Satgas membantu kepolisian untuk mengungkap kasus tersebut. Satgas telah menghimpun informasi sangat penting dan strategis dari Gayus Tambunan guna menginvestigasi kasus ini lebih lanjut.
Informasi itu terkait dengan mafia yang bukan sekedar melibatkan orang pajak, tetapi juga terkait dengan mafia peradilan, yakni mencakup institusi penegak hukum lainnya. "Kami sudah serahkan kepada Mabes Polri untuk ditindaklanjuti."
Anggota Satuan Tugas (Satgas), Mas Achmad Santosa mengungkapkan pengadilan pajak merupakan tempat penyelewengan yang dilakukan pegawai pajak.
Gayus Tambunan kini tengah diburu oleh Ditjen Pajak dan Kepolisian Indonesia. Gayus menjadi tersangka dugaan makelar kasus pajak karena di rekeningnya terdapat duit senilai Rp 25 miliar yang diduga berasal dari wajib pajak.
Sumber : http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/139740-satgas__dampak_kasus_gayus_sangat_merusak
Analisis :
Hasil analisis :
A. Analisa kasus :
Kasus gayus dinyatakan bukan kasus pidana perpajakan oleh dirjen pajak karena kasus ini tidak berkaitan dengan SPT wajib pajak, tetapi dalam pendapat kami, kasus ini adalah kasus perpajakan, dimana tindak kejahatan terjadi di dalam lingkup perpajakan. Selain itu, kasus ini juga menyeret secara langsusng beberapa pasal dalam undang-undang yang berbeda.
Kasus Gayus, menurut kami, merupakan suatu concursus atau perbarengan tindak pidana. Pada dasarnya yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan tindak pidana ialah terjadinya dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh satu orang dimana tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama kali belum dijatuhi pidana, atau antara tindak pidana yang awal dengan tindak pidana berikutnya belum dibatasi oleh suatu putusan hakim. Dapat juga di dalam bentuk concursus itu terjadi dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh dua atau lebih orang. Jadi intinya, yang terpenting adalah ada lebih dari satu tindak pidana dan diantara tindak pidana tersebut belum diputus hakim.
Pada pengulangan juga terdapat lebih dari satu tindak pidana yang dilakukan oleh satu orang. Perbedaan pokoknya adalah bahwa pada pengulangan tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama atau lebih awal telah diputus oleh hakim dengan mempidana pada si pembuat/pelaku, bahkan telah dijalaninya baik sebagian atau seluruhnya. Sedangkan pada perbarengan (concursus) syarat seperti pada pengulangan tidaklah diperlukan. Pengulangan tindak pidana lebih familiar dengan sebutan recidive.
Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dituduh melakukan tiga tindak pidana sekaligus, yaitu korupsi, pencucian uang, dan penggelapan. Ini tidak masuk ke dalam suatu penyertaan pidana karena Gayus melakukan delik secara sendiri dan tidak bersama-sama. Penyertaan dalam poin kesatu bentuk-bentuk penyertaan, yaitu “mereka yang melakukan (pembuat pelaksana: Pleger)” adalah berbeda dengan enkelvoudige dader (pembuat tunggal).
Perbedaan pleger dengan dader (pembuat tunggal) adalah, bagi seorang pleger masih diperlukan keterlibatan minimal seorang lainnya, baik secara psikis, misalnya terlibat dengan seorang pembuat penganjur; atau terlibat secara fisik, misalnya dengan pembuat peserta atau pembuat pembantu. Jadi, seorang pleger diperlukan sumbangan dari peserta lain dalam mewujudkan tindak pidana. Tetapi, keterlibatan dalam hal sumbangan peserta lain ini, perbuatannya haruslah sedemikian rupa sehingga perbuatannya itu tidak semata-mata menentukan untuk terwujudnya tindak pidana yang dituju.
Fakta-fakta di dalam kasus mafia pajak dengan tersangka Gayus Halomoan Tambunan, menunjukkan dan mengindikasikan bahwa itu merupakan suatu perbarengan tindak pidana.
Hal tersebut karena Gayus disangkakan dan dijerat dengan pasal mengenai korupsi, pencucian uang (money laundering) serta penggelapan. Ketiganya merupakan bentuk tindak pidana. Masing-masing berbeda antara satu dengan yang lain. Korupsi diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Kemudian, money laundering diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang. Lalu, penggelapan itu diatur di dalam Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372-377.
Oleh karena itu, concursus dari kasus Gayus masuk ke dalam concursus realis (perbarengan perbuatan) atau meerdaadse samenloop. Perihal apa yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan perbuatan, kiranya dapat disimpulkan dari rumusan pasal 65 ayat (1) dan pasal 66 ayat (1) KUHP, yakni : “beberapa perbuatan yang masing-masing harus dipandang sebagai perbuatan yang berdiri sendiri sehingga merupakan beberapa kejahatan …”. Pengertian perbuatan dalam rumusan di ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 adalah perbuatan yang telah memenuhi seluruh syarat dari suatu tindak pidana tertentu yang dirumuskan dalam undang-undang, atau secara singkat adalah tindak pidana, yang pengertian ini telah sesuai dengan kalimat di belakangnya, “sehingga merupakan beberapa kejahatan” (berdasarkan penafsiran sistematis).
Jadi berdasarkan rumusan ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 KUHP, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa masing-masing tindak pidana yang mana tindak pidana dalam perbarengan perbuatan itu satu sama lain adalah terpisah dan berdiri sendiri. Inilah ciri pokok dari perbarengan perbuatan. Kesimpulannya, kasus Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dalam penyelesaiannya dapat diadili dan dipidana sekaligus karena ini merupakan concursus. Nantinya akan diputus dalam satu putusan pidana dan tidak dijatuhkan sendiri-sendiri.
B. Pasal yang menjerat tersangka :
UU KUP Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perubahan Ketiga Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 Tentang Ketentuan Umum Dan Tata Cara Perpajakan :
• Pasal 36A (4) Pegawai pajak yang dengan maksud menguntungkan diri sendiri secara melawan hukum dengan menyalahgunakan kekuasaannya memaksa seseorang untuk memberikan sesuatu, untuk membayar atau menerima pembayaran, atau untuk mengerjakan sesuatu bagi dirinya sendiri, diancam dengan pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 12 Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi dan perubahannya.
Pasal 12 UU Tipikor, di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi.:
Setiap orang yang melakukan tindak pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 419, Pasal 420, Pasal 423, Pasal 425, atau Pasal 435 Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, dipidana dengan pidana penjara seumur hidup atau pidana penjara paling singkat 4 (empat) tahun dan paling lama 20 (dua puluh) tahun dan denda paling sedikit Rp 200.000.000,00 (dua ratus juta rupiah) dan paling banyak 1.000.000.000,00 (satu milyar rupiah).
Kasus ini merupakan kasus pidana penyuapan, dengan adanya kesaksian tersangka atas adanya suap PT. Bakrie yang diterima oleh tersangka. Pasal yang terkait dengan kasus ini adalah Pasal 11 Undang-Undang Pemberantasan Korupsi mengatur tentang penerimaan uang oleh pegawai negeri yang patut diduga berhubungan dengan jabatannya dan gratifikasi.
Setiap orang yang melakukan tindak pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 418 Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling singkat 1 (satu) tahun dan paling lama 5 (lima) tahun dan denda paling sedikit Rp 50.000.000,00 (lima puluh juta rupiah) dan paling banyak 250.000.000,00 (dua ratus lima puluh juta rupiah).
Isi pasal 418 dan 419 KUHP, yang mana berkaitan dengan kasus dalam pembahasan kami adalah sebagai berikut.
Seorang pejabat yang menerima hadiah atau janji padahal diketahui atau sepatutnya harus diduganya., hahwa hadiah atau janji itu diberikan karena kekuasaan atau kewenangan yang berhubungan dengan jabatannya, atau yang menurut pikiran orang yang memberi hadiah atau janji itu ada hubungan dengan jabatannya diancam dengan pidana penjara paling lama enam tahun atau pidana denda paling banyak empat ribu lima ratus rupiah.
Diancam dengan pidana penjara paling lama lima tahun seorang pejabat:
(1) yang menerima hadiah atau janji padahal diketahuinya bahwa hadiah atau janji itu diberikan untuk menggerakkannya supaya melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu dalam jabatannya yang bertentangan dengan kewajibannya;
(2) yang menerinia hadiah mengetahui bahwa hadiah itu diberikan sebagai akibat. atau oleh karena si penerima telah melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu dalam jabatannya yang bertentangan dengan kewajibannya.
Kasus ini juga masuk dalam kasus pidana, karena berkaitan dengan adanya upaya penggelapan dana negara. Penggelapan itu diatur di dalam Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372 , yang isinya :
Barang siapa dengan sengaja dan melawan hukum memiliki barang sesuatu yang seluruhnya atau sebagian adalah kepunyaan orang lain, tetapi yang ada dalam kekuasaannya bukan karena kejahatan, diancam karena penggelapan, dengan pidana penjara paling lama empat tahun atau pidana denda paling banyak sembilan ratus rupiah
Selain kasus penggelapan, juga terdapat adanya upaya untuk menguntungkan diri sendiri, sebagaimana disebutkan dalam pasal 378
Barang siapa dengan maksud untuk menguntungkan diri sendiri atau orang lain secara melawan hukum, dengan memakai nama palsu atau martabat palsu, dengan tipu muslihat, ataupun rangkaian kebohongan, menggerakkan orang lain untuk menyerahkan barang sesuatu kepadanya, atau supaya memberi hutang maupun menghapuskan piutang, diancam karena penipuan dengan pidana penjara paling lama empat tahun
Selain jeratan sanksi diatas, kasus ini juga masuk dalam ranah money loundry, diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang, dengan adanya pengalihan uang dengan cara dialirkan ke rekening lain, yang ketika dicek saldo rekening gayus, hanya ditemukan nominal Rp. 400.000.000,00, yang tidak sesuai dengan laporan yang diperoleh dari penyidikan.
Dari pembahasan diatas, kasus ini juga termasuk dalam kasus tindak pidana ekonomi karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan/fiskal negara. Karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan negara, khususnya dalam hal keuangan negara.
Kesimpulan
Kasus gayus dinyatakan bukan kasus pidana perpajakan oleh dirjen pajak karena kasus ini tidak berkaitan dengan SPT wajib pajak, tetapi dalam pendapat kami, kasus ini adalah kasus perpajakan, dimana tindak kejahatan terjadi di dalam lingkup perpajakan. Selain itu, kasus ini juga menyeret secara langsusng beberapa pasal dalam undang-undang yang berbeda.
Kasus Gayus, menurut kami, merupakan suatu concursus atau perbarengan tindak pidana. Pada dasarnya yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan tindak pidana ialah terjadinya dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh satu orang dimana tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama kali belum dijatuhi pidana, atau antara tindak pidana yang awal dengan tindak pidana berikutnya belum dibatasi oleh suatu putusan hakim. Dapat juga di dalam bentuk concursus itu terjadi dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh dua atau lebih orang. Jadi intinya, yang terpenting adalah ada lebih dari satu tindak pidana dan diantara tindak pidana tersebut belum diputus hakim.
Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dituduh melakukan tiga tindak pidana sekaligus, yaitu korupsi, pencucian uang, dan penggelapan. Ini tidak masuk ke dalam suatu penyertaan pidana karena Gayus melakukan delik secara sendiri dan tidak bersama-sama. Penyertaan dalam poin kesatu bentuk-bentuk penyertaan, yaitu “mereka yang melakukan (pembuat pelaksana: Pleger)” adalah berbeda dengan enkelvoudige dader (pembuat tunggal).
Fakta-fakta di dalam kasus mafia pajak dengan tersangka Gayus Halomoan Tambunan, menunjukkan dan mengindikasikan bahwa itu merupakan suatu perbarengan tindak pidana.
Jadi berdasarkan rumusan ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 KUHP, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa masing-masing tindak pidana yang mana tindak pidana dalam perbarengan perbuatan itu satu sama lain adalah terpisah dan berdiri sendiri. Inilah ciri pokok dari perbarengan perbuatan. Kesimpulannya, kasus Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dalam penyelesaiannya dapat diadili dan dipidana sekaligus karena ini merupakan concursus. Nantinya akan diputus dalam satu putusan pidana dan tidak dijatuhkan sendiri-sendiri.
Adapun pasal-pasal pidana yang menjerat tersangka, Gayus Tambunan, adalah :
Pasal 36A (4) UU KUP Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perubahan Ketiga Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 Tentang Ketentuan Umum Dan Tata Cara Perpajakan, Pasal 12 UU Tipikor, di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Pasal 11 Undang-Undang Pemberantasan Korupsi mengatur tentang penerimaan uang oleh pegawai negeri yang patut diduga berhubungan dengan jabatannya dan gratifikasi, Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372 dan pasal 378. Selain jeratan sanksi diatas, kasus ini juga masuk dalam ranah money loundry, diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang.
Dari pembahasan diatas, kasus ini juga termasuk dalam kasus tindak pidana ekonomi karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan/fiskal negara.
Satgas: Dampak Kasus Gayus Sangat Merusak
Kategori beratnya kasus ini karena bukan hanya menyangkut aparat pajak.
Minggu, 28 Maret 2010, 13:36 WIB
Heri Susanto
VIVAnews - Satuan Tugas Pemberantas Mafia Hukum mengungkapkan bahwa kasus Gayus Tambunan merupakan kasus mafia yang tergolong berat. Dampak kerusakannya juga sangat besar.
"Bayangkan, jika kasus ini dibiarkan, dampaknya akan sangat merusak," ujar
Sekretaris Satgas Mafia Hukum, Denny Indrayana saat dihubungi VIVAnews di Jakarta, Minggu, 28 Maret 2010.
Dia menekankan kategori beratnya kasus ini karena bukan hanya menyangkut aparat pajak, melainkan juga terkait dengan aparat penegak hukum lainnya, seperti kepolisian dan kejaksaan.
Di sisi lain, dampak besar dari kasus ini adalah dari sisi penerimaan negara. Padahal, penerimaan negara selama ini sebagian besar disumbang dari pajak. "Bayangkan, jika kasus ini dibiarkan terjadi," katanya.
Karena itu, kata Denny, Satgas membantu kepolisian untuk mengungkap kasus tersebut. Satgas telah menghimpun informasi sangat penting dan strategis dari Gayus Tambunan guna menginvestigasi kasus ini lebih lanjut.
Informasi itu terkait dengan mafia yang bukan sekedar melibatkan orang pajak, tetapi juga terkait dengan mafia peradilan, yakni mencakup institusi penegak hukum lainnya. "Kami sudah serahkan kepada Mabes Polri untuk ditindaklanjuti."
Anggota Satuan Tugas (Satgas), Mas Achmad Santosa mengungkapkan pengadilan pajak merupakan tempat penyelewengan yang dilakukan pegawai pajak.
Gayus Tambunan kini tengah diburu oleh Ditjen Pajak dan Kepolisian Indonesia. Gayus menjadi tersangka dugaan makelar kasus pajak karena di rekeningnya terdapat duit senilai Rp 25 miliar yang diduga berasal dari wajib pajak.
Sumber : http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/139740-satgas__dampak_kasus_gayus_sangat_merusak
Analisis :
Hasil analisis :
A. Analisa kasus :
Kasus gayus dinyatakan bukan kasus pidana perpajakan oleh dirjen pajak karena kasus ini tidak berkaitan dengan SPT wajib pajak, tetapi dalam pendapat kami, kasus ini adalah kasus perpajakan, dimana tindak kejahatan terjadi di dalam lingkup perpajakan. Selain itu, kasus ini juga menyeret secara langsusng beberapa pasal dalam undang-undang yang berbeda.
Kasus Gayus, menurut kami, merupakan suatu concursus atau perbarengan tindak pidana. Pada dasarnya yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan tindak pidana ialah terjadinya dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh satu orang dimana tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama kali belum dijatuhi pidana, atau antara tindak pidana yang awal dengan tindak pidana berikutnya belum dibatasi oleh suatu putusan hakim. Dapat juga di dalam bentuk concursus itu terjadi dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh dua atau lebih orang. Jadi intinya, yang terpenting adalah ada lebih dari satu tindak pidana dan diantara tindak pidana tersebut belum diputus hakim.
Pada pengulangan juga terdapat lebih dari satu tindak pidana yang dilakukan oleh satu orang. Perbedaan pokoknya adalah bahwa pada pengulangan tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama atau lebih awal telah diputus oleh hakim dengan mempidana pada si pembuat/pelaku, bahkan telah dijalaninya baik sebagian atau seluruhnya. Sedangkan pada perbarengan (concursus) syarat seperti pada pengulangan tidaklah diperlukan. Pengulangan tindak pidana lebih familiar dengan sebutan recidive.
Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dituduh melakukan tiga tindak pidana sekaligus, yaitu korupsi, pencucian uang, dan penggelapan. Ini tidak masuk ke dalam suatu penyertaan pidana karena Gayus melakukan delik secara sendiri dan tidak bersama-sama. Penyertaan dalam poin kesatu bentuk-bentuk penyertaan, yaitu “mereka yang melakukan (pembuat pelaksana: Pleger)” adalah berbeda dengan enkelvoudige dader (pembuat tunggal).
Perbedaan pleger dengan dader (pembuat tunggal) adalah, bagi seorang pleger masih diperlukan keterlibatan minimal seorang lainnya, baik secara psikis, misalnya terlibat dengan seorang pembuat penganjur; atau terlibat secara fisik, misalnya dengan pembuat peserta atau pembuat pembantu. Jadi, seorang pleger diperlukan sumbangan dari peserta lain dalam mewujudkan tindak pidana. Tetapi, keterlibatan dalam hal sumbangan peserta lain ini, perbuatannya haruslah sedemikian rupa sehingga perbuatannya itu tidak semata-mata menentukan untuk terwujudnya tindak pidana yang dituju.
Fakta-fakta di dalam kasus mafia pajak dengan tersangka Gayus Halomoan Tambunan, menunjukkan dan mengindikasikan bahwa itu merupakan suatu perbarengan tindak pidana.
Hal tersebut karena Gayus disangkakan dan dijerat dengan pasal mengenai korupsi, pencucian uang (money laundering) serta penggelapan. Ketiganya merupakan bentuk tindak pidana. Masing-masing berbeda antara satu dengan yang lain. Korupsi diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Kemudian, money laundering diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang. Lalu, penggelapan itu diatur di dalam Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372-377.
Oleh karena itu, concursus dari kasus Gayus masuk ke dalam concursus realis (perbarengan perbuatan) atau meerdaadse samenloop. Perihal apa yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan perbuatan, kiranya dapat disimpulkan dari rumusan pasal 65 ayat (1) dan pasal 66 ayat (1) KUHP, yakni : “beberapa perbuatan yang masing-masing harus dipandang sebagai perbuatan yang berdiri sendiri sehingga merupakan beberapa kejahatan …”. Pengertian perbuatan dalam rumusan di ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 adalah perbuatan yang telah memenuhi seluruh syarat dari suatu tindak pidana tertentu yang dirumuskan dalam undang-undang, atau secara singkat adalah tindak pidana, yang pengertian ini telah sesuai dengan kalimat di belakangnya, “sehingga merupakan beberapa kejahatan” (berdasarkan penafsiran sistematis).
Jadi berdasarkan rumusan ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 KUHP, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa masing-masing tindak pidana yang mana tindak pidana dalam perbarengan perbuatan itu satu sama lain adalah terpisah dan berdiri sendiri. Inilah ciri pokok dari perbarengan perbuatan. Kesimpulannya, kasus Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dalam penyelesaiannya dapat diadili dan dipidana sekaligus karena ini merupakan concursus. Nantinya akan diputus dalam satu putusan pidana dan tidak dijatuhkan sendiri-sendiri.
B. Pasal yang menjerat tersangka :
UU KUP Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perubahan Ketiga Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 Tentang Ketentuan Umum Dan Tata Cara Perpajakan :
• Pasal 36A (4) Pegawai pajak yang dengan maksud menguntungkan diri sendiri secara melawan hukum dengan menyalahgunakan kekuasaannya memaksa seseorang untuk memberikan sesuatu, untuk membayar atau menerima pembayaran, atau untuk mengerjakan sesuatu bagi dirinya sendiri, diancam dengan pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 12 Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi dan perubahannya.
Pasal 12 UU Tipikor, di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi.:
Setiap orang yang melakukan tindak pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 419, Pasal 420, Pasal 423, Pasal 425, atau Pasal 435 Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, dipidana dengan pidana penjara seumur hidup atau pidana penjara paling singkat 4 (empat) tahun dan paling lama 20 (dua puluh) tahun dan denda paling sedikit Rp 200.000.000,00 (dua ratus juta rupiah) dan paling banyak 1.000.000.000,00 (satu milyar rupiah).
Kasus ini merupakan kasus pidana penyuapan, dengan adanya kesaksian tersangka atas adanya suap PT. Bakrie yang diterima oleh tersangka. Pasal yang terkait dengan kasus ini adalah Pasal 11 Undang-Undang Pemberantasan Korupsi mengatur tentang penerimaan uang oleh pegawai negeri yang patut diduga berhubungan dengan jabatannya dan gratifikasi.
Setiap orang yang melakukan tindak pidana sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 418 Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling singkat 1 (satu) tahun dan paling lama 5 (lima) tahun dan denda paling sedikit Rp 50.000.000,00 (lima puluh juta rupiah) dan paling banyak 250.000.000,00 (dua ratus lima puluh juta rupiah).
Isi pasal 418 dan 419 KUHP, yang mana berkaitan dengan kasus dalam pembahasan kami adalah sebagai berikut.
Seorang pejabat yang menerima hadiah atau janji padahal diketahui atau sepatutnya harus diduganya., hahwa hadiah atau janji itu diberikan karena kekuasaan atau kewenangan yang berhubungan dengan jabatannya, atau yang menurut pikiran orang yang memberi hadiah atau janji itu ada hubungan dengan jabatannya diancam dengan pidana penjara paling lama enam tahun atau pidana denda paling banyak empat ribu lima ratus rupiah.
Diancam dengan pidana penjara paling lama lima tahun seorang pejabat:
(1) yang menerima hadiah atau janji padahal diketahuinya bahwa hadiah atau janji itu diberikan untuk menggerakkannya supaya melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu dalam jabatannya yang bertentangan dengan kewajibannya;
(2) yang menerinia hadiah mengetahui bahwa hadiah itu diberikan sebagai akibat. atau oleh karena si penerima telah melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu dalam jabatannya yang bertentangan dengan kewajibannya.
Kasus ini juga masuk dalam kasus pidana, karena berkaitan dengan adanya upaya penggelapan dana negara. Penggelapan itu diatur di dalam Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372 , yang isinya :
Barang siapa dengan sengaja dan melawan hukum memiliki barang sesuatu yang seluruhnya atau sebagian adalah kepunyaan orang lain, tetapi yang ada dalam kekuasaannya bukan karena kejahatan, diancam karena penggelapan, dengan pidana penjara paling lama empat tahun atau pidana denda paling banyak sembilan ratus rupiah
Selain kasus penggelapan, juga terdapat adanya upaya untuk menguntungkan diri sendiri, sebagaimana disebutkan dalam pasal 378
Barang siapa dengan maksud untuk menguntungkan diri sendiri atau orang lain secara melawan hukum, dengan memakai nama palsu atau martabat palsu, dengan tipu muslihat, ataupun rangkaian kebohongan, menggerakkan orang lain untuk menyerahkan barang sesuatu kepadanya, atau supaya memberi hutang maupun menghapuskan piutang, diancam karena penipuan dengan pidana penjara paling lama empat tahun
Selain jeratan sanksi diatas, kasus ini juga masuk dalam ranah money loundry, diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang, dengan adanya pengalihan uang dengan cara dialirkan ke rekening lain, yang ketika dicek saldo rekening gayus, hanya ditemukan nominal Rp. 400.000.000,00, yang tidak sesuai dengan laporan yang diperoleh dari penyidikan.
Dari pembahasan diatas, kasus ini juga termasuk dalam kasus tindak pidana ekonomi karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan/fiskal negara. Karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan negara, khususnya dalam hal keuangan negara.
Kesimpulan
Kasus gayus dinyatakan bukan kasus pidana perpajakan oleh dirjen pajak karena kasus ini tidak berkaitan dengan SPT wajib pajak, tetapi dalam pendapat kami, kasus ini adalah kasus perpajakan, dimana tindak kejahatan terjadi di dalam lingkup perpajakan. Selain itu, kasus ini juga menyeret secara langsusng beberapa pasal dalam undang-undang yang berbeda.
Kasus Gayus, menurut kami, merupakan suatu concursus atau perbarengan tindak pidana. Pada dasarnya yang dimaksud dengan perbarengan tindak pidana ialah terjadinya dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh satu orang dimana tindak pidana yang dilakukan pertama kali belum dijatuhi pidana, atau antara tindak pidana yang awal dengan tindak pidana berikutnya belum dibatasi oleh suatu putusan hakim. Dapat juga di dalam bentuk concursus itu terjadi dua atau lebih tindak pidana oleh dua atau lebih orang. Jadi intinya, yang terpenting adalah ada lebih dari satu tindak pidana dan diantara tindak pidana tersebut belum diputus hakim.
Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dituduh melakukan tiga tindak pidana sekaligus, yaitu korupsi, pencucian uang, dan penggelapan. Ini tidak masuk ke dalam suatu penyertaan pidana karena Gayus melakukan delik secara sendiri dan tidak bersama-sama. Penyertaan dalam poin kesatu bentuk-bentuk penyertaan, yaitu “mereka yang melakukan (pembuat pelaksana: Pleger)” adalah berbeda dengan enkelvoudige dader (pembuat tunggal).
Fakta-fakta di dalam kasus mafia pajak dengan tersangka Gayus Halomoan Tambunan, menunjukkan dan mengindikasikan bahwa itu merupakan suatu perbarengan tindak pidana.
Jadi berdasarkan rumusan ayat (1) pasal 65 dan 66 KUHP, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa masing-masing tindak pidana yang mana tindak pidana dalam perbarengan perbuatan itu satu sama lain adalah terpisah dan berdiri sendiri. Inilah ciri pokok dari perbarengan perbuatan. Kesimpulannya, kasus Gayus Halomoan Tambunan dalam penyelesaiannya dapat diadili dan dipidana sekaligus karena ini merupakan concursus. Nantinya akan diputus dalam satu putusan pidana dan tidak dijatuhkan sendiri-sendiri.
Adapun pasal-pasal pidana yang menjerat tersangka, Gayus Tambunan, adalah :
Pasal 36A (4) UU KUP Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perubahan Ketiga Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 Tentang Ketentuan Umum Dan Tata Cara Perpajakan, Pasal 12 UU Tipikor, di dalam Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi juncto Undang-undang No. 20 Tahun 2001 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Pasal 11 Undang-Undang Pemberantasan Korupsi mengatur tentang penerimaan uang oleh pegawai negeri yang patut diduga berhubungan dengan jabatannya dan gratifikasi, Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) pasal 372 dan pasal 378. Selain jeratan sanksi diatas, kasus ini juga masuk dalam ranah money loundry, diatur di dalam Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang juncto Undang-undang No. 25 Tahun 2003 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 15 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang.
Dari pembahasan diatas, kasus ini juga termasuk dalam kasus tindak pidana ekonomi karena berkaitan dengan kondisi keuangan/fiskal negara.
Senin, 18 April 2011
WTO
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization that intends to supervise and liberalize international trade. The organization officially commenced on January 1, 1995 under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948. The organization deals with regulation of trade between participating countries; it provides a framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements, and a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO agreements which are signed by representatives of member governments and ratified by their parliaments.[4][5] Most of the issues that the WTO focuses on derive from previous trade negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round (1986–1994).
The organization is currently endeavoring to persist with a trade negotiation called the Doha Development Agenda (or Doha Round), which was launched in 2001 to enhance equitable participation of poorer countries which represent a majority of the world's population. However, the negotiation has been dogged by "disagreement between exporters of agricultural bulk commodities and countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers on the precise terms of a 'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from surges in imports. At this time, the future of the Doha Round is uncertain."[6]
The WTO has 153 members,[7] representing more than 97% of total world trade[8] and 30 observers, most seeking membership. The WTO is governed by a ministerial conference, meeting every two years; a general council, which implements the conference's policy decisions and is responsible for day-to-day administration; and a director-general, who is appointed by the ministerial conference. The WTO's headquarters is at the Centre William Rappard, Geneva, Switzerland
History
Harry White (l) and John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference — Both economists had been strong advocates of a liberal international trade environment, and recommended the establishment of three institutions: the IMF (fiscal and monetary issues), the World Bank (financial and structural issues), and the ITO (international economic cooperation).
The WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was established after World War II in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedicated to international economic cooperation — notably the Bretton Woods institutions known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A comparable international institution for trade, named the International Trade Organization was successfully negotiated. The ITO was to be a United Nations specialized agency and would address not only trade barriers but other issues indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements. But the ITO treaty was not approved by the U.S. and a few other signatories and never went into effect.
In the absence of an international organization for trade, the GATT would over the years "transform itself" into a de facto international organization.[13]
GATT rounds of negotiations
The GATT was the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1945 until the WTO was established in 1995.[14] Despite attempts in the mid 1950s and 1960s to create some form of institutional mechanism for international trade, the GATT continued to operate for almost half a century as a semi-institutionalized multilateral treaty regime on a provisional basis.
[edit] From Geneva to Tokyo
Seven rounds of negotiations occurred under GATT. The first real GATT trade rounds concentrated on further reducing tariffs. Then, the Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties brought about a GATT anti-dumping Agreement and a section on development. The Tokyo Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to tackle trade barriers that do not take the form of tariffs, and to improve the system, adopting a series of agreements on non-tariff barriers, which in some cases interpreted existing GATT rules, and in others broke entirely new ground. Because these plurilateral agreements were not accepted by the full GATT membership, they were often informally called "codes". Several of these codes were amended in the Uruguay Round, and turned into multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members. Only four remained plurilateral (those on government procurement, bovine meat, civil aircraft and dairy products), but in 1997 WTO members agreed to terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two.
Uruguay Round
During the Doha Round, the US government blamed Brazil and India for being inflexible, and the EU for impeding agricultural imports.[16] The President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, responded to the criticisms by arguing that progress would only be achieved if the richest countries (especially the US and countries in the EU) make deeper cuts in their agricultural subsidies, and further open their markets for agricultural goods.
Main article: Uruguay Round
Well before GATT's 40th anniversary, its members concluded that the GATT system was straining to adapt to a new globalizing world economy.[18][19] In response to the problems identified in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (structural deficiencies, spill-over impacts of certain countries' policies on world trade GATT could not manage etc.), the eighth GATT round — known as the Uruguay Round — was launched in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed: the talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles; all the original GATT articles were up for review.[19] The Final Act concluding the Uruguay Round and officially establishing the WTO regime was signed April 15, 1994, during the ministerial meeting at Marrakesh, Morocco, and hence is known as the Marrakesh Agreement.
The GATT still exists as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations (a distinction is made between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994).[18] GATT 1994 is not however the only legally binding agreement included via the Final Act at Marrakesh; a long list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings was adopted. The agreements fall into a structure with six main parts:
* The Agreement Establishing the WTO
* Goods and investment — the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods including the GATT 1994 and the Trade Related Investment Measures
* Services — the General Agreement on Trade in Services
* Intellectual property — the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
* Dispute settlement (DSU)
* Reviews of governments' trade policies (TPRM)
[edit] Ministerial conferences
The topmost decision-making body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which usually meets every two years. It brings together all members of the WTO, all of which are countries or customs unions. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements. The inaugural ministerial conference was held in Singapore in 1996. Disagreements between largely developed and developing economies emerged during this conference over four issues initiated by this conference, which led to them being collectively referred to as the "Singapore issues". The second ministerial conference was held in Geneva in Switzerland. The third conference in Seattle, Washington ended in failure, with massive demonstrations and police and National Guard crowd control efforts drawing worldwide attention. The fourth ministerial conference was held in Doha in the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar. The Doha Development Round was launched at the conference. The conference also approved the joining of China, which became the 143rd member to join. The fifth ministerial conference was held in Cancún, Mexico, aiming at forging agreement on the Doha round. An alliance of 22 southern states, the G20 developing nations (led by India, China, Brazil, ASEAN led by the Philippines), resisted demands from the North for agreements on the so-called "Singapore issues" and called for an end to agricultural subsidies within the EU and the US. The talks broke down without progress.
The sixth WTO ministerial conference was held in Hong Kong from 13–18 December 2005. It was considered vital if the four-year-old Doha Development Agenda negotiations were to move forward sufficiently to conclude the round in 2006. In this meeting, countries agreed to phase out all their agricultural export subsidies by the end of 2013, and terminate any cotton export subsidies by the end of 2006. Further concessions to developing countries included an agreement to introduce duty free, tariff free access for goods from the Least Developed Countries, following the Everything but Arms initiative of the European Union — but with up to 3% of tariff lines exempted. Other major issues were left for further negotiation to be completed by the end of 2010. The WTO General Council, on 26 May 2009, agreed to hold a seventh WTO ministerial conference session in Geneva from 30 November-3 December 2009. A statement by chairman Amb. Mario Matus acknowledged that the prime purpose was to remedy a breach of protocol requiring two-yearly "regular" meetings, which had lapsed with the Doha Round failure in 2005, and that the "scaled-down" meeting would not be a negotiating session, but "emphasis will be on transparency and open discussion rather than on small group processes and informal negotiating structures". The general theme for discussion was "The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment"
Doha Round
Main article: Doha Round
The Doha Development Round started in 2001 and continues today.
The WTO launched the current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) or Doha Round, at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. The Doha round was to be an ambitious effort to make globalization more inclusive and help the world's poor, particularly by slashing barriers and subsidies in farming. The initial agenda comprised both further trade liberalization and new rule-making, underpinned by commitments to strengthen substantial assistance to developing countries.
The negotiations have been highly contentious and agreement has not been reached, despite the intense negotiations at several ministerial conferences and at other sessions. Disagreements still continue over several key areas including agriculture subsidies.
Functions
Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most important:
* It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered agreements.
* It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.
Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of developing, least-developed and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical cooperation and training.[32]
The WTO is also a center of economic research and analysis: regular assessments of the global trade picture in its annual publications and research reports on specific topics are produced by the organization. Finally, the WTO cooperates closely with the two other components of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank.
Principles of the trading system
The WTO establishes a framework for trade policies; it does not define or specify outcomes. That is, it is concerned with setting the rules of the trade policy games.[34] Five principles are of particular importance in understanding both the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO:
1. Non-Discrimination. It has two major components: the most favoured nation (MFN) rule, and the national treatment policy. Both are embedded in the main WTO rules on goods, services, and intellectual property, but their precise scope and nature differ across these areas. The MFN rule requires that a WTO member must apply the same conditions on all trade with other WTO members, i.e. a WTO member has to grant the most favorable conditions under which it allows trade in a certain product type to all other WTO members.[34] "Grant someone a special favour and you have to do the same for all other WTO members."[35] National treatment means that imported goods should be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods (at least after the foreign goods have entered the market) and was introduced to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade (e.g. technical standards, security standards et al. discriminating against imported goods).[34]
2. Reciprocity. It reflects both a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that may arise because of the MFN rule, and a desire to obtain better access to foreign markets. A related point is that for a nation to negotiate, it is necessary that the gain from doing so be greater than the gain available from unilateral liberalization; reciprocal concessions intend to ensure that such gains will materialise.[36]
3. Binding and enforceable commitments. The tariff commitments made by WTO members in a multilateral trade negotiation and on accession are enumerated in a schedule (list) of concessions. These schedules establish "ceiling bindings": a country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. If satisfaction is not obtained, the complaining country may invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedures.[35][36]
4. Transparency. The WTO members are required to publish their trade regulations, to maintain institutions allowing for the review of administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. These internal transparency requirements are supplemented and facilitated by periodic country-specific reports (trade policy reviews) through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).[37] The WTO system tries also to improve predictability and stability, discouraging the use of quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports.[35]
5. Safety valves. In specific circumstances, governments are able to restrict trade. There are three types of provisions in this direction: articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain noneconomic objectives; articles aimed at ensuring "fair competition"; and provisions permitting intervention in trade for economic reasons.[37] Exceptions to the MFN principle also allow for preferential treatment of developed countries, regional free trade areas and customs unions.[citation needed]
Organizational structure
The General Council has multiple bodies which oversee committees in different areas, re the following:
Council for Trade in Goods
There are 11 committees under the jurisdiction of the Goods Council each with a specific task. All members of the WTO participate in the committees. The Textiles Monitoring Body is separate from the other committees but still under the jurisdiction of Goods Council. The body has its own chairman and only 10 members. The body also has several groups relating to textiles.[38]
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Information on intellectual property in the WTO, news and official records of the activities of the TRIPS Council, and details of the WTO’s work with other international organizations in the field.[39]
Council for Trade in Services
The Council for Trade in Services operates under the guidance of the General Council and is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is open to all WTO members, and can create subsidiary bodies as required.[40]
Trade Negotiations Committee
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) is the committee that deals with the current trade talks round. The chair is WTO’s director-general. The committee is currently tasked with the Doha Development Round.[41]
The Service Council has three subsidiary bodies: financial services, domestic regulations, GATS rules and specific commitments.[38] The General council has several different committees, working groups, and working parties.[42] There are committees on the following: Trade and Environment; Trade and Development (Subcommittee on Least-Developed Countries); Regional Trade Agreements; Balance of Payments Restrictions; and Budget, Finance and Administration. There are working parties on the following: Accession. There are working groups on the following: Trade, debt and finance; and Trade and technology transfer.
[edit] Voting system
The WTO operates on a one country, one vote system, but actual votes have never been taken. Decision making is generally by consensus, and relative market size is the primary source of bargaining power. The advantage of consensus decision-making is that it encourages efforts to find the most widely acceptable decision. Main disadvantages include large time requirements and many rounds of negotiation to develop a consensus decision, and the tendency for final agreements to use ambiguous language on contentious points that makes future interpretation of treaties difficult.[citation needed]
In reality, WTO negotiations proceed not by consensus of all members, but by a process of informal negotiations between small groups of countries. Such negotiations are often called "Green Room" negotiations (after the colour of the WTO Director-General's Office in Geneva), or "Mini-Ministerials", when they occur in other countries. These processes have been regularly criticised by many of the WTO's developing country members which are often totally excluded from the negotiations.[citation needed]
Richard Harold Steinberg (2002) argues that although the WTO's consensus governance model provides law-based initial bargaining, trading rounds close through power-based bargaining favouring Europe and the U.S., and may not lead to Pareto improvement.[43]
[edit] Dispute settlement
Main article: Dispute settlement in the WTO
In 1994, the WTO members agreed on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) annexed to the "Final Act" signed in Marrakesh in 1994.[44] Dispute settlement is regarded by the WTO as the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and as a "unique contribution to the stability of the global economy".[45] WTO members have agreed that, if they believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally.[46]
The operation of the WTO dispute settlement process involves the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions.[47] Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, World Trade Organization.
[edit] Accession and membership
Main article: WTO accession and membership
The process of becoming a WTO member is unique to each applicant country, and the terms of accession are dependent upon the country's stage of economic development and current trade regime.[48] The process takes about five years, on average, but it can last more if the country is less than fully committed to the process or if political issues interfere.[49] As is typical of WTO procedures, an offer of accession is only given once consensus is reached among interested parties.[50]
[edit] Accession process
Status of WTO negotiations:
members (including dual-representation with the European Union)
Draft Working Party Report or Factual Summary adopted
Goods and/or Services offers submitted
Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime submitted
observer, negotiations to start later or no Memorandum on FTR submitted
frozen procedures or no negotiations in the last 3 years
no official interaction with the WTO
A country wishing to accede to the WTO submits an application to the General Council, and has to describe all aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements.[51] The application is submitted to the WTO in a memorandum which is examined by a working party open to all interested WTO Members.[50]
After all necessary background information has been acquired, the working party focuses on issues of discrepancy between the WTO rules and the applicant's international and domestic trade policies and laws. The working party determines the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO for the applicant nation, and may consider transitional periods to allow countries some leeway in complying with the WTO rules.[48]
The final phase of accession involves bilateral negotiations between the applicant nation and other working party members regarding the concessions and commitments on tariff levels and market access for goods and services. The new member's commitments are to apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are negotiated bilaterally.[51]
When the bilateral talks conclude, the working party sends to the general council or ministerial conference an accession package, which includes a summary of all the working party meetings, the Protocol of Accession (a draft membership treaty), and lists ("schedules") of the member-to-be's commitments. Once the general council or ministerial conference approves of the terms of accession, the applicant's parliament must ratify the Protocol of Accession before it can become a member.[52]
[edit] Members and observers
The WTO has 153 members (almost all of the 123 nations participating in the Uruguay Round signed on at its foundation, and the rest had to get membership).[53] The 27 states of the European Union are represented also as the European Communities. WTO members do not have to be full sovereign nation-members. Instead, they must be a customs territory with full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations. Thus Hong Kong (as "Hong Kong, China" since 1997) became a GATT contracting party, and the Republic of China (ROC) (commonly known as Taiwan, whose sovereignty has been disputed by the People's Republic of China or PRC) acceded to the WTO in 2002 under the name of "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" (Chinese Taipei).[54]
A number of non-members (30) are observers at WTO proceedings and are currently negotiating their membership. The full list of WTO observers are:[55] 1. Afghanistan 2. Algeria 3. Andorra 4. Azerbaijan 5. The Bahamas 6. Belarus 7. Bhutan 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 9. Comoros 10. Equatorial Guinea 11. Ethiopia 12. Islamic Republic of Iran 13. Iraq 14. Kazakhstan 15. Lao People's Democratic Republic, or Laos 16. Lebanese Republic 17. Liberia 18. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 19. Montenegro 20. Russian Federation 21. Samoa 22. Sao Tomé and Principe 23. Serbia 24. Seychelles 25. Sudan 26. Syrian Arab Republic 27. Tajikistan 28. Uzbekistan 29. Vanuatu 30. Yemen
Russia is the biggest economy outside WTO and after the completion of Russia's accession, Iran would be the biggest economy outside the WTO.[56] With the exception of the Holy See, observers must start accession negotiations within five years of becoming observers. Some international intergovernmental organizations are also granted observer status to WTO bodies.[57] 14 states and 2 territories so far have no official interaction with the WTO.
Agreements
Main article: Uruguay Round
The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements which have the status of international legal texts. Member countries must sign and ratify all WTO agreements on accession.[58] A discussion of some of the most important agreements follows. The Agreement on Agriculture came into effect with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. The AoA has three central concepts, or "pillars": domestic support, market access and export subsidies. The General Agreement on Trade in Services was created to extend the multilateral trading system to service sector, in the same way the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for merchandise trade. The Agreement entered into force in January 1995. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation. It was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures — also known as the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. Under the SPS agreement, the WTO sets constraints on members' policies relating to food safety (bacterial contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labelling) as well as animal and plant health (imported pests and diseases). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization. It was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the end of 1994. The object ensures that technical negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade".[59] The Agreement on Customs Valuation, formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, prescribes methods of customs valuation that Members are to follow. Chiefly, it adopts the "transaction value" approach.
The organization is currently endeavoring to persist with a trade negotiation called the Doha Development Agenda (or Doha Round), which was launched in 2001 to enhance equitable participation of poorer countries which represent a majority of the world's population. However, the negotiation has been dogged by "disagreement between exporters of agricultural bulk commodities and countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers on the precise terms of a 'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from surges in imports. At this time, the future of the Doha Round is uncertain."[6]
The WTO has 153 members,[7] representing more than 97% of total world trade[8] and 30 observers, most seeking membership. The WTO is governed by a ministerial conference, meeting every two years; a general council, which implements the conference's policy decisions and is responsible for day-to-day administration; and a director-general, who is appointed by the ministerial conference. The WTO's headquarters is at the Centre William Rappard, Geneva, Switzerland
History
Harry White (l) and John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference — Both economists had been strong advocates of a liberal international trade environment, and recommended the establishment of three institutions: the IMF (fiscal and monetary issues), the World Bank (financial and structural issues), and the ITO (international economic cooperation).
The WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was established after World War II in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedicated to international economic cooperation — notably the Bretton Woods institutions known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A comparable international institution for trade, named the International Trade Organization was successfully negotiated. The ITO was to be a United Nations specialized agency and would address not only trade barriers but other issues indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements. But the ITO treaty was not approved by the U.S. and a few other signatories and never went into effect.
In the absence of an international organization for trade, the GATT would over the years "transform itself" into a de facto international organization.[13]
GATT rounds of negotiations
The GATT was the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1945 until the WTO was established in 1995.[14] Despite attempts in the mid 1950s and 1960s to create some form of institutional mechanism for international trade, the GATT continued to operate for almost half a century as a semi-institutionalized multilateral treaty regime on a provisional basis.
[edit] From Geneva to Tokyo
Seven rounds of negotiations occurred under GATT. The first real GATT trade rounds concentrated on further reducing tariffs. Then, the Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties brought about a GATT anti-dumping Agreement and a section on development. The Tokyo Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to tackle trade barriers that do not take the form of tariffs, and to improve the system, adopting a series of agreements on non-tariff barriers, which in some cases interpreted existing GATT rules, and in others broke entirely new ground. Because these plurilateral agreements were not accepted by the full GATT membership, they were often informally called "codes". Several of these codes were amended in the Uruguay Round, and turned into multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members. Only four remained plurilateral (those on government procurement, bovine meat, civil aircraft and dairy products), but in 1997 WTO members agreed to terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two.
Uruguay Round
During the Doha Round, the US government blamed Brazil and India for being inflexible, and the EU for impeding agricultural imports.[16] The President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, responded to the criticisms by arguing that progress would only be achieved if the richest countries (especially the US and countries in the EU) make deeper cuts in their agricultural subsidies, and further open their markets for agricultural goods.
Main article: Uruguay Round
Well before GATT's 40th anniversary, its members concluded that the GATT system was straining to adapt to a new globalizing world economy.[18][19] In response to the problems identified in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (structural deficiencies, spill-over impacts of certain countries' policies on world trade GATT could not manage etc.), the eighth GATT round — known as the Uruguay Round — was launched in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed: the talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles; all the original GATT articles were up for review.[19] The Final Act concluding the Uruguay Round and officially establishing the WTO regime was signed April 15, 1994, during the ministerial meeting at Marrakesh, Morocco, and hence is known as the Marrakesh Agreement.
The GATT still exists as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations (a distinction is made between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994).[18] GATT 1994 is not however the only legally binding agreement included via the Final Act at Marrakesh; a long list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings was adopted. The agreements fall into a structure with six main parts:
* The Agreement Establishing the WTO
* Goods and investment — the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods including the GATT 1994 and the Trade Related Investment Measures
* Services — the General Agreement on Trade in Services
* Intellectual property — the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
* Dispute settlement (DSU)
* Reviews of governments' trade policies (TPRM)
[edit] Ministerial conferences
The topmost decision-making body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which usually meets every two years. It brings together all members of the WTO, all of which are countries or customs unions. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements. The inaugural ministerial conference was held in Singapore in 1996. Disagreements between largely developed and developing economies emerged during this conference over four issues initiated by this conference, which led to them being collectively referred to as the "Singapore issues". The second ministerial conference was held in Geneva in Switzerland. The third conference in Seattle, Washington ended in failure, with massive demonstrations and police and National Guard crowd control efforts drawing worldwide attention. The fourth ministerial conference was held in Doha in the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar. The Doha Development Round was launched at the conference. The conference also approved the joining of China, which became the 143rd member to join. The fifth ministerial conference was held in Cancún, Mexico, aiming at forging agreement on the Doha round. An alliance of 22 southern states, the G20 developing nations (led by India, China, Brazil, ASEAN led by the Philippines), resisted demands from the North for agreements on the so-called "Singapore issues" and called for an end to agricultural subsidies within the EU and the US. The talks broke down without progress.
The sixth WTO ministerial conference was held in Hong Kong from 13–18 December 2005. It was considered vital if the four-year-old Doha Development Agenda negotiations were to move forward sufficiently to conclude the round in 2006. In this meeting, countries agreed to phase out all their agricultural export subsidies by the end of 2013, and terminate any cotton export subsidies by the end of 2006. Further concessions to developing countries included an agreement to introduce duty free, tariff free access for goods from the Least Developed Countries, following the Everything but Arms initiative of the European Union — but with up to 3% of tariff lines exempted. Other major issues were left for further negotiation to be completed by the end of 2010. The WTO General Council, on 26 May 2009, agreed to hold a seventh WTO ministerial conference session in Geneva from 30 November-3 December 2009. A statement by chairman Amb. Mario Matus acknowledged that the prime purpose was to remedy a breach of protocol requiring two-yearly "regular" meetings, which had lapsed with the Doha Round failure in 2005, and that the "scaled-down" meeting would not be a negotiating session, but "emphasis will be on transparency and open discussion rather than on small group processes and informal negotiating structures". The general theme for discussion was "The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment"
Doha Round
Main article: Doha Round
The Doha Development Round started in 2001 and continues today.
The WTO launched the current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) or Doha Round, at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. The Doha round was to be an ambitious effort to make globalization more inclusive and help the world's poor, particularly by slashing barriers and subsidies in farming. The initial agenda comprised both further trade liberalization and new rule-making, underpinned by commitments to strengthen substantial assistance to developing countries.
The negotiations have been highly contentious and agreement has not been reached, despite the intense negotiations at several ministerial conferences and at other sessions. Disagreements still continue over several key areas including agriculture subsidies.
Functions
Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most important:
* It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered agreements.
* It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.
Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of developing, least-developed and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical cooperation and training.[32]
The WTO is also a center of economic research and analysis: regular assessments of the global trade picture in its annual publications and research reports on specific topics are produced by the organization. Finally, the WTO cooperates closely with the two other components of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank.
Principles of the trading system
The WTO establishes a framework for trade policies; it does not define or specify outcomes. That is, it is concerned with setting the rules of the trade policy games.[34] Five principles are of particular importance in understanding both the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO:
1. Non-Discrimination. It has two major components: the most favoured nation (MFN) rule, and the national treatment policy. Both are embedded in the main WTO rules on goods, services, and intellectual property, but their precise scope and nature differ across these areas. The MFN rule requires that a WTO member must apply the same conditions on all trade with other WTO members, i.e. a WTO member has to grant the most favorable conditions under which it allows trade in a certain product type to all other WTO members.[34] "Grant someone a special favour and you have to do the same for all other WTO members."[35] National treatment means that imported goods should be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods (at least after the foreign goods have entered the market) and was introduced to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade (e.g. technical standards, security standards et al. discriminating against imported goods).[34]
2. Reciprocity. It reflects both a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that may arise because of the MFN rule, and a desire to obtain better access to foreign markets. A related point is that for a nation to negotiate, it is necessary that the gain from doing so be greater than the gain available from unilateral liberalization; reciprocal concessions intend to ensure that such gains will materialise.[36]
3. Binding and enforceable commitments. The tariff commitments made by WTO members in a multilateral trade negotiation and on accession are enumerated in a schedule (list) of concessions. These schedules establish "ceiling bindings": a country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. If satisfaction is not obtained, the complaining country may invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedures.[35][36]
4. Transparency. The WTO members are required to publish their trade regulations, to maintain institutions allowing for the review of administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. These internal transparency requirements are supplemented and facilitated by periodic country-specific reports (trade policy reviews) through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).[37] The WTO system tries also to improve predictability and stability, discouraging the use of quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports.[35]
5. Safety valves. In specific circumstances, governments are able to restrict trade. There are three types of provisions in this direction: articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain noneconomic objectives; articles aimed at ensuring "fair competition"; and provisions permitting intervention in trade for economic reasons.[37] Exceptions to the MFN principle also allow for preferential treatment of developed countries, regional free trade areas and customs unions.[citation needed]
Organizational structure
The General Council has multiple bodies which oversee committees in different areas, re the following:
Council for Trade in Goods
There are 11 committees under the jurisdiction of the Goods Council each with a specific task. All members of the WTO participate in the committees. The Textiles Monitoring Body is separate from the other committees but still under the jurisdiction of Goods Council. The body has its own chairman and only 10 members. The body also has several groups relating to textiles.[38]
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Information on intellectual property in the WTO, news and official records of the activities of the TRIPS Council, and details of the WTO’s work with other international organizations in the field.[39]
Council for Trade in Services
The Council for Trade in Services operates under the guidance of the General Council and is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is open to all WTO members, and can create subsidiary bodies as required.[40]
Trade Negotiations Committee
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) is the committee that deals with the current trade talks round. The chair is WTO’s director-general. The committee is currently tasked with the Doha Development Round.[41]
The Service Council has three subsidiary bodies: financial services, domestic regulations, GATS rules and specific commitments.[38] The General council has several different committees, working groups, and working parties.[42] There are committees on the following: Trade and Environment; Trade and Development (Subcommittee on Least-Developed Countries); Regional Trade Agreements; Balance of Payments Restrictions; and Budget, Finance and Administration. There are working parties on the following: Accession. There are working groups on the following: Trade, debt and finance; and Trade and technology transfer.
[edit] Voting system
The WTO operates on a one country, one vote system, but actual votes have never been taken. Decision making is generally by consensus, and relative market size is the primary source of bargaining power. The advantage of consensus decision-making is that it encourages efforts to find the most widely acceptable decision. Main disadvantages include large time requirements and many rounds of negotiation to develop a consensus decision, and the tendency for final agreements to use ambiguous language on contentious points that makes future interpretation of treaties difficult.[citation needed]
In reality, WTO negotiations proceed not by consensus of all members, but by a process of informal negotiations between small groups of countries. Such negotiations are often called "Green Room" negotiations (after the colour of the WTO Director-General's Office in Geneva), or "Mini-Ministerials", when they occur in other countries. These processes have been regularly criticised by many of the WTO's developing country members which are often totally excluded from the negotiations.[citation needed]
Richard Harold Steinberg (2002) argues that although the WTO's consensus governance model provides law-based initial bargaining, trading rounds close through power-based bargaining favouring Europe and the U.S., and may not lead to Pareto improvement.[43]
[edit] Dispute settlement
Main article: Dispute settlement in the WTO
In 1994, the WTO members agreed on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) annexed to the "Final Act" signed in Marrakesh in 1994.[44] Dispute settlement is regarded by the WTO as the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and as a "unique contribution to the stability of the global economy".[45] WTO members have agreed that, if they believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally.[46]
The operation of the WTO dispute settlement process involves the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions.[47] Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, World Trade Organization.
[edit] Accession and membership
Main article: WTO accession and membership
The process of becoming a WTO member is unique to each applicant country, and the terms of accession are dependent upon the country's stage of economic development and current trade regime.[48] The process takes about five years, on average, but it can last more if the country is less than fully committed to the process or if political issues interfere.[49] As is typical of WTO procedures, an offer of accession is only given once consensus is reached among interested parties.[50]
[edit] Accession process
Status of WTO negotiations:
members (including dual-representation with the European Union)
Draft Working Party Report or Factual Summary adopted
Goods and/or Services offers submitted
Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime submitted
observer, negotiations to start later or no Memorandum on FTR submitted
frozen procedures or no negotiations in the last 3 years
no official interaction with the WTO
A country wishing to accede to the WTO submits an application to the General Council, and has to describe all aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements.[51] The application is submitted to the WTO in a memorandum which is examined by a working party open to all interested WTO Members.[50]
After all necessary background information has been acquired, the working party focuses on issues of discrepancy between the WTO rules and the applicant's international and domestic trade policies and laws. The working party determines the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO for the applicant nation, and may consider transitional periods to allow countries some leeway in complying with the WTO rules.[48]
The final phase of accession involves bilateral negotiations between the applicant nation and other working party members regarding the concessions and commitments on tariff levels and market access for goods and services. The new member's commitments are to apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are negotiated bilaterally.[51]
When the bilateral talks conclude, the working party sends to the general council or ministerial conference an accession package, which includes a summary of all the working party meetings, the Protocol of Accession (a draft membership treaty), and lists ("schedules") of the member-to-be's commitments. Once the general council or ministerial conference approves of the terms of accession, the applicant's parliament must ratify the Protocol of Accession before it can become a member.[52]
[edit] Members and observers
The WTO has 153 members (almost all of the 123 nations participating in the Uruguay Round signed on at its foundation, and the rest had to get membership).[53] The 27 states of the European Union are represented also as the European Communities. WTO members do not have to be full sovereign nation-members. Instead, they must be a customs territory with full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations. Thus Hong Kong (as "Hong Kong, China" since 1997) became a GATT contracting party, and the Republic of China (ROC) (commonly known as Taiwan, whose sovereignty has been disputed by the People's Republic of China or PRC) acceded to the WTO in 2002 under the name of "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" (Chinese Taipei).[54]
A number of non-members (30) are observers at WTO proceedings and are currently negotiating their membership. The full list of WTO observers are:[55] 1. Afghanistan 2. Algeria 3. Andorra 4. Azerbaijan 5. The Bahamas 6. Belarus 7. Bhutan 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 9. Comoros 10. Equatorial Guinea 11. Ethiopia 12. Islamic Republic of Iran 13. Iraq 14. Kazakhstan 15. Lao People's Democratic Republic, or Laos 16. Lebanese Republic 17. Liberia 18. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 19. Montenegro 20. Russian Federation 21. Samoa 22. Sao Tomé and Principe 23. Serbia 24. Seychelles 25. Sudan 26. Syrian Arab Republic 27. Tajikistan 28. Uzbekistan 29. Vanuatu 30. Yemen
Russia is the biggest economy outside WTO and after the completion of Russia's accession, Iran would be the biggest economy outside the WTO.[56] With the exception of the Holy See, observers must start accession negotiations within five years of becoming observers. Some international intergovernmental organizations are also granted observer status to WTO bodies.[57] 14 states and 2 territories so far have no official interaction with the WTO.
Agreements
Main article: Uruguay Round
The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements which have the status of international legal texts. Member countries must sign and ratify all WTO agreements on accession.[58] A discussion of some of the most important agreements follows. The Agreement on Agriculture came into effect with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. The AoA has three central concepts, or "pillars": domestic support, market access and export subsidies. The General Agreement on Trade in Services was created to extend the multilateral trading system to service sector, in the same way the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for merchandise trade. The Agreement entered into force in January 1995. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation. It was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures — also known as the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. Under the SPS agreement, the WTO sets constraints on members' policies relating to food safety (bacterial contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labelling) as well as animal and plant health (imported pests and diseases). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization. It was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the end of 1994. The object ensures that technical negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade".[59] The Agreement on Customs Valuation, formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, prescribes methods of customs valuation that Members are to follow. Chiefly, it adopts the "transaction value" approach.
Countervailing duties
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Countervailing duties (CVDs) aka Anti-subsidy are trade import duties imposed under WTO Rules to neutralize the negative effects of subsidies. They are imposed after an investigation finds that a foreign country subsidizes its exports, injuring domestic producers in the importing country. According to World Trade Organization rules, a country can launch its own investigation and decide to charge extra duties, provided such additional duties are in accordance with the GATT Article VI and the GATT "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties".
Since countries can rule domestically whether domestic industries are in danger and whether foreign countries subsidize the products, the institutional process surrounding the investigation and determinations has significant impacts beyond the countervailing duties.
Countervailing duties in the U.S. are assessed by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce which determines whether imports in question are being subsidized and, if so, by how much. If there is a determination that there is material injury to the competing domestic industry, the Department of Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to levy duties in the amount equivalent to subsidy margins.
Petitions for remedies may be filed by domestic manufacturers or unions within the domestic industry, however the law requires that the petitioners represent at least 25% of the domestic production of the goods for which competition is causing material injury.
dari : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervailing_duties
Countervailing duties (CVDs) aka Anti-subsidy are trade import duties imposed under WTO Rules to neutralize the negative effects of subsidies. They are imposed after an investigation finds that a foreign country subsidizes its exports, injuring domestic producers in the importing country. According to World Trade Organization rules, a country can launch its own investigation and decide to charge extra duties, provided such additional duties are in accordance with the GATT Article VI and the GATT "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties".
Since countries can rule domestically whether domestic industries are in danger and whether foreign countries subsidize the products, the institutional process surrounding the investigation and determinations has significant impacts beyond the countervailing duties.
Countervailing duties in the U.S. are assessed by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce which determines whether imports in question are being subsidized and, if so, by how much. If there is a determination that there is material injury to the competing domestic industry, the Department of Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to levy duties in the amount equivalent to subsidy margins.
Petitions for remedies may be filed by domestic manufacturers or unions within the domestic industry, however the law requires that the petitioners represent at least 25% of the domestic production of the goods for which competition is causing material injury.
dari : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervailing_duties
The 15 original Uruguay Round subjects
The 1986 agenda
The 15 original Uruguay Round subjects
Tariffs
Non-tariff barriers
Natural resource products
Textiles and clothing
Agriculture
Tropical products
GATT articles
Tokyo Round codes
Anti-dumping
Subsidies
Intellectual property
Investment measures
Dispute settlement
The GATT system
Services
The 15 original Uruguay Round subjects
Tariffs
Non-tariff barriers
Natural resource products
Textiles and clothing
Agriculture
Tropical products
GATT articles
Tokyo Round codes
Anti-dumping
Subsidies
Intellectual property
Investment measures
Dispute settlement
The GATT system
Services
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: The Uruguay Round
It took seven and a half years, almost twice the original schedule. By the end, 123 countries were taking part. It covered almost all trade, from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatments. It was quite simply the largest trade negotiation ever, and most probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history.
At times it seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system since GATT was created at the end of the Second World War. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay Round did see some early results. Within only two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in import duties on tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They had also revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures implemented on the spot. And they called for regular reports on GATT members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade regimes transparent around the world.
A round to end all rounds? back to top
The seeds of the Uruguay Round were sown in November 1982 at a ministerial meeting of GATT members in Geneva. Although the ministers intended to launch a major new negotiation, the conference stalled on agriculture and was widely regarded as a failure. In fact, the work programme that the ministers agreed formed the basis for what was to become the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda.
Nevertheless, it took four more years of exploring, clarifying issues and painstaking consensus-building, before ministers agreed to launch the new round. They did so in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. They eventually accepted a negotiating agenda that covered virtually every outstanding trade policy issue. The talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles. All the original GATT articles were up for review. It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed, and the ministers gave themselves four years to complete it.
Two years later, in December 1988, ministers met again in Montreal, Canada, for what was supposed to be an assessment of progress at the round’s half-way point. The purpose was to clarify the agenda for the remaining two years, but the talks ended in a deadlock that was not resolved until officials met more quietly in Geneva the following April.
Despite the difficulty, during the Montreal meeting, ministers did agree a package of early results. These included some concessions on market access for tropical products — aimed at assisting developing countries — as well as a streamlined dispute settlement system, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism which provided for the first comprehensive, systematic and regular reviews of national trade policies and practices of GATT members. The round was supposed to end when ministers met once more in Brussels, in December 1990. But they disagreed on how to reform agricultural trade and decided to extend the talks. The Uruguay Round entered its bleakest period.
Despite the poor political outlook, a considerable amount of technical work continued, leading to the first draft of a final legal agreement. This draft “Final Act” was compiled by the then GATT director-general, Arthur Dunkel, who chaired the negotiations at officials’ level. It was put on the table in Geneva in December 1991. The text fulfilled every part of the Punta del Este mandate, with one exception — it did not contain the participating countries’ lists of commitments for cutting import duties and opening their services markets. The draft became the basis for the final agreement.
Over the following two years, the negotiations lurched between impending failure, to predictions of imminent success. Several deadlines came and went. New points of major conflict emerged to join agriculture: services, market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation of a new institution. Differences between the United States and European Union became central to hopes for a final, successful conclusion.
In November 1992, the US and EU settled most of their differences on agriculture in a deal known informally as the “Blair House accord”. By July 1993 the “Quad” (US, EU, Japan and Canada) announced significant progress in negotiations on tariffs and related subjects (“market access”). It took until 15 December 1993 for every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and services to be concluded (although some final touches were completed in talks on market access a few weeks later). On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.
The delay had some merits. It allowed some negotiations to progress further than would have been possible in 1990: for example some aspects of services and intellectual property, and the creation of the WTO itself. But the task had been immense, and negotiation-fatigue was felt in trade bureaucracies around the world. The difficulty of reaching agreement on a complete package containing almost the entire range of current trade issues led some to conclude that a negotiation on this scale would never again be possible. Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new negotiations on a number of topics. And by 1996, some countries were openly calling for a new round early in the next century. The response was mixed; but the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to reopen negotiations on agriculture and services at the turn of the century. These began in early 2000 and were incorporated into the Doha Development Agenda in late 2001.
What happened to GATT? back to top
The WTO replaced GATT as an international organization, but the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Trade lawyers distinguish between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994. Confusing? For most of us, it’s enough to refer simply to “GATT”.
The post-Uruguay Round built-in agenda back to top
Many of the Uruguay Round agreements set timetables for future work. Part of this “built-in agenda” started almost immediately. In some areas, it included new or further negotiations. In other areas, it included assessments or reviews of the situation at specified times. Some negotiations were quickly completed, notably in basic telecommunications, financial services. (Member governments also swiftly agreed a deal for freer trade in information technology products, an issue outside the “built-in agenda”.)
The agenda originally built into the Uruguay Round agreements has seen additions and modifications. A number of items are now part of the Doha Agenda, some of them updated.
There were well over 30 items in the original built-in agenda. This is a selection of highlights:
1996
* Maritime services: market access negotiations to end (30 June 1996, suspended to 2000, now part of Doha Development Agenda)
* Services and environment: deadline for working party report (ministerial conference, December 1996)
* Government procurement of services: negotiations start
1997
* Basic telecoms: negotiations end (15 February)
* Financial services: negotiations end (30 December)
* Intellectual property, creating a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
1998
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
* Services (emergency safeguards): results of negotiations on emergency safeguards to take effect (by 1 January 1998, deadline now March 2004)
* Rules of origin: Work programme on harmonization of rules of origin to be completed (20 July 1998)
* Government procurement: further negotiations start, for improving rules and procedures (by end of 1998)
* Dispute settlement: full review of rules and procedures (to start by end of 1998)
1999
* Intellectual property: certain exceptions to patentability and protection of plant varieties: review starts
2000
* Agriculture: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Services: new round of negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Tariff bindings: review of definition of “principle supplier” having negotiating rights under GATT Art 28 on modifying bindings
* Intellectual property: first of two-yearly reviews of the implementation of the agreement
2002
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
2005
* Textiles and clothing: full integration into GATT and agreement expires 1 January
At times it seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system since GATT was created at the end of the Second World War. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay Round did see some early results. Within only two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in import duties on tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They had also revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures implemented on the spot. And they called for regular reports on GATT members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade regimes transparent around the world.
A round to end all rounds? back to top
The seeds of the Uruguay Round were sown in November 1982 at a ministerial meeting of GATT members in Geneva. Although the ministers intended to launch a major new negotiation, the conference stalled on agriculture and was widely regarded as a failure. In fact, the work programme that the ministers agreed formed the basis for what was to become the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda.
Nevertheless, it took four more years of exploring, clarifying issues and painstaking consensus-building, before ministers agreed to launch the new round. They did so in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. They eventually accepted a negotiating agenda that covered virtually every outstanding trade policy issue. The talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles. All the original GATT articles were up for review. It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed, and the ministers gave themselves four years to complete it.
Two years later, in December 1988, ministers met again in Montreal, Canada, for what was supposed to be an assessment of progress at the round’s half-way point. The purpose was to clarify the agenda for the remaining two years, but the talks ended in a deadlock that was not resolved until officials met more quietly in Geneva the following April.
Despite the difficulty, during the Montreal meeting, ministers did agree a package of early results. These included some concessions on market access for tropical products — aimed at assisting developing countries — as well as a streamlined dispute settlement system, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism which provided for the first comprehensive, systematic and regular reviews of national trade policies and practices of GATT members. The round was supposed to end when ministers met once more in Brussels, in December 1990. But they disagreed on how to reform agricultural trade and decided to extend the talks. The Uruguay Round entered its bleakest period.
Despite the poor political outlook, a considerable amount of technical work continued, leading to the first draft of a final legal agreement. This draft “Final Act” was compiled by the then GATT director-general, Arthur Dunkel, who chaired the negotiations at officials’ level. It was put on the table in Geneva in December 1991. The text fulfilled every part of the Punta del Este mandate, with one exception — it did not contain the participating countries’ lists of commitments for cutting import duties and opening their services markets. The draft became the basis for the final agreement.
Over the following two years, the negotiations lurched between impending failure, to predictions of imminent success. Several deadlines came and went. New points of major conflict emerged to join agriculture: services, market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation of a new institution. Differences between the United States and European Union became central to hopes for a final, successful conclusion.
In November 1992, the US and EU settled most of their differences on agriculture in a deal known informally as the “Blair House accord”. By July 1993 the “Quad” (US, EU, Japan and Canada) announced significant progress in negotiations on tariffs and related subjects (“market access”). It took until 15 December 1993 for every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and services to be concluded (although some final touches were completed in talks on market access a few weeks later). On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.
The delay had some merits. It allowed some negotiations to progress further than would have been possible in 1990: for example some aspects of services and intellectual property, and the creation of the WTO itself. But the task had been immense, and negotiation-fatigue was felt in trade bureaucracies around the world. The difficulty of reaching agreement on a complete package containing almost the entire range of current trade issues led some to conclude that a negotiation on this scale would never again be possible. Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new negotiations on a number of topics. And by 1996, some countries were openly calling for a new round early in the next century. The response was mixed; but the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to reopen negotiations on agriculture and services at the turn of the century. These began in early 2000 and were incorporated into the Doha Development Agenda in late 2001.
What happened to GATT? back to top
The WTO replaced GATT as an international organization, but the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Trade lawyers distinguish between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994. Confusing? For most of us, it’s enough to refer simply to “GATT”.
The post-Uruguay Round built-in agenda back to top
Many of the Uruguay Round agreements set timetables for future work. Part of this “built-in agenda” started almost immediately. In some areas, it included new or further negotiations. In other areas, it included assessments or reviews of the situation at specified times. Some negotiations were quickly completed, notably in basic telecommunications, financial services. (Member governments also swiftly agreed a deal for freer trade in information technology products, an issue outside the “built-in agenda”.)
The agenda originally built into the Uruguay Round agreements has seen additions and modifications. A number of items are now part of the Doha Agenda, some of them updated.
There were well over 30 items in the original built-in agenda. This is a selection of highlights:
1996
* Maritime services: market access negotiations to end (30 June 1996, suspended to 2000, now part of Doha Development Agenda)
* Services and environment: deadline for working party report (ministerial conference, December 1996)
* Government procurement of services: negotiations start
1997
* Basic telecoms: negotiations end (15 February)
* Financial services: negotiations end (30 December)
* Intellectual property, creating a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
1998
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
* Services (emergency safeguards): results of negotiations on emergency safeguards to take effect (by 1 January 1998, deadline now March 2004)
* Rules of origin: Work programme on harmonization of rules of origin to be completed (20 July 1998)
* Government procurement: further negotiations start, for improving rules and procedures (by end of 1998)
* Dispute settlement: full review of rules and procedures (to start by end of 1998)
1999
* Intellectual property: certain exceptions to patentability and protection of plant varieties: review starts
2000
* Agriculture: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Services: new round of negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
* Tariff bindings: review of definition of “principle supplier” having negotiating rights under GATT Art 28 on modifying bindings
* Intellectual property: first of two-yearly reviews of the implementation of the agreement
2002
* Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
2005
* Textiles and clothing: full integration into GATT and agreement expires 1 January
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS
Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc
Binding tariffs, and applying them equally to all trading partners (most-favoured-nation treatment, or MFN) are key to the smooth flow of trade in goods. The WTO agreements uphold the principles, but they also allow exceptions — in some circumstances. Three of these issues are:
actions taken against dumping (selling at an unfairly low price)
subsidies and special “countervailing” duties to offset the subsidies
emergency measures to limit imports temporarily, designed to “safeguard” domestic industries.
Anti-dumping actions
If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition? Opinions differ, but many governments take action against dumping in order to defend their domestic industries. The WTO agreement does not pass judgement. Its focus is on how governments can or cannot react to dumping — it disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the “Anti-Dumping Agreement”. (This focus only on the reaction to dumping contrasts with the approach of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.)
The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine (“material”) injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), and show that the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so.
GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners — typically anti-dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.
There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used, two alternatives are available — the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.
Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty.
Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless an investigation shows that ending the measure would lead to injury.
Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly small (defined as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible (i.e. if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product — although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports).
The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure.
Subsidies and countervailing measures
This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. It says a country can use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.
The agreement contains a definition of subsidy. It also introduces the concept of a “specific” subsidy — i.e. a subsidy available only to an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises, or group of industries in the country (or state, etc) that gives the subsidy. The disciplines set out in the agreement only apply to specific subsidies. They can be domestic or export subsidies.
The agreement defines two categories of subsidies: prohibited and actionable. It originally contained a third category: non-actionable subsidies. This category existed for five years, ending on 31 December 1999, and was not extended. The agreement applies to agricultural goods as well as industrial products, except when the subsidies are exempt under the Agriculture Agreement’s “peace clause”, due to expire at the end of 2003.
Prohibited subsidies: subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods. They are prohibited because they are specifically designed to distort international trade, and are therefore likely to hurt other countries’ trade. They can be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement procedure where they are handled under an accelerated timetable. If the dispute settlement procedure confirms that the subsidy is prohibited, it must be withdrawn immediately. Otherwise, the complaining country can take counter measures. If domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Actionable subsidies: in this category the complaining country has to show that the subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. Otherwise the subsidy is permitted. The agreement defines three types of damage they can cause. One country’s subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country. They can hurt rival exporters from another country when the two compete in third markets. And domestic subsidies in one country can hurt exporters trying to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market. If the Dispute Settlement Body rules that the subsidy does have an adverse effect, the subsidy must be withdrawn or its adverse effect must be removed. Again, if domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Some of the disciplines are similar to those of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Countervailing duty (the parallel of anti-dumping duty) can only be charged after the importing country has conducted a detailed investigation similar to that required for anti-dumping action. There are detailed rules for deciding whether a product is being subsidized (not always an easy calculation), criteria for determining whether imports of subsidized products are hurting (“causing injury to”) domestic industry, procedures for initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on the implementation and duration (normally five years) of countervailing measures. The subsidized exporter can also agree to raise its export prices as an alternative to its exports being charged countervailing duty.
Subsidies may play an important role in developing countries and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies. Other developing countries are given until 2003 to get rid of their export subsidies. Least-developed countries must eliminate import-substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies designed to help domestic production and avoid importing) by 2003 — for other developing countries the deadline was 2000. Developing countries also receive preferential treatment if their exports are subject to countervailing duty investigations. For transition economies, prohibited subsidies had to be phased out by 2002.
Safeguards: emergency protection from imports
A WTO member may restrict imports of a product temporarily (take “safeguard” actions) if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in imports. Here, the injury has to be serious. Safeguard measures were always available under GATT (Article 19). However, they were infrequently used, some governments preferring to protect their domestic industries through “grey area” measures — using bilateral negotiations outside GATT’s auspices, they persuaded exporting countries to restrain exports “voluntarily” or to agree to other means of sharing markets. Agreements of this kind were reached for a wide range of products: automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, for example.
The WTO agreement broke new ground. It prohibits “grey-area” measures, and it sets time limits (a “sunset clause”) on all safeguard actions. The agreement says members must not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side. The bilateral measures that were not modified to conform with the agreement were phased out at the end of 1998. Countries were allowed to keep one of these measures an extra year (until the end of 1999), but only the European Union — for restrictions on imports of cars from Japan — made use of this provision.
An import “surge” justifying safeguard action can be a real increase in imports (an absolute increase); or it can be an increase in the imports’ share of a shrinking market, even if the import quantity has not increased (relative increase).
Industries or companies may request safeguard action by their government. The WTO agreement sets out requirements for safeguard investigations by national authorities. The emphasis is on transparency and on following established rules and practices — avoiding arbitrary methods. The authorities conducting investigations have to announce publicly when hearings are to take place and provide other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence. The evidence must include arguments on whether a measure is in the public interest.
The agreement sets out criteria for assessing whether “serious injury” is being caused or threatened, and the factors which must be considered in determining the impact of imports on the domestic industry. When imposed, a safeguard measure should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to help the industry concerned to adjust. Where quantitative restrictions (quotas) are imposed, they normally should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
In principle, safeguard measures cannot be targeted at imports from a particular country. However, the agreement does describe how quotas can be allocated among supplying countries, including in the exceptional circumstance where imports from certain countries have increased disproportionately quickly. A safeguard measure should not last more than four years, although this can be extended up to eight years, subject to a determination by competent national authorities that the measure is needed and that there is evidence the industry is adjusting. Measures imposed for more than a year must be progressively liberalized.
When a country restricts imports in order to safeguard its domestic producers, in principle it must give something in return. The agreement says the exporting country (or exporting countries) can seek compensation through consultations. If no agreement is reached the exporting country can retaliate by taking equivalent action — for instance, it can raise tariffs on exports from the country that is enforcing the safeguard measure. In some circumstances, the exporting country has to wait for three years after the safeguard measure was introduced before it can retaliate in this way — i.e. if the measure conforms with the provisions of the agreement and if it is taken as a result of an increase in the quantity of imports from the exporting country.
To some extent developing countries’ exports are shielded from safeguard actions. An importing country can only apply a safeguard measure to a product from a developing country if the developing country is supplying more than 3% of the imports of that product, or if developing country members with less than 3% import share collectively account for more than 9% of total imports of the product concerned.
The WTO’s Safeguards Committee oversees the operation of the agreement and is responsible for the surveillance of members’ commitments. Governments have to report each phase of a safeguard investigation and related decision-making, and the committee reviews these reports.
dari : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies
Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc
Binding tariffs, and applying them equally to all trading partners (most-favoured-nation treatment, or MFN) are key to the smooth flow of trade in goods. The WTO agreements uphold the principles, but they also allow exceptions — in some circumstances. Three of these issues are:
actions taken against dumping (selling at an unfairly low price)
subsidies and special “countervailing” duties to offset the subsidies
emergency measures to limit imports temporarily, designed to “safeguard” domestic industries.
Anti-dumping actions
If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition? Opinions differ, but many governments take action against dumping in order to defend their domestic industries. The WTO agreement does not pass judgement. Its focus is on how governments can or cannot react to dumping — it disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the “Anti-Dumping Agreement”. (This focus only on the reaction to dumping contrasts with the approach of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.)
The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine (“material”) injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), and show that the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so.
GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners — typically anti-dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.
There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used, two alternatives are available — the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.
Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty.
Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless an investigation shows that ending the measure would lead to injury.
Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly small (defined as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible (i.e. if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product — although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports).
The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure.
Subsidies and countervailing measures
This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. It says a country can use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.
The agreement contains a definition of subsidy. It also introduces the concept of a “specific” subsidy — i.e. a subsidy available only to an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises, or group of industries in the country (or state, etc) that gives the subsidy. The disciplines set out in the agreement only apply to specific subsidies. They can be domestic or export subsidies.
The agreement defines two categories of subsidies: prohibited and actionable. It originally contained a third category: non-actionable subsidies. This category existed for five years, ending on 31 December 1999, and was not extended. The agreement applies to agricultural goods as well as industrial products, except when the subsidies are exempt under the Agriculture Agreement’s “peace clause”, due to expire at the end of 2003.
Prohibited subsidies: subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods. They are prohibited because they are specifically designed to distort international trade, and are therefore likely to hurt other countries’ trade. They can be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement procedure where they are handled under an accelerated timetable. If the dispute settlement procedure confirms that the subsidy is prohibited, it must be withdrawn immediately. Otherwise, the complaining country can take counter measures. If domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Actionable subsidies: in this category the complaining country has to show that the subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. Otherwise the subsidy is permitted. The agreement defines three types of damage they can cause. One country’s subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country. They can hurt rival exporters from another country when the two compete in third markets. And domestic subsidies in one country can hurt exporters trying to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market. If the Dispute Settlement Body rules that the subsidy does have an adverse effect, the subsidy must be withdrawn or its adverse effect must be removed. Again, if domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
Some of the disciplines are similar to those of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Countervailing duty (the parallel of anti-dumping duty) can only be charged after the importing country has conducted a detailed investigation similar to that required for anti-dumping action. There are detailed rules for deciding whether a product is being subsidized (not always an easy calculation), criteria for determining whether imports of subsidized products are hurting (“causing injury to”) domestic industry, procedures for initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on the implementation and duration (normally five years) of countervailing measures. The subsidized exporter can also agree to raise its export prices as an alternative to its exports being charged countervailing duty.
Subsidies may play an important role in developing countries and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies. Other developing countries are given until 2003 to get rid of their export subsidies. Least-developed countries must eliminate import-substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies designed to help domestic production and avoid importing) by 2003 — for other developing countries the deadline was 2000. Developing countries also receive preferential treatment if their exports are subject to countervailing duty investigations. For transition economies, prohibited subsidies had to be phased out by 2002.
Safeguards: emergency protection from imports
A WTO member may restrict imports of a product temporarily (take “safeguard” actions) if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in imports. Here, the injury has to be serious. Safeguard measures were always available under GATT (Article 19). However, they were infrequently used, some governments preferring to protect their domestic industries through “grey area” measures — using bilateral negotiations outside GATT’s auspices, they persuaded exporting countries to restrain exports “voluntarily” or to agree to other means of sharing markets. Agreements of this kind were reached for a wide range of products: automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, for example.
The WTO agreement broke new ground. It prohibits “grey-area” measures, and it sets time limits (a “sunset clause”) on all safeguard actions. The agreement says members must not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side. The bilateral measures that were not modified to conform with the agreement were phased out at the end of 1998. Countries were allowed to keep one of these measures an extra year (until the end of 1999), but only the European Union — for restrictions on imports of cars from Japan — made use of this provision.
An import “surge” justifying safeguard action can be a real increase in imports (an absolute increase); or it can be an increase in the imports’ share of a shrinking market, even if the import quantity has not increased (relative increase).
Industries or companies may request safeguard action by their government. The WTO agreement sets out requirements for safeguard investigations by national authorities. The emphasis is on transparency and on following established rules and practices — avoiding arbitrary methods. The authorities conducting investigations have to announce publicly when hearings are to take place and provide other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence. The evidence must include arguments on whether a measure is in the public interest.
The agreement sets out criteria for assessing whether “serious injury” is being caused or threatened, and the factors which must be considered in determining the impact of imports on the domestic industry. When imposed, a safeguard measure should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to help the industry concerned to adjust. Where quantitative restrictions (quotas) are imposed, they normally should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
In principle, safeguard measures cannot be targeted at imports from a particular country. However, the agreement does describe how quotas can be allocated among supplying countries, including in the exceptional circumstance where imports from certain countries have increased disproportionately quickly. A safeguard measure should not last more than four years, although this can be extended up to eight years, subject to a determination by competent national authorities that the measure is needed and that there is evidence the industry is adjusting. Measures imposed for more than a year must be progressively liberalized.
When a country restricts imports in order to safeguard its domestic producers, in principle it must give something in return. The agreement says the exporting country (or exporting countries) can seek compensation through consultations. If no agreement is reached the exporting country can retaliate by taking equivalent action — for instance, it can raise tariffs on exports from the country that is enforcing the safeguard measure. In some circumstances, the exporting country has to wait for three years after the safeguard measure was introduced before it can retaliate in this way — i.e. if the measure conforms with the provisions of the agreement and if it is taken as a result of an increase in the quantity of imports from the exporting country.
To some extent developing countries’ exports are shielded from safeguard actions. An importing country can only apply a safeguard measure to a product from a developing country if the developing country is supplying more than 3% of the imports of that product, or if developing country members with less than 3% import share collectively account for more than 9% of total imports of the product concerned.
The WTO’s Safeguards Committee oversees the operation of the agreement and is responsible for the surveillance of members’ commitments. Governments have to report each phase of a safeguard investigation and related decision-making, and the committee reviews these reports.
dari : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies
ANTI-DUMPING: AGREEMENT, on implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994
ANTI-DUMPING: AGREEMENT
Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(The Anti-dumping Agreement)
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “AD Agreement”) governs the application of anti-dumping measures by Members of the WTO. Anti-dumping measures are unilateral remedies which may be applied by a Member after an investigation and determination by that Member, in accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that an imported product is “dumped” and that the dumped imports are causing material injury to a domestic industry producing the like product.
The AD Agreement sets forth certain substantive requirements that must be fulfilled in order to impose an anti-dumping measure, as well as detailed procedural requirements regarding the conduct of anti-dumping investigations and the imposition and maintenance in place of anti-dumping measures. A failure to respect either the substantive or procedural requirements can be taken to dispute settlement and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure. Unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the AD Agreement does not establish any disciplines on dumping itself, primarily because dumping is a pricing practice engaged in by business enterprises, and thus not within the direct reach of multilateral disciplines.
Substantive rules back to top
Article 1 of the AD Agreement establishes the basic principle that a Member may not impose an anti-dumping measure unless it determines, pursuant to an investigation conducted in conformity with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that there are dumped imports, material injury to a domestic industry, and a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury.
Determination of dumping
Article 2 contains substantive rules for the determination of dumping. Dumping is calculated on the basis of a “fair comparison” between normal value (the price of the imported product in the “ordinary course of trade” in the country of origin or export) and export price (the price of the product in the country of import). Article 2 contains detailed provisions governing the calculation of normal value and export price, and elements of the fair comparison that must be made.
Determination of injury
Article 3 of the AD Agreement contains rules regarding the determination of material injury caused by dumped imports. Material injury is defined as material injury itself, threat of material injury, or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. The basic requirement for determinations of injury, is that there be an objective examination, based on positive evidence of the volume and price effects of dumped imports and the consequent impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. Article 3 contains specific rules regarding factors to be considered in making determinations of material injury, while specifying that no one or several of the factors which must be considered is determinative. Article 3.5 requires, in establishing the causal link between dumped imports and material injury, known factors other than dumped imports which may be causing injury must be examined, and that injury caused by these factors must not be attributed to dumped imports.
A significant new provision, Article 3.3, establishes the conditions in which a cumulative evaluation of the effects of dumped imports from more than one country may be undertaken. Under the rules, authorities must determine that the margin of dumping from each country is not de minimis, that the volume of imports from each country is not negligible, and that a cumulative assessment is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition among the imports and between the imports and the domestic like product.
Definition of industry
Article 4 of the AD Agreement sets forth a definition of the domestic industry to be considered for purposes of assessing injury and causation. The domestic industry is defined as producers of a “like product”, which term is defined in Article 2.6 as a product that is identical to, or in the absence of such a product, one that has characteristics closely resembling those of, the imported dumped product under consideration. Article 4 contains special rules for defining a “regional” domestic industry in exceptional circumstances where production and consumption in the importing country are geographically isolated, and for the evaluation of injury and assessment of duties in such cases. Article 4 also establishes that domestic producers may be excluded from consideration as part of the domestic industry if they are “related” (defined as a situation of legal or effective control) to exporters or importers of the dumped product.
Procedural requirements back to top
Overview
A principal objective of the procedural requirements of the AD Agreement is to ensure transparency of proceedings, a full opportunity for parties to defend their interests, and adequate explanations by investigating authorities of their determinations. The extensive and detailed procedural requirements relating to investigations focus on the sufficiency of petitions (through minimum information and “standing” requirements) to ensure that meritless investigations are not initiated, on the establishment of time periods for the completion of investigations, and on the provision of access to information to all interested parties, along with reasonable opportunities to present their views and arguments. Additional procedural requirements relate to the offering, acceptance, and administration of price undertakings by exporters in lieu of the imposition of anti-dumping measures. The AD Agreement requires investigating authorities to give public notice of and explain their determinations at various stages of the investigative process in substantial detail. It also establishes rules for the timing of the imposition of anti-dumping duties, the duration of such duties, and obliges Members to periodically review the continuing need for anti-dumping duties and price undertakings. There are detailed provisions guiding the imposition and collection of duties under various duty assessment systems, intended to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, and that individual exporters are not subjected to anti-dumping duties in excess of their individual margin of dumping. Article 13 of the AD Agreement requires Members to provide for judicial review of final determinations in anti-dumping investigations and reviews. Other provisions establish that Members may, at their discretion, take anti-dumping actions on behalf of and at the request of a third country, and recognise that “special regard” must be given by developed country Members to the situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping duties.
Specific Provisions
Initiation and conduct of investigations
Article 5 establishes the requirements for the initiation of investigations. The AD Agreement specifies that investigations should generally be initiated based on a written request submitted “by or on behalf of” a domestic industry. This “standing” requirement is supported by numeric limits for determining whether there is sufficient support by domestic producers to conclude that the request is made by or on behalf of the domestic industry, and thereby warrants initiation. The AD Agreement establishes requirements for evidence of dumping, injury, and causality, as well as other information regarding the product, industry, importers, exporters, and other matters, in written applications for anti-dumping relief, and specifies that, in special circumstances when authorities initiate without a written application from a domestic industry, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causality. In order to ensure that meritless investigations are not continued, potentially disrupting legitimate trade, Article 5.8 provides for immediate termination of investigations in the event the volume of imports is negligible or the margin of dumping is de minimis, and establishes numeric thresholds for these determinations. In order to minimize the trade disruptive effect of investigations, Article 5.10 specifies that investigations shall be completed within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after initiation.
Article 6 sets forth detailed rules on the process of investigation, including the collection of evidence and the use of sampling techniques. It requires authorities to guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive information and verify the information on which determinations are based. In addition, to ensure the transparency of proceedings, authorities are required to disclose the information on which determinations are to be based to interested parties and provide them with adequate opportunity to comment, and establishes the rights of parties to participate in the investigation, including the right to meet with parties with adverse interests, for instance in a public hearing.
Imposition of provisional measures
Article 7 relates to the imposition of provisional measures. Article 7 includes the requirement that authorities make a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality before applying provisional measures, and the requirement that no provisional measures may be applied sooner than 60 days after initiation of an investigation.
Price undertakings
Article 8 establishes the principle that undertakings to revise prices or cease exports at dumped prices may be entered into to settle an investigation, but only after a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality has been made. It also establishes that undertakings are voluntary on the part of both exporters and investigating authorities. In addition, an exporter may request that the investigation be continued after an undertaking has been accepted, and if a final determination of no dumping, no injury, or no causality results, the undertaking shall automatically lapse.
Imposition and collection of duties
Article 9 establishes the general principle that imposition of anti-dumping duties is optional, even if all the requirements for imposition have been met, and establishes the desirability of application a “lesser duty” rule. Under a lesser duty rule, authorities impose duties at a level lower than the margin of dumping but adequate to remove injury. Article 9.3 establishes that anti-dumping duties may not exceed the dumping margin calculated during the investigation. In order to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, Article 9.3 requires procedures for determination of the actual amount of duty owed, or refund of excess duties paid, depending on the duty assessment system of a Member, normally within 12 months of a request, and in no case more than 18 months. Article 9.4 establishes rules for calculating the amount of duties to be imposed on exporters not individually examined during the investigation. Article 9.5 provides for expedited reviews to calculate individual margins of dumping for exporters or producers newly entering the market of the importing Member.
Article 10 establishes the general principle that both provisional and final anti-dumping duties may be applied only as of the date on which the determinations of dumping, injury, and causality have been made. However, recognizing that injury may have occurred during the period of investigation, or that exporters may have taken actions to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, Article 10 contains rules for the retroactive imposition of dumping duties in specified circumstances. If the imposition of anti-dumping duties is based on a finding of material injury, as opposed to threat of material injury or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry, anti-dumping duties may be collected as of the date provisional measures were imposed. If provisional duties were collected in an amount greater than the amount of the final duty, or if the imposition of duties is based on a finding of threat of material injury or material retardation, a refund of provisional duties is required. Article 10.6 provides for retroactive application of final duties to a date not more than 90 days prior to the application of provisional measures in certain exceptional circumstances involving a history of dumping, massive dumped imports, and potential undermining of the remedial effects of the final duty.
Duration, termination, and review of anti-dumping measures
Article 11 establishes rules for the duration of anti-dumping duties, and requirements for periodic review of the continuing need, if any, for the imposition of anti-dumping duties or price undertakings. These requirements respond to the concern raised by the practice of some countries of leaving anti-dumping duties in place indefinitely. The “sunset” requirement establishes that dumping duties shall normally terminate no later than five years after first being applied, unless a review investigation prior to that date establishes that expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. This five year “sunset” provision also applies to price undertakings. The AD Agreement requires authorities to review the need for the continued imposition of a duty upon request of an interested party.
Public notice
Article 12 sets forth detailed requirements for public notice by investigating authorities of the initiation of investigations, preliminary and final determinations, and undertakings. The public notice must disclose non-confidential information concerning the parties, the product, the margins of dumping, the facts revealed during the investigation, and the reasons for the determinations made by the authorities, including the reasons for accepting and rejecting relevant arguments or claims made by exporters or importers. These public notice requirements are intended to increase the transparency of determinations, with the hope that this will increase the extent to which determinations are based on fact and solid reasoning.
The committee and dispute settlement back to top
Article 16 establishes the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, and sets forth requirements for Members to notify without delay all preliminary and final actions taken in anti-dumping investigations, and notify semi-annually all actions taken during the relevant reporting period.
Article 17 establishes that the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to disputes under the AD Agreement. However, Article 17.6 establishes a special standard of review to be applied by panels in examining disputes in anti-dumping cases with regard both to matters of fact and questions of interpretation of the Agreement. This standard gives a degree of deference to the factual decisions and legal interpretations of national authorities, and is intended to prevent dispute settlement panels from making decisions based purely on their own views. A Ministerial Decision, which is not part of the AD Agreement, regarding this provision establishes that its operation will be reviewed after three years with a view to consideration whether it is capable of general application.
Final provisions back to top
Article 18.3 establishes the effective date of the AD Agreement, providing that it is applicable to investigations and reviews of existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the entry into force of the AD Agreement. Article 18.4 requires Members to bring their laws into conformity with the AD Agreement by the date of entry into force of the AD Agreement. Under Article 18.5, Members are required to notify their anti-dumping laws and regulations to the Committee.
Annex I to the AD Agreement establishes procedures for “on-the-spot” investigations, which are generally undertaken in the territory of an exporting Member to verify information provided by foreign producers or exporters. Annex II to the AD Agreement sets forth provisions on the use of “best information available” in investigations, specifying the conditions under which investigating authorities may rely on information from a source other than the person concerned.
The Ministerial Decision on Anti-Circumvention, which is not part of the AD Agreement, noted that the negotiators had been unable to agree on a specific text dealing with the problem of anti-circumvention, recognized the desirability of applying uniform rules in this area as soon as possible, and referred the matter to the Committee for resolution. The Committee has established an Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, which is open to participation by all Members, to carry out the task assigned by the Ministers.
contact us : World Trade Organization, rue de Lausanne 154, CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland
Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(The Anti-dumping Agreement)
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “AD Agreement”) governs the application of anti-dumping measures by Members of the WTO. Anti-dumping measures are unilateral remedies which may be applied by a Member after an investigation and determination by that Member, in accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that an imported product is “dumped” and that the dumped imports are causing material injury to a domestic industry producing the like product.
The AD Agreement sets forth certain substantive requirements that must be fulfilled in order to impose an anti-dumping measure, as well as detailed procedural requirements regarding the conduct of anti-dumping investigations and the imposition and maintenance in place of anti-dumping measures. A failure to respect either the substantive or procedural requirements can be taken to dispute settlement and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure. Unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the AD Agreement does not establish any disciplines on dumping itself, primarily because dumping is a pricing practice engaged in by business enterprises, and thus not within the direct reach of multilateral disciplines.
Substantive rules back to top
Article 1 of the AD Agreement establishes the basic principle that a Member may not impose an anti-dumping measure unless it determines, pursuant to an investigation conducted in conformity with the provisions of the AD Agreement, that there are dumped imports, material injury to a domestic industry, and a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury.
Determination of dumping
Article 2 contains substantive rules for the determination of dumping. Dumping is calculated on the basis of a “fair comparison” between normal value (the price of the imported product in the “ordinary course of trade” in the country of origin or export) and export price (the price of the product in the country of import). Article 2 contains detailed provisions governing the calculation of normal value and export price, and elements of the fair comparison that must be made.
Determination of injury
Article 3 of the AD Agreement contains rules regarding the determination of material injury caused by dumped imports. Material injury is defined as material injury itself, threat of material injury, or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. The basic requirement for determinations of injury, is that there be an objective examination, based on positive evidence of the volume and price effects of dumped imports and the consequent impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. Article 3 contains specific rules regarding factors to be considered in making determinations of material injury, while specifying that no one or several of the factors which must be considered is determinative. Article 3.5 requires, in establishing the causal link between dumped imports and material injury, known factors other than dumped imports which may be causing injury must be examined, and that injury caused by these factors must not be attributed to dumped imports.
A significant new provision, Article 3.3, establishes the conditions in which a cumulative evaluation of the effects of dumped imports from more than one country may be undertaken. Under the rules, authorities must determine that the margin of dumping from each country is not de minimis, that the volume of imports from each country is not negligible, and that a cumulative assessment is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition among the imports and between the imports and the domestic like product.
Definition of industry
Article 4 of the AD Agreement sets forth a definition of the domestic industry to be considered for purposes of assessing injury and causation. The domestic industry is defined as producers of a “like product”, which term is defined in Article 2.6 as a product that is identical to, or in the absence of such a product, one that has characteristics closely resembling those of, the imported dumped product under consideration. Article 4 contains special rules for defining a “regional” domestic industry in exceptional circumstances where production and consumption in the importing country are geographically isolated, and for the evaluation of injury and assessment of duties in such cases. Article 4 also establishes that domestic producers may be excluded from consideration as part of the domestic industry if they are “related” (defined as a situation of legal or effective control) to exporters or importers of the dumped product.
Procedural requirements back to top
Overview
A principal objective of the procedural requirements of the AD Agreement is to ensure transparency of proceedings, a full opportunity for parties to defend their interests, and adequate explanations by investigating authorities of their determinations. The extensive and detailed procedural requirements relating to investigations focus on the sufficiency of petitions (through minimum information and “standing” requirements) to ensure that meritless investigations are not initiated, on the establishment of time periods for the completion of investigations, and on the provision of access to information to all interested parties, along with reasonable opportunities to present their views and arguments. Additional procedural requirements relate to the offering, acceptance, and administration of price undertakings by exporters in lieu of the imposition of anti-dumping measures. The AD Agreement requires investigating authorities to give public notice of and explain their determinations at various stages of the investigative process in substantial detail. It also establishes rules for the timing of the imposition of anti-dumping duties, the duration of such duties, and obliges Members to periodically review the continuing need for anti-dumping duties and price undertakings. There are detailed provisions guiding the imposition and collection of duties under various duty assessment systems, intended to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, and that individual exporters are not subjected to anti-dumping duties in excess of their individual margin of dumping. Article 13 of the AD Agreement requires Members to provide for judicial review of final determinations in anti-dumping investigations and reviews. Other provisions establish that Members may, at their discretion, take anti-dumping actions on behalf of and at the request of a third country, and recognise that “special regard” must be given by developed country Members to the situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping duties.
Specific Provisions
Initiation and conduct of investigations
Article 5 establishes the requirements for the initiation of investigations. The AD Agreement specifies that investigations should generally be initiated based on a written request submitted “by or on behalf of” a domestic industry. This “standing” requirement is supported by numeric limits for determining whether there is sufficient support by domestic producers to conclude that the request is made by or on behalf of the domestic industry, and thereby warrants initiation. The AD Agreement establishes requirements for evidence of dumping, injury, and causality, as well as other information regarding the product, industry, importers, exporters, and other matters, in written applications for anti-dumping relief, and specifies that, in special circumstances when authorities initiate without a written application from a domestic industry, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causality. In order to ensure that meritless investigations are not continued, potentially disrupting legitimate trade, Article 5.8 provides for immediate termination of investigations in the event the volume of imports is negligible or the margin of dumping is de minimis, and establishes numeric thresholds for these determinations. In order to minimize the trade disruptive effect of investigations, Article 5.10 specifies that investigations shall be completed within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after initiation.
Article 6 sets forth detailed rules on the process of investigation, including the collection of evidence and the use of sampling techniques. It requires authorities to guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive information and verify the information on which determinations are based. In addition, to ensure the transparency of proceedings, authorities are required to disclose the information on which determinations are to be based to interested parties and provide them with adequate opportunity to comment, and establishes the rights of parties to participate in the investigation, including the right to meet with parties with adverse interests, for instance in a public hearing.
Imposition of provisional measures
Article 7 relates to the imposition of provisional measures. Article 7 includes the requirement that authorities make a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality before applying provisional measures, and the requirement that no provisional measures may be applied sooner than 60 days after initiation of an investigation.
Price undertakings
Article 8 establishes the principle that undertakings to revise prices or cease exports at dumped prices may be entered into to settle an investigation, but only after a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality has been made. It also establishes that undertakings are voluntary on the part of both exporters and investigating authorities. In addition, an exporter may request that the investigation be continued after an undertaking has been accepted, and if a final determination of no dumping, no injury, or no causality results, the undertaking shall automatically lapse.
Imposition and collection of duties
Article 9 establishes the general principle that imposition of anti-dumping duties is optional, even if all the requirements for imposition have been met, and establishes the desirability of application a “lesser duty” rule. Under a lesser duty rule, authorities impose duties at a level lower than the margin of dumping but adequate to remove injury. Article 9.3 establishes that anti-dumping duties may not exceed the dumping margin calculated during the investigation. In order to ensure that anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected, Article 9.3 requires procedures for determination of the actual amount of duty owed, or refund of excess duties paid, depending on the duty assessment system of a Member, normally within 12 months of a request, and in no case more than 18 months. Article 9.4 establishes rules for calculating the amount of duties to be imposed on exporters not individually examined during the investigation. Article 9.5 provides for expedited reviews to calculate individual margins of dumping for exporters or producers newly entering the market of the importing Member.
Article 10 establishes the general principle that both provisional and final anti-dumping duties may be applied only as of the date on which the determinations of dumping, injury, and causality have been made. However, recognizing that injury may have occurred during the period of investigation, or that exporters may have taken actions to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, Article 10 contains rules for the retroactive imposition of dumping duties in specified circumstances. If the imposition of anti-dumping duties is based on a finding of material injury, as opposed to threat of material injury or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry, anti-dumping duties may be collected as of the date provisional measures were imposed. If provisional duties were collected in an amount greater than the amount of the final duty, or if the imposition of duties is based on a finding of threat of material injury or material retardation, a refund of provisional duties is required. Article 10.6 provides for retroactive application of final duties to a date not more than 90 days prior to the application of provisional measures in certain exceptional circumstances involving a history of dumping, massive dumped imports, and potential undermining of the remedial effects of the final duty.
Duration, termination, and review of anti-dumping measures
Article 11 establishes rules for the duration of anti-dumping duties, and requirements for periodic review of the continuing need, if any, for the imposition of anti-dumping duties or price undertakings. These requirements respond to the concern raised by the practice of some countries of leaving anti-dumping duties in place indefinitely. The “sunset” requirement establishes that dumping duties shall normally terminate no later than five years after first being applied, unless a review investigation prior to that date establishes that expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. This five year “sunset” provision also applies to price undertakings. The AD Agreement requires authorities to review the need for the continued imposition of a duty upon request of an interested party.
Public notice
Article 12 sets forth detailed requirements for public notice by investigating authorities of the initiation of investigations, preliminary and final determinations, and undertakings. The public notice must disclose non-confidential information concerning the parties, the product, the margins of dumping, the facts revealed during the investigation, and the reasons for the determinations made by the authorities, including the reasons for accepting and rejecting relevant arguments or claims made by exporters or importers. These public notice requirements are intended to increase the transparency of determinations, with the hope that this will increase the extent to which determinations are based on fact and solid reasoning.
The committee and dispute settlement back to top
Article 16 establishes the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, and sets forth requirements for Members to notify without delay all preliminary and final actions taken in anti-dumping investigations, and notify semi-annually all actions taken during the relevant reporting period.
Article 17 establishes that the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to disputes under the AD Agreement. However, Article 17.6 establishes a special standard of review to be applied by panels in examining disputes in anti-dumping cases with regard both to matters of fact and questions of interpretation of the Agreement. This standard gives a degree of deference to the factual decisions and legal interpretations of national authorities, and is intended to prevent dispute settlement panels from making decisions based purely on their own views. A Ministerial Decision, which is not part of the AD Agreement, regarding this provision establishes that its operation will be reviewed after three years with a view to consideration whether it is capable of general application.
Final provisions back to top
Article 18.3 establishes the effective date of the AD Agreement, providing that it is applicable to investigations and reviews of existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the entry into force of the AD Agreement. Article 18.4 requires Members to bring their laws into conformity with the AD Agreement by the date of entry into force of the AD Agreement. Under Article 18.5, Members are required to notify their anti-dumping laws and regulations to the Committee.
Annex I to the AD Agreement establishes procedures for “on-the-spot” investigations, which are generally undertaken in the territory of an exporting Member to verify information provided by foreign producers or exporters. Annex II to the AD Agreement sets forth provisions on the use of “best information available” in investigations, specifying the conditions under which investigating authorities may rely on information from a source other than the person concerned.
The Ministerial Decision on Anti-Circumvention, which is not part of the AD Agreement, noted that the negotiators had been unable to agree on a specific text dealing with the problem of anti-circumvention, recognized the desirability of applying uniform rules in this area as soon as possible, and referred the matter to the Committee for resolution. The Committee has established an Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, which is open to participation by all Members, to carry out the task assigned by the Ministers.
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